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Abstract 
Amateurism acted as the guiding principle for the many sporting clubs and governing bodies that were 
created and developed by the late Victorian middle-classes. While some forms of coaching and training 
were tolerated, many organisations, such as the Amateur Rowing Association, expressed a preference for 
amateur honorary coaches rather than professionals. Through the use of archival material, oral history 
interviews, and ongoing case studies in athletics and swimming, this thesis traces the trajectory of the less 
than harmonious relationship between amateurism and professional coaching in Britain throughout the 
twentieth century. In the pre and interwar period, a number of proposals for coaching schemes emerged, 
especially after poor Olympic performances, but continuing resistance within the amateur establishment 
meant that these initiatives were uncoordinated and experienced short life-spans. Even in the post-war 
period, characterised by an increasing number of centralised coaching schemes and the appointment of 
national coaches, amateur officials sought to maintain strict control over their appointments. A reluctance to 
accept advice from professional coaches, coupled with a struggling economy and a government 
determined to remain distant from sport, contributed to a further decline in international sporting 
performance. British athletes had long proved unable to compete with the Americans and the emergence of 
another sporting superpower at the 1952 Olympics, the Soviet Union, finally prompted a number of 
responses, including the 1960 Wolfenden Report. The government subsequently took a more active role in 
sport, resulting in an inevitable shift towards greater specialisation as centralised funding became 
inextricably linked with targets and results. Although this encouraged a more widespread utilisation of 
professional coaches and improved the integration of sports science, the ethos of amateurism proved far-
reaching, even at elite levels. The evidence suggests that, while it is no longer considered a guiding 
principle, its legacy continues to impact on the working lives of many British coaches. 
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Introduction 
At the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing, the British team successfully achieved a total of forty-seven 
medals, of which nineteen were gold. However, previous British performances at the Olympics have not 
always been so successful. Despite competing in every Games since its inception in 1896 this was the 
highest medal tally ever achieved, apart from that of the 1908 London Games. This result was not a lucky 
coincidence; it was achieved through a carefully planned and well-resourced professional system which 
integrated several different aspects of athlete development. Sports science and medicine, intensive training 
centres, full-time professional coaches and greater funding availability for athletes all created an 
environment which allowed full time training and preparation using the best facilities. However, this shift 
towards a more specialised system of British sport could be considered a fairly recent development, which 
might explain why Britain, unlike some other countries, has previously struggled to achieve results on the 
international scene.  
This thesis examines the trajectory of amateurism and how this influenced the development of 
coaching and training techniques in British swimming and athletics during the twentieth century. Specific 
focus has been placed on the Olympic Games and how poor British performances may have encouraged a 
greater incorporation of coaching through the adoption of nationalised schemes. While a limited amount of 
coaching was generally tolerated, there always appeared to be a preference for amateur or honorary 
coaches rather than the utilisation of professionals because of the strict adherence to amateurism and 
volunteerism. Even in those sports where some professionals were appointed, amateur administrators 
remained wary of their intentions and as such, sought to control them by imposing a master-servant 
relationship, thus ensuring that professional coaches never gained authority within the National Governing 
Bodies (NGB). Particularly in the post-war period, the number of professional coaches in certain NGBs rose 
dramatically, but whereas other countries would have utilised these coaches to train and improve the 
standard of their elite athletes, the primary duties of the British coaches was to educate a contingent of 
honorary coaches and trainers so that they could then pass on their knowledge to amateur participants. 
There was a residual underlying disquiet regarding professional coaches and this appeared to stem from a 
belief that they were in some way not suitable for amateur sport. The fact that they wished to receive 
payment for the improvement of athletes did not sit well with many of the amateur officials. In some ways, 
this mind-set was to be expected especially when consideration is given to the principles on which many of 
the NGBs had been forged. Richard Holt, Tony Mason, John Lowerson and Martin Polley all suggest that 
British sport grew and developed under the auspices of amateurism and as such, it was inevitable that 
these principles would underpin the approaches taken by the emerging sporting bodies.1 However, as this 
                                                     
1 Richard Holt, Sport and the British: A Modern History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Richard Holt and Tony Mason, Sport in 
Britain, 1945-2000 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2000); Tony Mason, ed., Sport in Britain: A Social History (Cambridge: 
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research progressed it became increasingly apparent that the impact of the amateur ethos went much 
deeper than has been previously suggested. Its unfaltering life-span and influence appeared to gain further 
impetus as various aspects of sports science began to impact in the latter half of the twentieth century. This 
appeared to create a renewed uncertainty regarding issues of professionalism in British sport and led to 
resistance towards the incorporation of scientific methods, reflecting the controlling influence that 
amateurism continued to have over British sport. Utilising a range of primary and secondary sources it is the 
intention of this thesis to demonstrate how amateurism has influenced coaching developments and to 
argue, that despite the fact that amateurism is no longer considered the guiding principle, its legacy can still 
be seen in certain aspects of British sport. 
Even though there is a plethora of literature available on individual aspects of this research, for 
example, work by Peter Lovesey, Martin Polley, Thierry Terret, Christopher Love, Ian Keil and Don Wix has 
focused on the development of British athletics and swimming and while the progression and development 
of sports science and medicine in British sport has been examined by Vanessa Heggie, for the most part 
such work is more generalised and does not specially focus on the interaction of these different areas under 
the notion of amateurism.2 In addition, despite the analysis of coaching traditions in both swimming and 
athletics receiving more attention in recent years, particularly through the work of Dave Day and Neil Carter, 
published material with a specific focus on British coaching remains limited.3 This research was designed to 
address this oversight by collecting and combining oral history testimonies and detailed archival evidence in 
order to develop a thematic and contextualised account of the progression of amateurism and its 
relationships with coaching and training techniques in twentieth-century Britain. The placing of this material 
within the wider context of British culture and sport helps to produce a unique perspective on a previously 
under researched area.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Lowerson, Sport and the English Middle Classes, 1870-1914 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1995); Martin Polley, Moving the Goalposts: A History of Sport and Society in Britain since 1945 (Oxon: 
Routledge, 1998). 
2 Peter Lovesey, The Official Centenary History of the Amateur Athletic Association (Enfield: Guinness Superlatives, 1979); 
Martin Polley, ‘“The Amateur Rules”: Amateurism and Professionalism in Post-War British Athletics’, Contemporary British 
History 14, no. 2 (2000): 81-114; Thierry Terret, ‘Professional Swimming in England before the Rise of Amateurism, 1837-75’, 
The International Journal of the History of Sport 12, no. 1 (1995): 18-32; Ian Keil and Don Wix, In the Swim: The Amateur 
Swimming Association from 1869 to 1994 (Loughborough: Swimming Times, 1996); Christopher Love, ‘Social Class and the 
Swimming World: Amateurs and Professionals’, The International Journal of the History of Sport 24, no. 5 (2007): 603-19; 
Vanessa Heggie, A History of British Sports Medicine (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011). 
3 Dave Day, ‘From Barclay to Brickett: Coaching Practices and Coaching Lives in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century 
England’ (PhD diss., DeMontfort University, 2008); Dave Day, ‘Craft Coaching and the “Discerning Eye” of the Coach’, 
International Journal of Sports Science and Coaching 6, no. 1 (2011): 179-96; Neil Carter, ‘From Knox to Dyson: Coaching, 
Amateurism and British Athletics, 1912-1947’, Sport in History 30, no. 1 (2010): 55-81; Dave Day, Neil Carter and Tegan 
Carpenter, ‘The Olympics, Amateurism and Britain’s Coaching Heritage’, International Journal of Heritage Studies IFirst article 
(2012): 1-14. 
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Themes 
To achieve these aims, this thesis is centred on a number of different themes including the Olympic 
Games, coaching, oral history and amateurism and these will be explored in depth in the following section. 
 
Olympic Games 
The Olympic Games were chosen as a means to monitor the progression, the impact of the nascent 
coaching schemes and demonstrate how poor performances by British athletes potentially offered further 
impetus for continued improvement. By selecting the Olympics for analysis it was also possible to discuss 
the development of British sport and coaching techniques within an international framework. This also 
allowed for a comparison between British and foreign training methods and an analysis of their influence on 
the British sporting system. Throughout the thesis it will be noted that specific focus has been placed on 
certain Olympic Games rather than analysing each one in chronological order. The reasoning for this 
emerged from the ongoing analysis and a realisation that while a discussion of each individual Games may 
have been possible, it seemed unnecessary to include them if they added no extra value to the overall 
thesis. Consequently, the Games that have been selected and included throughout the thesis are the ones 
that were deemed most appropriate in terms of British coaching developments and advances.  
Although the World Championships offered an alternative avenue for investigation, the Olympic 
Games were considered particularly appropriate for this work, because not only are they a more 
established event (the World Championships for swimming and athletics did not begin until 1973 and 1983, 
respectively), but the ranking of nations is more visible, and they also occur on a four yearly basis, unlike 
the World Championships which occur every two. Monitoring the impact of coaching schemes on a four 
year basis ensured that the developments had sufficient time to become established and demonstrate 
some progress. Also, it needs to be considered, particularly from the perspective of the athlete, that the 
Olympic Games are normally perceived as the highlight of their athletic career and that greater emphasis is 
placed on preparing for them. As Dave Collins, a sport psychologist and Director of British Athletics from 
2005-2008, emphasised when interviewed by the author in ‘the vast majority of sports that I have ever 
worked in, an Olympic medal is the pinnacle, that’s the business.’4 
 
Coaching - Athletics and Swimming 
Two sports, athletics and swimming, were selected for comprehensive analysis predominately because of 
their ongoing popularity and their prominent presence at the Games since the birth of the modern Olympic 
movement in 1896. Athletics in particular has always been considered a major event of the Olympics. For 
                                                     
4 Dave Collins, interview by author, February 17, 2011, Crewe, Cheshire. 
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example, in 1908, some countries, the United States of America (USA) in particular, measured their overall 
success at the Games based solely on the outcome of the athletics events. In addition, by restricting the 
research to only two sports it was possible to provide a much more detailed analysis than would have been 
possible if a broader spectrum had been attempted. 
These two sports were also considered the most appropriate because their relevant NGBs, the 
Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) and the Amateur Swimming Association (ASA), have consistently 
incorporated some degree of coaching and training during the course of the twentieth century. Although 
somewhat reluctantly at times, both athletics and swimming engaged with various incarnations of 
centralised coaching schemes and therefore it was possible to trace their activities and involvement by 
accessing official documents from a number of different sources. Information regarding the progress and 
development of these coaching schemes is intertwined within short case studies throughout the thesis in an 
attempt to show their evolution in relation to the context of British society and sport. It will be recognised 
that these case studies are predominately focused on the working class men who were appointed within 
the NGBs coaching positions. While there are isolated cases of women working within this environment, as 
is demonstrated within this thesis, it was essentially a male endeavour. Women may have been appointed 
in teaching roles that were not directly connected to the NGBs but as the focus of this research was 
specifically on individuals that were associated with the coaching schemes and were appointed as a result 
of centralised grant money, it was deemed inappropriate to include them. 
Throughout the thesis intricate details regarding the discussions and communications between the 
NGBs and the particular grant awarding bodies are presented because the ways in which the debates 
unfold, signify the very ‘amateur’ nature of the administration of British sport. The evidence presented 
demonstrates, that although money and support was available for the NGBs to progress, particularly with 
regards to coaching, because they remained guarded about their autonomy and the level of control they 
had over their professional coaches, they often did not fully embrace these opportunities and in some 
instances rejected them completely. Archival material was gathered from both the ASA and AAA, and while 
this offered in-depth detail about the internal workings of the organisations it was not possible to gain the 
entire perspective from association documents because as Martin Polley highlights, ‘an organisation’s 
minutes and reports are created within that organisation...and they will embody its traditions, concerns, 
ideologies and internal politics.’5 Consequently, because of their traditional positions on coaching and 
amateurism, which were closely aligned to the principle of volunteerism, professional coaches were often 
viewed with uncertainty by administrators and so information and issues relating to them was often 
disregarded. Therefore, although association documents have proved useful, they have been primarily 
                                                     
5 Martin Polley, Sports History: A Practical Guide (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 102. 
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used as a means of triangulation. Other archival material from the likes of the British Olympic Association, 
National Fitness Council, Ministry of Education and British Association of Sports and Medicine offered 
interpretation from different perspectives, which also allowed for a greater collaboration and synthesis of 
material. Furthermore, the use of newspapers, seminal texts, private family collections and oral history 
interviews has ensured a cross-examination of information across a number of different sources thus 
attempting to establish historical accuracy, although this is in itself something of a contestable statement. In 
general, this thesis lends itself towards what Alun Munslow refers to as, a reconstructionist or empirical 
perspective, but it also recognises that such work always involves a degree of interpretation.6 Douglas 
Booth suggests that both reconstructionism and constructionism are ‘evidence-based, objectivist-inspired 
models in which historians aspire to build accurate, independent and truthful reconstructions of the past’7 
and it is anticipated that the mixed method approach taken in this work will help to provide a ‘narrative 
truth.’8 
 
Oral History 
Oral history, ‘one of the best ways of getting truly original source material’, was used as one means to 
gather evidence for this study.9 It is an umbrella term used to describe various research methods in which 
memories and personal commentaries of historical significance are collected through the use of recorded 
interviews.10 There are four basic types of oral histories and these include life histories, topical histories, 
thematic studies and artefact specific research.11 As this research was specifically focused on the 
experiences of both coaches and sports science staff in a specific period of time, the use of topical oral 
histories was deemed the most appropriate because it focuses on ‘what, when, how, why, or with what 
consequence something happened’, or in other words, it uses a specific event or circumstance as the basis 
for historical documentation.12 This research focused on the experiences of individuals who were working in 
a similar scenario but as they were fulfilling different roles at various times it would have been impossible to 
have found a single individual with all the information required. By conducting a number of interviews with a 
variety of relevant individuals it was possible to collect alternative accounts and then piece together what 
they knew and experienced to present a collective analysis.13 In order to achieve this is was necessary to 
                                                     
6 Alun Munslow, Deconstructing History, 2nd ed. (Oxon: Routledge, 1996), 20-7; Alun Munslow, Narrative and History 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 10-5. 
7 Douglas Booth, The Field: Truth and Fiction in Sports History (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), 10. 
8 Ibid., 13-5; Munslow, Deconstructing History, 12. 
9 Polley, Sports History, 129. 
10 Donald A. Ritchie, Doing Oral History: A Practical Guide (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 19. 
11 Texas Historical Commission, Fundamentals of Oral History: Texas Preservation Guidelines (Texas: Texas Historical 
Commission, 2004), 2. 
12 Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data, 2nd ed. (California: Sage Publications 
Inc, 2005), 11. 
13 Ibid., 6. 
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actively seek appropriate individuals who each had relevant experiences and knowledge of the periods and 
environments being researched. Therefore, all the interviewees in this study were selected because of their 
previous or current involvement with coaching and/or sports science in British sport. The nine interviews 
conducted included a former Director of Coaching for UK athletics, a Technical Director of Scottish 
swimming, two athletics National Coaches, one National Technical Officer (NTO), two professional 
swimming coaches and two individuals who have worked in British sports science. Attempts were made to 
select persons who had been employed in the positions at different periods of times to ensure that an array 
of perspectives and interpretations were collected. Short biographies of all the included interviewees are 
listed in Appendix A. 
All interviews were conducted in accordance with the Oral History Association Principles and 
Standards which encourage ‘those who produce and use oral history to recognise certain principles, rights 
and obligations for the creation of source material that is authentic, useful and reliable.’14 The interviews 
were semi-structured and the questions were altered according to who was being interviewed. For example, 
the national coaches were subjected to a different set of questions to the sports science researchers. By 
asking the interviewee ‘only about information he or she knows best’ Herbert and Irene Rubin suggest that 
this ensures the interview evidence gathered is of rich detail.15 Before the interviews were conducted, 
interviewees’ consent, which included an agreement to publish their name in connection with the interview 
material, was obtained. Participants were not obligated to continue in the research and had the opportunity 
to withdraw at any point. Any information which the interviewees highlighted either at the time or after the 
interview that they did not want to be published was omitted from the final transcription. The recordings and 
transcripts will remain in the author’s care until they can be placed into a digital archive where they can be 
accessed by a much larger audience, with the full permission of the interviewees. 
Katherine Borland suggests that ‘oral personal narratives occur naturally within a conversational 
context’ but it is the job of the oral historian to, 
 
Identify chunks of artful talk within this flow of conversation, give them physical existence 
(most often through writing), and embed them in a new context of expressive or at least 
communicative activity (usually the scholarly article aimed towards an audience of 
professional peers). Thus we construct a second level narrative based upon, but at the same 
time, reshaping the first.16 
 
                                                     
14 Oral History Association, ‘Principles and Standards of the Oral History Association’, http://www.oralhistory.org/do-oral-
history/principles-and-practices/oral-history-evaluation-guidelines-revised-in-2000/#1.3 (accessed April 26, 2012). 
15 Rubin and Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing, 227. 
16 Katherine Borland, ‘“That’s Not What I Said”: Interpretive Conflict in Oral Narrative Research’, in Women’s Words: The 
Feminist Practice of Oral History, ed. Sherna Berger Gluck and Daphne Patai (New York: Routledge, 1991), 63. 
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As such, there are many different ways to interpret oral history material but the one deemed most 
appropriate for this particular research is what Lynn Abrams refers to as ‘evidential.’ This ‘encompasses the 
application of oral history for evidence gathering, the use of oral testimony as data, providing information to 
support an argument and illustrative material for publication.’ Quotes, which have been selected for their 
‘typicality’, have been chosen from the testimonies and are presented throughout the thesis as short ‘pithy’ 
extracts.17 This model of interpretation has been adopted by many other researchers such as Elizabeth 
Roberts, Paul Thompson, Stephen Humphries and Jerry White.18 The interweaving of quotation with 
narrative and documentary evidence allows for the creation of ‘fresh historical interpretations’ and a ‘multi-
dimensional picture of the past.’19 
 
Amateurism 
 
Amateurism did not rest merely on a technical definition of whether or not an athlete was paid, 
rather the concept incorporated a range of ideals and beliefs that had a broad social 
significance reaching far beyond the sports field.20 
 
The ethos of Amateurism is the running theme throughout this thesis and as such an effort has been made, 
where possible, to consistently relate information to its principles. Its influence can be clearly seen in nearly 
all aspects of British sport, particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Although its presence 
became ever more diluted in the latter stages of the twentieth century this thesis will attempt to 
demonstrate that despite this, its impact and legacy has been far reaching particularly with regards to 
coaching provision. In order to understand amateurism and how it became such a valued and established 
part of British sport it is necessary to fully appreciate its initial formation and development, so the following 
section provides a brief overview of the evolution of amateurism in British sport.  
The English word ‘amateur’ can trace its origins back to the Latin, Amatorem which means ‘one who 
loves or is fond of; who has a taste for anything.’21 Emerging in France at the end of the seventeenth 
century, where it was often used in connection with connoisseurs of fine art, it was around 1780 the word 
came into regular use in Britain and it gradually began to be used in connection with sport with which it 
                                                     
17 Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 15. 
18 Elizabeth Roberts, A Woman’s Place: An Oral History of Working Class Women 1890-1940 (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1994); 
Paul Thompson, The Edwardians (London: Routledge, 1992); Stephen Humphries, Hooligans or Rebels? An Oral History of 
Working Class Childhood and Youth, 1889-1939 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995); Jerry White, Rothschild Buildings 
(London: Pimlico, 2003); Lynn Abrams, The Orphan Country: Children of Scotland’s Broken Homes, 1845 to the Present Day 
(Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd, 1998). 
19 Stephen Humphries, The Handbook of Oral History: Recording Life Histories (London: Inter-Action Imprint, 1984), 52. 
20 Norman Baker, ‘The Amateur Ideal in a Society of Equality: Change and Continuity in Post-Second World War British Sport, 
1945-48’, International Journal of the History of Sport 12, no. 1 (1995): 101. 
21 Eugene Glader, Amateurism and Athletics (New York: Leisure Press, 1978), 96. 
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subsequently became irrevocably linked.22 However, contemporary definitions appear to differ somewhat. 
The Oxford English dictionary defines an amateur as ‘a person who engages in a pursuit, especially in 
sport, on an unpaid basis’ or ‘a person who is contemptibly inept at a particular activity.’23 The word 
appears to have undergone a period of transition; an amateur was once morally superior to the 
professional because they rejected specialisation and payment and participated in sport for the love of the 
game and had a respect for fair play and moderation. Since the professional thus contravened the true 
spirit of sport, the amateur became glorified.24 However, a variety of reasons, perhaps the most influential 
of which was the dilution of the professional ban at the Olympics, which gradually gained momentum after 
1974, ensured that the meaning of amateurism continued to evolve. This resulted in the definition most 
commonly associated with being an amateur in the twenty-first century which is being of mediocre 
standard. Neil Carter argues that this shift in definition is nothing new, suggesting ‘there have been many 
different and complex interpretations of amateurism. In effect, amateurism was a state of mind, its rhetoric 
ever changing to justify itself.’25 These differing interpretations may have emerged because, as Richard 
Holt suggests, amateurism was ‘a complex phenomenon with complex causes.’26 As a result, establishing a 
consensus about what constituted an amateur performer has been a task that sporting administrators have 
struggled with over the years and one that resulted in each NGB using the terms ‘amateur’ and 
‘professional’ to mean just what they chose them to mean. For example, in 1956, in association football and 
women’s hockey and netball, an amateur could receive a fee or honorarium for coaching, but in lawn tennis 
and athletics this was not permissible. While the AAA declared that being a professional in one sport 
constituted a loss of amateur status in others, the Lawn Tennis Association had no such regulation.27 The 
following sections will explore how this disparity over the exact nature of amateurism may have stemmed 
partly from the uncertainty which surrounded its emergence and early formalisation in British sport.  
 
 
                                                     
22 Lincoln Allison, Amateurism in Sport: An Analysis and a Defence (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 3; Peter A. French, 
Ethics and College Sports: Ethics, Sports, and the University (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 11; University 
of Birmingham Physical Education Department, Britain in the World of Sport: An Examination of the Factors Involved in 
Participation in Competitive International Sport (Birmingham: The Physical Education Association, 1956), 17. 
23 Oxford Online Dictionary, s.v. ‘amateur’, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/amateur?region=us (accessed October 31, 
2011). 
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‘Sportisation’ 
The second half of the nineteenth century saw continuing industrialisation and urbanisation transform the 
way in which sport in Britain was played and managed. Richard Holt, Wray Vamplew and Mike Huggins 
have all made connections between modernisation and an increase in spare time, something which prior to 
industrialisation and shorter working weeks was fairly unfamiliar.28 However, it was the way in which this 
spare time was utilised that ultimately caused a formalisation of sport in Britain. This period of ‘sportisation’ 
was also aided by an increase in disposable income, improved transport links and the influx of individuals 
from rural to urban areas which consequently altered the amount of space and time available for leisure. 
Sport became moulded around such factors and this eventually encouraged the development of sporting 
rules, the creation of voluntary sporting organisations and perhaps one of the most influential features of 
this period, the materialisation of class distinction and social exclusion in sport.29 However, whilst it is clear 
that industrialisation had a major impact on the development and progress of modern sport, Norbert Elias 
and Eric Dunning argue there is a ‘widespread tendency to explain almost everything that occurred in the 
19th century as a result of the Industrial Revolution’ and as such its influence needs to be kept in 
perspective. Elias and Dunning, therefore, suggest that both ‘industrialisation and sportisation were 
symptomatic of a deeper-lying transformation of European societies which demanded of their individual 
member’s greater regularity and differentiation of conduct.’30 Consequently, it could be suggested that while 
increasing opportunities and social change may have been influential in the formalisation of sport, it may 
have been the natural progression of society that created a demand for a new approach to sport which saw 
a shift away from popular violent pastimes towards more rationalised activity.31 
 
Emerging Middle Classes and Sport  
It was once a common belief that the middle classes were forged out of the industrial revolution during the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.32 However, more recently it has been suggested, 
particularly by Dror Wahrman, that because there was no clearly defined period of ‘revolution’ and that the 
social change experienced in different industries was ‘gradual and protracted’ it is not possible to attribute 
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the emergence of the middle class to the industrial revolution.33 In fact, the transformation of British social 
culture was a long process, something which had already become firmly established well before the period 
of industrialisation.34 However, although the middle classes were noted as existing as far back as the 
seventeenth century, because they had not yet had the opportunity to make themselves as a ‘distinctive 
presence’ on the historical stage, it was increasingly difficult for researchers to acknowledge their early 
existence.35 Nonetheless, increasing industrialisation, which encouraged a shift in the occupational 
hierarchy, was conducive to establishing middle class identity and by the mid-Victorian period the middle 
class had a ‘clear social-economic basis in business and the professions’ and, as a result, they gradually 
gained ‘social weight and definition.’36  
The rise of the English middle classes to positions of power in industry and commercialism resulted in 
a demand for recognition of their contribution to the nation’s ever expanding authority and wealth.37 
Although only 1,500,000 families, equalling only 5.5 per cent of the total population, were considered to be 
‘middle-class’ in 1870, ‘their social position and influence were extremely high in proportion to their 
numbers.’38 As a result of this new found power and control, the middle-classes had the ability to exert 
influence over various aspects of Victorian life, one of these being that of sport and the emerging concept 
of amateurism.39 The rules of many sports in Britain, including those related to amateurism, were 
developed in the 1880s, and although other classes may have played their sport according to the amateur 
ethos, it was the professional middle class that developed the principles and refined them into a sporting 
philosophy, which aimed to keep sport ‘pure’ by excluding corruption and money.40 Although both the upper 
and lower classes had previously received money from sport in the ‘traditional sports’ era either through 
playing or wagering, the period of ‘modern sport’, coupled with the emergence of the ‘Gentleman Amateur’ 
ethos, saw a rise in middle class concerns. If individuals were willing to accept payment for winning then 
there was the potential that money could be accepted to lose.41 As a result, the original rules of these newly 
emerging governing bodies were designed with the participant in mind. Although, the individuals who 
developed these rules were generally from the higher ranks of society, who had both time and money at 
their disposal, and therefore, the rulings they developed were designed for individuals in similar social 
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circumstances. There was also a strong allegiance to volunteerism amongst these individuals as it was 
believed that this would ensure that the sports were managed with the interest of the games being 
paramount.42 However, this close affiliation to ‘philanthropic voluntary action’ also had a much deeper 
meaning, whereby it offered a ‘significant source of social welfare’ during the late nineteenth century. The 
development and involvement in ‘charity’ schemes which could aid the poor became popular during this 
time, and because such activities were reserved for those who had the ability to donate both time and 
money, it was generally an exclusive pastime for the upper and wealthy middle classes.43 Consequently, by 
immersing themselves in philanthropic activities and demonstrating a strong loyalty to the amateur ethos, 
which stressed enjoyment and fair play over the work ethic, the upper middle classes were afforded the 
opportunity to fulfil their aspirations of ‘social upward mobility’ and create a distinction between themselves 
and the lower middle and working class masses.44 As Patrick Joyce and Martin Pugh have both 
highlighted, the Victorian middle class was never a distinct social entity but more a cluster of diverse 
groupings which were stratified according to their economic, political, social and religious standings. As 
such, those who achieved this higher middle class position were keen to offset themselves against those 
whom they perceived to be inferior. 45 
 
Social Hegemony 
 
The maintenance of a firm code of amateurism by sports administrators served a pragmatic as 
well as a moral purpose. Whether developed instinctively or as a deliberate policy, the more 
exactly the tenets of amateurism were enforced, the less likely it was that those who lacked 
independent wealth could afford to compete at a national or international level as amateurs.46 
 
The amateur ideal was explicit in terms of how sport should be played in that it should be done purely for 
recreation and enjoyment and be entirely unrelated to an individual’s occupation. Since earning money 
from sport would violate the cherished values of amateur sport, a ‘true’ amateur needed an independent 
source of wealth thereby enabling the refined sportsman to exclude the lower-class masses from their 
sport.47 In 1895, American Caspar Whitney questioned ‘why there should be so much constant strife to 
bring together in sport the two divergent elements of society that never by any chance meet elsewhere on 
even terms.’ He was not against the ‘labouring classes’ having the opportunity to participate in sport ‘in 
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whatsoever manner best suits their inclinations’, but did not understand why they should be given the 
opportunity to play under rules which were designed for the more privileged classes.48 Sports participation, 
as with many other aspects of life, was therefore dictated by social class. The ideals of amateurism were 
not founded with the intention of instilling some form of ‘sacred morality’ in individuals but essentially 
provided the upper and middle classes with a means of preventing undesirable individuals from 
participating in their sport. For example, in rowing, an individual would not be considered an amateur if he 
had ‘ever taught, pursued or assisted in the pursuit of excellence of athletic exercises of any kind as a 
means of livelihood; nor have ever been employed in or about boats in manual labour, not be a mechanic, 
labourer or artisan.’49 It was believed that individuals whose work involved manual labour would have a 
physiological advantage over the gentlemen amateurs and, based upon such grounds, they were 
considered professionals.  
However, while certain individuals ‘might aspire to meet its standards, amateurism was an essentially 
aristocratic concept’ and as a result had various different facets to its meaning.50 Simply being an amateur 
did not offer someone the privilege to control and organise sport because that was reserved for gentlemen. 
While there was a time when being a gentleman was depicted by birth or wealth alone, the rise of the 
middle classes caused the social-class demarcation to become blurred and education was now also 
considered a significant factor. The growing numbers of city merchants and industrialists now had the 
opportunity to distance themselves from lower middle class groups by ensuring their sons achieved a 
higher level of education.51 Gentlemen amateurs emerged as a distinct group of middle and upper class 
individuals who placed emphasis on the ‘spirit of the game’ and believed that wages and wagering in sport 
‘destroyed the frame-work of healthy competition.’52 Although they played many sports that the working 
classes also enjoyed, such as athletics, cricket and rowing, a gentleman amateur had a social and class 
distinction which could be used to distinguish them from what they perceived to be socially inferior 
individuals.53 Fair play was a central notion of amateurism and an unwillingness to take an unfair 
advantage over another opponent was paramount to being a gentleman. Charles Burgess Fry, who 
represented England at football, athletics and cricket - an all-round typical gentleman amateur - 
commented on the issue of fair play and he suggested that it was ‘a standing insult’ to sport that rules were 
                                                     
48 Caspar Whitney, A Sporting Pilgrimage: Riding to Hounds, Golf, Rowing, Football, Club and University Athletics. Studies in 
English Sport, Past and Present (New York: Harper, 1895), 164-7. 
49 Abrahams, ‘Sport, Professionalism and Olympics’, File HA Box 2, AAA Collection: HA, Birmingham Archives. 
50 Baker, ‘Amateur Ideal’, 102. 
51 Holt, Sport and the British, 113. 
52 Ibid., 99; Simon B. Eassom, ‘From the Bank to the Baron: A 200 Year History of Amateurism Embedded in the Olympic Ideal’ 
(Paper Presented at the Second International Symposium for Olympic research, Ontario, Canada, October, 1994). 
53 Holt, Sport and the British, 99; University of Birmingham, Britain World of Sport, 17. 
 13 
Tegan Carpenter July 2012 
required to prevent players from attempting to ‘trip, hack and push into opponents’, because from his 
perspective, competitors should not even have considered resorting to such unfair tactics.54 
The exemplary late nineteenth-century amateur had the ability to excel at several sports without any 
apparent effort.55 Individuals such as George Smith and Leslie Balfour Melville who were successful across 
a multitude of sports, including horse racing, rugby union and athletics, were considered true gentlemen 
amateurs. Amateur ideals stressed ‘play for play’s sake’, although winning was acceptable provided that it 
was not achieved by cheating and that it was kept in perspective.56 This ‘moral perspective’ included a 
judicious use of training, since a gentleman should not have to work hard to achieve and therefore, to train 
too hard, to take a specific diet or to be overly concerned with winning were just ‘not cricket.’57 By doing 
ones best a man could remain secure in the belief that he had participated in sport in the right manner, and 
if that resulted in defeat then that was entirely acceptable because sport was predominately played for 
intrinsic gain.58 
 
Amateurism and Coaching 
Despite a widespread acknowledgement that placing too much emphasis on coaching and training an 
individual could in some way violate the rules of amateurism, there were some sports that accepted the use 
of coaches and trainers, which highlights ‘the fluid nature of interpretations of amateurism in this period.’59 
As the terms “coach” and “coaching” have both evolved since their initial conception, in order to avoid 
confusion it seems necessary at this point to highlight how these terms are to be interpreted throughout this 
thesis. Coach refers to the individual who is responsible for directing the training of their athletes and 
coaching is the actual act of preparing an athlete for competition.60 This preparation encompasses a 
number of different tasks, including the orchestration and implementation of carefully developed training 
plans, the acclimatisation of athletes for a competition environment, and the offering of technical and 
tactical advice throughout a performance.61 While any individual has the opportunity to be a coach, being 
considered a long-term successful coach requires more than just managing athletes who win competitions. 
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Effective coaches have a clear understanding of the technical and tactical aspects of their sport and they 
have the ability to successfully transfer this knowledge to all their athletes.62 Many of the coaches 
discussed throughout this thesis appeared to have an innate intuition about how to improve their athletes 
and this has been commonly interpreted as a ‘coaching eye’. Evidence suggests that many believed it was 
this skill that ensured they were at the forefront of their profession. 
Returning to the issue of coaching acceptance, university rowing generally acknowledged that some 
amount of coaching was required if they were to row with elegance and style but, unlike other sports, they 
preferred to use amateur rather than professional coaches.63 However, as Rob Light highlights, ‘few, if any, 
modern sports have a stronger tradition of coaching than cricket.’64 The structure of cricket during the late 
nineteenth century ensured that professional players were at the forefront of the technical developments in 
the sport and it soon became established that in order for amateurs to display grace while batting and 
bowling they would need to receive ‘expert tuition’ from the professionals who quickly assumed a coaching 
role.65 However, amateurs and their representative authorities still marginalised professionals because they 
generally came from the lower social orders.66 This was essentially why many sports did not welcome 
coaching from professionals, because not only would it involve a reversal of class status, but upper-class 
individuals did not want to risk acquiring ‘plebeian’ characteristics.67 Also, there was a belief that if lower-
class professionals were offered too much power, they might attempt to exert some sort of control over the 
administration of amateur sport. Those sports which did accept some amount of coaching controlled the 
situation by imposing a master-servant relationship on their working professionals.68 Administrators 
prevented professional coaches and teachers from holding office within their sporting organisations to 
ensure that they never achieved any control over the direction of their sports.69 Professionals, or ‘paid 
servants’, were also frequently reminded of their inferior position within the club environment and treated as 
such.70 In both tennis and cricket clubs, professionals were kept separate from amateur members; they 
were allocated different changing rooms and catering facilities to ensure the professionals could not mix 
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socially with other members.71 In fact, it was not until 1952 that the first professional was appointed to 
captain England at cricket.72  
 
Exporting Amateurism 
As British sport became ever entwined with the notions of amateurism it was only natural that when the 
sports and games played in Britain were exported to the colonies that the amateur ethos would be exported 
with them. Initially, the British sporting system had a profound influence on sport in the USA, and by the 
mid-nineteenth century, Americans participated in many of the same types of sporting activities as the 
‘leisure classes’ in England.73 Although the Americans had the tendency to approach sport less formally 
than their British counterparts, it was still regarded in the same spirit and many early baseball clubs were 
formed and organised around the British amateur model.74 However, it soon became apparent that the 
‘upper class amateur ideal of participation...was destined to be a failure in a society whose ideology of 
freedom of opportunity provided for all to seek excellence through effort and ability.’75 The British university 
sporting model, whereby sport was controlled and administered through amateur student-run bodies, was 
therefore not considered applicable to American colleges.76 Instead a ‘meritocratic approach’ developed in 
intercollegiate sport, one which relied on talent rather than ‘ascribed status as seen in England’s elitist 
universities.’77 The popularity and prestige which soon became associated with college sport caused an 
escalating level of competitiveness. While the appointment of full time professional coaches went someway 
to raising standards, they could only achieve so much and there was an increasing need for particularly 
efficient skilled athletes. Consequently, many individuals who would never have given consideration to 
attend university or college were persuaded to sign up to courses by the offer of payment for their athletic 
services.78 However, not everybody agreed with such a system and in 1904 it was suggested that if 
colleges were sending teams of professionals to compete against each other then, ‘it becomes a question 
of who can hire the strongest team, and the whole thing is reduced to an absurdity.’79 Others agreed, 
arguing that ‘the man who makes some athletic pursuit his main business, instead of turning to it as a 
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health-giving pastime, ceases to be a particularly useful citizen.’80 But, as college sport was now 
considered a lucrative form of commercial entertainment, it was inevitable that such practices would 
continue. Whereas Britain had resisted the infiltration of money and professionalism into many aspects of 
sport, the cultural differences which existed between the two countries were too large to ensure that 
America would follow the same path. It was pointed out by an American commentator that while the British 
confined their contests to the ‘gentleman class, that is, to the well-to-do class, who are not subject to 
temptations in regard to money…we don’t want any such restrictions. It is impossible here.’81 As a result, 
the ‘elitist and separatist’ English system of amateurism that Caspar Whitney had longed for at the turn of 
the century was considered an ‘outdated non-egalitarian concept’, and this ensured it never gained much 
support in the American college sport system.82 
America was not the only country which appeared to have difficulty accepting and incorporating the 
strict British amateur ethos. This ongoing disparity with regards to the principles of amateurism prompted 
Ernest Charles Buley, an Australian journalist, to express his distaste at the British class system’s 
imposition on sport: 
 
Now this is not the first time I have been allowed to express my views...on the injustice of 
amateur definitions in this country...my correspondents then told me I was all wrong, and 
advised me to go back to Australia if I did not like the way in which sport was conducted 
here...I have spoken to many thousands of soldiers, and have gathered their almost 
unanimous impression that this is a country where there is one law for the rich and another for 
the poor. Trying to trace that impression to its source, I found that in most instances they had 
derived it from the methods in which sport...is conducted here.83  
 
He objected to the Amateur Rowing Association’s ruling on amateurism which suggested that ‘any man 
who works with his hands is ipso facto, a professional and a “menial”’ arguing that ‘what man, whose 
honest valuable work is branded as “menial” by one of the written laws of sport, can believe that in sport all 
men are esteemed equal?’84 It seems, therefore, despite being initially embraced by other countries, that 
amateurism was gradually redefined to accommodate alternative principles with regards to sport. 
Ultimately, ‘the ideal of the uncompensated athlete succumbed to cultural biases and to economic reality’ 
as the intense training and commitment required to be successful in top level sport accelerated a shift away 
from amateur sport. However, there was no other country in the world where the traditional concepts of 
amateurism had such an obvious and unfaltering life-span as it did in Britain.85 
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Outline 
This thesis traces the development of British coaching, training techniques and amateurism chronologically 
through the twentieth century; in order to successfully do this it has been necessary to create nine distinct 
chapters. Chapters one and two specifically focus on British sporting developments in the pre and interwar 
period and concentrates on how the poor performances in 1912 and 1936 provided an impetus for an 
improving coaching environment. These early coaching developments were deemed particularly 
appropriate for this research as these provide the first example of a national coach being appointed directly 
by a NGB. From here, the direction of this thesis shifts towards British coaching progress in the post-war 
era, which is covered in depth in chapters three and four. Specific focus is given to certain aspects of post-
war society, such as the aftermath of war and the 1948 London Olympic Games, because these factors 
were considered particularly influential in ensuring the longevity of amateur hegemony in British sport. The 
focus of chapter five differs slightly, in that the emphasis is on an alternative to the British sporting model – 
the Soviet Union. Detailed background information associated with the formation and development of the 
Soviet sporting system is provided in order to create an understanding of the differing ways in which sport 
in the East developed and how this was interpreted by those in the West. Subsequent chapters centre on 
two specific areas which emerged through the research and were considered particularly influential in 
ensuring Soviet success - government intervention and sports science. These aspects are considered from 
a British perspective and emphasis has been placed on Soviet influence, because while previous research 
has focused on the impact and incorporation of American methods on the British setup, the Soviet impact 
has been under-researched. The thesis ends by drawing together the evidence in order to present an 
argument which suggests the possibility of a continuing amateur legacy in British sport.  
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Chapter One: London and Stockholm – British Olympic Performances and Ad-Hoc Coaching 
Developments 
During the Edwardian period, there were growing anxieties in Britain regarding the decline of industrial 
supremacy. It was at this point that the Olympic Games began to emerge as a platform for both sporting 
and diplomatic rivalries. However, British performances at both the 1908 and 1912 Olympics signalled that 
British sporting methods and coaching, which were restricted by amateur hegemony, were now no longer 
adequate to challenge the emerging powers of both the United States and Germany. This chapter explores 
these processes in detail and places the development of British coaching within the wider context of sport 
and culture. The section begins by demonstrating how and why the formation of the Olympic Games was 
heavily influenced by the principles of amateurism and establishes how the early involvement of the British 
in the Olympic movement epitomised the state of sport in Britain. Events such as the loss of British global 
power, the 1908 Games, and poor performances by British athletes in 1912, are all considered in depth 
and emphasis is placed on how these may have provided impetus for an improved standard of coaching 
and training. Lastly, the chapter establishes how World War I and other external factors prevented these 
early ad-hoc coaching developments from becoming an established aspect of British sport. 
 
The Evolution of the Olympics  
The Olympic Games have developed into a commodity of great significance, being widely considered as 
the world’s most visible sporting competition. The Games have continued to evolve and adapt despite 
political events which, in more recent years, have had a tendency to define them. They have developed 
into something more than sport by becoming a ‘profound and deeply embedded component of our global 
culture.’1 Coubertin had hoped the Games would be an opportunity to blend sport with culture and 
education, a philosophy which he coined as ‘Olympism’, and it appears that there were a variety of 
influences which ultimately encouraged him to revive the Olympic Movement.2 Bruce Kidd has suggested 
that Coubertin was particularly concerned with the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation in his country 
which had resulted in ‘class conflict, poverty, disease and despair.’3 Like many others, he believed that the 
resolution to this problem rested in educational reform and this prompted him to visit educational 
institutions in England, Germany, America and Canada in order to gain some insight. He was inspired by 
the early intercollegiate competitions in America and Canada and intrigued by the British attitudes towards 
sport and physical education, which were encapsulated in the British public schools curriculum. This 
English ‘element’ was to play a significant role in ‘laying the philosophical foundations of a revival’ because 
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Coubertin saw the potential that competitive sport harboured with regards to inspiring and invigorating 
individuals.4  
During one of his visits to Britain, his attention was drawn to Dr Penny Brookes’ Much Wenlock 
Games which had been established in 1850. Although they were initially ‘little more than a well organised 
sports day’, by the time Coubertin visited in 1890 the evolution of the Games was obvious.5 He was 
particularly impressed with the highly structured competitions and elaborate medal presentations of the 
Games and reporting on his visit, he noted that ‘the Olympic Games, which modern Greece has been 
unable to restore, are being revived today is due not to a Hellene, but to Dr. W. P. Brookes. He is the one 
that began them forty years ago.’6 As a result, David Young has suggested that Brookes, and not 
Coubertin, should be credited with the revival of the modern Olympics, although it is apparent that Brookes 
had been unable to gain the international support he desired.7 Where Brookes had tried and failed, 
Coubertin was able to successfully revive the Olympic Games under modern conditions, initiatives which 
began with his 1892 lecture in Sorbonne.8 He hoped that the revival of the Olympics would ‘bring 
athleticism to a high state of perfection and that they would provide the opportunity to infuse new elements 
of ambition to the lives of the rising generation and offer a new respect for life.’9 Although this declaration 
was not met with great enthusiasm, he gradually began to gain international support and in 1894, again in 
Sorbonne, he created the International Olympic Committee (IOC), which remains the administrative body 
for the Olympic Games.10 
For a long time, the amateur principles of sport were considered a significant asset to the Games; 
the Olympic Movement moulded the definitions of amateurism and claimed them as their own. When the 
IOC was established it adopted a core set of amateur values, not only to be respected by competitors but 
to be adhered to without question, although from its creation in 1894 through to 1986 abiding by the 
amateur ruling remained the biggest challenge faced by the Olympic Movement.11 However, although the 
Olympic movement was defined by the amateur ethos, at the time of its inception, Coubertin himself had 
little allegiance to the concept of amateurism, although he was aware that many others, particularly his 
British contemporaries, had a strong belief in its principles and he recognised that he would need to indulge 
these individuals so that he could gain their support.12 In his memoirs he wrote,  
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Here it was again – the same old question…Personally I was not particularly concerned. 
Today I can admit it; the question never really bothered me. It had served as a screen to 
convene the congress designed to revive the Olympic Games. Realising the importance 
attached to it in sport circles, I always showed the necessary enthusiasm, but it was an 
enthusiasm without real conviction.13  
 
Coubertin’s core belief was that sport should be used to ‘produce a moral, not a social elite’ and in 1910, in 
an attempt to establish perceptions of amateur definitions and classifications, he persuaded his committee 
to issue a questionnaire to all the sporting federations and associations that had some connection to the 
Olympics.14 Coubertin described the answers as ‘widely contradictory’ because there was no agreement, 
either in or between sports, and the responses were ‘mere statements; no reasons. Pure fantasy; nothing 
concrete, nothing really well thought out.’ This highlighted the discrepancies that existed between 
definitions of amateurism and Coubertin suggested that from that moment he ‘lost even the little interest’ 
that he ‘had in the question of amateurism.’15 Avery Brundage, IOC president from 1952-72, the man who 
defined amateur politics within the IOC arguably more than any other and who ‘saw himself as the protector 
of Coubertin’s Olympic ideas’, later defended amateurism in a way that Coubertin himself may not have 
approved of.16 Nevertheless, the modern Olympic Games were reinstated during a period when 
amateurism was held in high esteem, and as such, it was conducive to the success of the Games and 
Olympism that amateurism was incorporated into the movement. Sensibly, Coubertin was willing to offer 
support to amateurism as a guiding principle of the Olympic Movement and at the 1894 conference in 
Sorbonne, which acted as the prologue to the modern Olympic Games, it was agreed that eligibility to 
participate in Olympic competition would be restricted to: 
 
Any person who has never taken part in a public race open to all comers and run for a money 
prize, or for money forming a part of the sum taken at the gates, or with professionals for a 
prize, or for money collected by public transcriptions, or who has never been at any period of 
his life a professor or salaried master of physical exercises.17  
 
It subsequently became apparent that such a decree would not only be difficult to uphold but also that it 
was open to individual interpretation. In 1905, Coubertin reinforced that amateur sport was not simply a set 
of rules, but an opinion, suggesting ‘it is very difficult to give a precise definition of who is an amateur 
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athlete and who isn’t; the problem is still far from being solved.’18 Despite this uncertainty, amateurism 
continued to exert its influence over the Olympic Movement for many years. This was in part due to the 
contemporary ideologues, such as Brundage, who saw value in amateur sport not only as a concept 
through which to keep the Olympic Movement pure and free from corruption, but also as a personal 
philosophy. He believed that while amateur sport was ‘delicate and fragile’, its values were intangible and 
the delight that one felt as a result of physical expression would deepen one’s experience through self-
satisfaction and accomplishment.19 
Over the years, there have been many cases of athletes violating this much vaunted amateur code. 
Jim Thorpe achieved two gold medals at Stockholm in 1912, although evidence later emerged that he had 
played with a professional baseball team and the Amateur Athletic Union subsequently stripped him of his 
records and medals. Thorpe had broken the rules, accepted money for sport, and above all else, had not 
acted as a gentleman should.20 Paavo Nurmi was a Finnish runner who achieved nine Olympic gold 
medals at the 1920, 1924 and 1928 Games but he was suspended in 1932 and eventually banned by the 
International Amateur Athletics Federation on grounds of alleged professionalism for having accepted 
expenses over and above those to which as an amateur he was entitled.21 
 
Creation of the British Olympic Association 
As British sporting principles had been so influential in the revival of the Games, it was inevitable that 
Britain would play an active role in the formation of the IOC. Of the initial thirteen members, there were two 
nations, France and Britain, who had more than one representative.22 However, despite this early 
involvement, Britain did not form a National Olympic Committee until 1905. 
One individual who set in motion the development of the British Olympic Association (BOA) perhaps 
more than any other was Reverend Robert Stuart de Courcy Laffan. An unlikely friendship which formed 
between Laffan and Coubertin was particularly significant for the development of British sport because it 
ensured the ‘rationalisation of British involvement in the Olympic Games.’23 Laffan was the headmaster at 
Cheltenham College, which had historical connections with both Muscular Christianity and rational 
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recreation, when he had his first introduction to the Olympic Movement at the IOC’s first working session at 
the La Harve Congress in 1897. Sent as a representative of the Headmasters of English Public Schools, 
Laffan presented a speech in ‘French of the greatest purity’ in which he depicted the potential ‘moral value 
of sport.’24 His presentation seemingly had a significant effect on the audience, most notably De Coubertin, 
who was convinced that ‘a new collaborator with the most invaluable qualities had fallen from the skies to 
help us.’ Laffan explained to Coubertin that he had felt a calling to the Olympic Movement which he was 
required to serve with ‘all his power.’25 Coubertin, impressed by his vision and tenacity, co-opted Laffan 
onto the IOC and he would later be an important conduit in the development of the BOA. Laffan was clearly 
aware of the level of work required in administering the National Olympic Committee. He later noted, ‘I 
came to the Olympic Movement prepared to scoff and I remained to admire - and to work.’26 His 
involvement continued for thirty years, during which time he spread both a knowledge and enthusiasm for 
the Olympic Movement around Britain. 
The first visit of the IOC to London in 1904 began a series of events which resulted in the founding of 
a BOA in order to bring Britain into the heart of the Olympic Movement. The BOA was formed at a meeting 
at the House of Commons in May 1905, when Mr W. H. Grenfell (later Lord Desborough) was elected as 
chairman of the association and Laffan as honorary secretary.27 A small council which consisted of the 
chief founders of the BOA, including Theodore Andrea Cook, was also appointed, and this council was 
instructed to draft rules for the governance of the association and to invite the leading National Governing 
Bodies (NGB) to each send one representative to the council.28 This would ensure that ‘full information as 
to the views of experts in every branch of sport’ would be at the disposal of the council.29 The BOA was 
subsequently officially authorised as the representative body of IOC in Great Britain.  
An exploration of the social background of the men involved in the initial formation of the BOA 
emphasises how British sport was administered and run at that point in time. A group of wealthy and 
bourgeois sportsman of the correct social standing organised and controlled the direction of sport, so the 
appointment of Lord Desborough as chairman was hardly a surprise. Renowned as a politician and 
sportsman he held many positions of power in areas of public service, it being noted at one point that he 
was serving on 115 committees simultaneously, although it was his athletic prowess and influence within 
sporting organisations that made him the ideal candidate for the BOA. He had represented Harrow at 
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cricket and Oxford in fencing, athletics and rowing and he had participated in the University Boat Race in 
1878 and 1888. Desborough was also known for his more adventurous sporting endeavours. He swam 
across the base of Niagara Falls on two separate occasions, rowed the English Channel, stroked the 
London-Oxford stretch of the Thames in twenty-two consecutive hours and ascended the Matterhorn via 
three different routes. He held many positions of influence within sporting bodies at various times during his 
career including president of the Life Saving Society, president and chairman of the Bath Club and 
president of the Marylebone Cricket Club and Lawn Tennis Association.30 While Theodore Andrea Cook 
may not have held as many prestigious positions as Desborough, he came from a similar upper class and 
public school background. As a journalist for the Daily Telegraph and editor-in-chief of The Field, he was 
well known in sporting circles. While at Oxford, he founded the university fencing club and went on to act as 
vice president of the Amateur Fencing Association in 1923 until his death in 1928. In 1903, in Paris, he 
acted as a non-playing captain (common practice at this time) to the first British fencing team to compete 
abroad.31 Laffan, Desborough and Cook epitomised the aristocratic and upper-middle class individuals who 
were attracted to the BOA; men who retained a profound admiration for the values of amateurism.32 
Because the BOA was defined by its ‘patriotic and amateur ideals’,  there was a clear consensus about the 
value and position of sport in society, and as such this may have influenced the administration and 
direction of the BOA.33 
Once a leader in athletic endeavours, Britain was now suffering frequent international defeats and 
Matthew Llewellyn has emphasised that the sporting success of the nation’s past ‘was relative, not 
absolute.’ Britain’s achievements were due primarily due to the fact that it was the birth-place of many 
sports and the ‘first nation to enter the field’, but as other countries began to gain experience in these 
games and shaped them by their own interpretations of amateurism, they quickly began to supersede 
Britain.34 The BOA saw its formation as an opportunity to demonstrate to the rest of the world that British 
sport was not in decline and to reemphasise the values of amateurism. Britain would achieve sporting 
success while adopting an amateur approach, even if that meant occasionally being beaten by lesser 
nations who were more ‘business-like’ in their approach to sport. These traditions and beliefs continued to 
have a profound influence on the BOA for many years. There was also a strong sense of autonomy that ran 
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though the organisation, a common trait amongst British sporting bodies, and the BOA ‘cherished and 
defended its independence, and rejected all political interference in its affairs.’35  
 
Early Olympic Games - British Perceptions 
1908 London Games and Aftermath 
 
Some years ago the late Rev. de Courcy Laffan, as fine a sportsman as he was a preacher, 
told me that, at certain Olympic Games, he was standing alongside a famous Swedish coach 
when the javelin throwing was being decided, and the latter remarked to him that the British 
performance was a crime against nature. “You have the finest raw material in the world,” he 
said, “and you persistently neglect to develop it.”36 
 
Beginning in the late eighteenth century and gaining impetus during the nineteenth, the far-reaching period 
of industrialisation had provided Britain with a stable economic, social and political base which allowed it to 
dominate trade around the world and create capital. However, a series of events, such as the end of the 
Victorian period, marked by the death of Queen Victoria in 1901, and the Boer War, had set in motion a 
process which caused Britain to lose some of its economic and industrial supremacy. The Second Boer 
War, which spanned from 1899 to 1902, had not only resulted in a significant drain on resources, but had 
also had an impact on how Britain was perceived by the rest of the world. The British Army experienced 
great difficulties against what they perceived to be group of inferior farmers who had little resemblance to 
any conventional army. This had exposed a number of deficiencies in many crucial areas such as military 
organisation and national fitness, two aspects in particular which were necessary for Britain to be 
considered a world leader.37 However, it was the burning of Boer farms and the establishment of 
concentration camps by the British army, in which many Boer women and children died, that altered public 
opinion. To many, including British citizens, this accentuated the belief that Britain was incapable of 
efficiently dealing with the issues of war.38 However, it was the obvious shift in industrial supremacy that 
undoubtedly highlighted to the rest of the world that Britain was in decline. Up until 1890, Britain was the 
leading producer of both steel and iron, but by 1910, it was unable to rival the production of America and it 
was a similar scenario in the newly emerging chemical and electrical industries in which America and 
Germany had established themselves as the world leaders. Britain had lost its monopoly over industrial 
progress and was now no longer considered the principal nation. That accolade now belonged to America, 
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where significant amounts of natural resources had ensured the USA would become a commanding force 
on the worldwide economic stage.39 Considering Britain had been the industry leader for such a long 
period, it was increasingly difficult for British citizens to accept she had fallen from power, and this loss was 
emphasised further as Germany became an international powerhouse. This, coupled with the fact that 
Kaiser Wilhelm II had wired his support to the Boer’s during the war and followed an anti-British foreign 
policy, had solidified an emerging rivalry between the two nations.40 The power struggle between these 
three nations had ensured that any sporting competitions would act ‘as a means of demonstrating...overall 
cultural superiority and promoting nationalism’ and it was inevitable, therefore, that this intense rivalry 
would present itself at the 1908 Games.41 
The 1908 Olympics had originally been awarded to Rome, but a lack of preparation and the eruption 
of Mount Vesuvius in 1906 resulted in the Italian government and Organising Committee agreeing that it 
would no longer be financially viable to act as host, so the IOC invited London to hold the Games. The BOA 
took it upon themselves to gauge the level of interest and support they were likely to receive from the 
NGBs and, following favourable replies from the majority, the decision was taken in November 1906 to 
stage the Games.42 The biggest issue that the organising committee faced was the construction of fully 
functional facilities, but fortunately, the Franco-British exhibition due to be held in the summer of 1908 was 
already in its planning stages and the Olympics had a history of connections with World Fairs. However, 
there was a risk attached to forging such a partnership because the 1900 Paris and 1904 St Louis Games, 
which allied themselves to World Fairs, had both been considered failures. Coubertin said of the 1904 
Games, ‘we have made a hash of our work, it’s a miracle that the Olympic Movement survived that 
celebration.’43 Nevertheless, Desborough made an agreement with entrepreneur Imre Kiralfy and his 
committee for the Franco-British exhibition that they would ‘construct at their own cost all of the racing 
tracks and building necessary for carrying out the Olympic Games.’44 As an additional sign of good faith, 
£2000 was advanced to the BOA to cover current working expenses and British NGBs were further 
satisfied when Kiralfy agreed to award them indemnity if the gate admissions were divided three to one 
between the exhibition and the BOA.45 
Considering the climate in which the 1908 Games were expected to function, whereby each country 
was attempting to demonstrate its national vigour and athletic superiority, it is not surprising that the Games 
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witnessed a fierce rivalry between Britain and America which quickly degenerated into bitter confrontations 
between the two countries.46 From a British perspective, the Games were considered a success, since not 
only had the organisers managed to coordinate the Games in a short period of time, their athletes had also 
topped the medal tables with 141, which outstripped the American total by a hundred. However, there was 
a suggestion from some that Britain had only succeeded because they were the host nation. During this 
time, the home country not only provided all the officials, but also framed the event programme and as 
such, London organisers included all the ‘sports which we hold in high estimation, and at which we are 
therefore specially proficient.’47 As a result, despite Britain dominating in the majority of events, the 
American media claimed victory based solely on the track and field results. The New York Times declared 
that American athletes were, ‘as usual, well in the lead. They won 75...points in the contests at Athens two 
years ago, against Great Britain’s 41.’48 The American team were not satisfied with the system of scoring 
and officiating, which they considered unjust because the total points would be calculated from all the 
events in the programme. Since American athletes were not present in the majority of events, the American 
press wanted an alternative system. It was claimed the ‘English system of marking Olympic victories would 
make England sure winners’ and American administrators wanted track and field to be considered as a 
separate entity with its own ‘Championship Trophy.’ James Sullivan, head of the American Olympic 
Committee, stated that ‘we came here, as we went to Paris and Athens, with a field team, and are making a 
fight in the field events, caring nothing for the other sports. We asked that the championship trophy be put 
up for the field sports separately, but this request was not acceded to.’49 Disputes continued and by the 
closing of the athletics events on the 25 July (the official closing ceremony did not occur until 31 October), 
relationships were strained. The Times observed that, ‘The Games have not been all plain sailing. The 
perfect harmony which everyone wished for has been marred by certain regrettable disputes and protests 
and objections to the judges’ rulings.’50 
Although Britain believed it had organised a successful Games, a number of factors may have 
overshadowed some of their shortcomings. There was a sense that because Britain had saved the Games 
when Italy could no longer act as host, and then organised the Games in only two years, that any 
deficiencies should be overlooked. In the eyes of British amateur administrators, the Games had been a 
success both in terms of organisation and Britain’s perceived dominance in events. However, their 
significant advantage in having ‘home’ officials (this caused so much controversy that it was declared that 
all future Games would have to include officials of different nationalities) and having designed a programme 
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which was unlikely to ever be repeated, had potentially concealed quite how badly British athletes had 
performed. There was some acknowledgement of Britain’s struggling performance, in that it was 
recognised that American athletes far outranked British athletes in terms of speed and strength, but there 
was still this belief in Britain that as the originators of modern sport, this heritage would carry them through 
to victory in subsequent games. 
 
Business-like methods may sometimes have results which, from our British and possibly 
insular point of view, have a tendency to spoil the game. After giving all due honour to the 
magnificent performances of the Americans, we may say that we have contrived to exhibit a 
very respectable degree of excellence, and so we shall not go far wrong, in the cause of true 
sport, if we stick to our antiquated methods.51 
 
Consequently, there was little assessment of the training and preparation (or lack of) of British athletes, 
something which would undoubtedly surface when Britain participated in Games away from home. 
However, it also needs to be considered that improving sport was perhaps not the first priority for many. 
Not only was sport controlled by a voluntary tradition, which ensured that established figures continued to 
view sport as separate and autonomous from the more important aspects of government, but Britain had 
also entered a period of instability following the sudden death of Edward VIII in May 1910.52 There was 
widespread industrial unrest which included a series of national strikes, most notably the miners’ strike in 
South Wales in 1910 and the Liverpool dockers in 1911 during which Winston Churchill, then Home 
Secretary, ordered in the Army to control the escalating violence.53 Rising disputes amongst workers were 
not the only factor which challenged the edifice of British civilisation since the workers’ strikes ran 
concurrently with the civil disobedience of the Suffragette Movement, the uncertainty surrounding the issue 
of Irish Home Rule and the growing realisation that Germany, with its rapid naval expansion, was now both 
a military and economic threat.54 It is not surprising then, that despite growing evidence of Britain’s 
diminishing athletic supremacy, preparations for Stockholm did not begin until late 1911.  
Although preparations had been slow, there were two initiatives that emerged which potentially 
furthered British coaching in athletics. Perhaps these were prompted by the slow developments of the 
NGBs and by comments made in the Manchester Guardian which suggested that failures of British athletes 
were not the result of a lack of training knowledge and material but because ‘scientific training and 
coaching’ was required. Consequently, a group of enthusiasts formed an Athletes’ Advisory Club (AAC) 
which it was hoped would, ‘induce old athletes of experience to act as amateur advisers and coaches to 
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young athletes.’55 Although it is unclear exactly which individuals were members of the club it was 
apparently dominated by a number of Oxbridge graduates, men who not only had the enthusiasm to try and 
improve sport, but also the financial security which enabled them to donate both time and money. One 
individual, who had attended a meeting of the AAC, observed that every influential member of the 
committee ‘was a university man’ and argued that the opportunities available for ‘non University men’ within 
the club were limited. Although the AAC was attempting to improve the international performance of British 
athletes, it was obvious that various members of the committee still believed in the amateur traditions of 
sport. At one meeting it had been observed that a member of the committee had suggested that ‘a 
gentleman athlete could only hope to be properly coached by a man who was also a gentleman’ and this 
strict adherence to amateurism was described by one reporter as ‘snobbery.’56 The committee were acutely 
aware that as a result of lack of funding within British sport, it was not possible for many athletic clubs to 
appoint professional coaches, and so it was envisaged that amateur trainers and advisers from the AAC 
could be used to supplement any future coaching developments put in place by the Amateur Athletic 
Association (AAA).57 However, it does also have to be considered that, although these ‘gentleman’ certainly 
had intentions of trying to improve British standards, by offering their services they would also ensure that 
the sport continued to be controlled by amateurs. Since not every athlete would have been considered a 
‘gentleman athlete’ there was still very much a sense of exclusivity surrounding the sport, something which 
the AAC seemed keen to maintain. 
The other notable coaching development was a coaching scheme proposal which had been sent from 
the Sportsman to the AAA. The paper had offered to work in conjunction with the AAA by offering much 
needed finance. British sport had been founded on a voluntary tradition and it was not until the latter part of 
the twentieth century that NGBs began to receive financial support from indirect government sources. Prior 
to this, NGBs relied heavily on donations and subscription fees in order to function, thus the offer of money 
from the Sportsman was welcomed. The ‘Sportsman’s Scheme’, as it became known, proposed to appoint 
Walter George as chief advisor for the Olympic training scheme but this was rejected by the AAA who 
asked the Sportsman to reconsider their nominee and accept the AAA’s recommendation of Alec Nelson.58 
It is not entirely clear why the AAA did not wish to appoint George, although it can be assumed that as 
George had never shown any prior interest in coaching he was not considered experienced enough to fulfil 
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such a role.59 As George was to be an integral part of the ‘Sportsman’s Scheme’, negotiations stalled and 
the Sportsman withdrew its offer of support. Nevertheless, the proposal may have provided the impetus 
needed to improve the coaching of British Olympic athletes because it emerged that the Southern 
Association had begun to develop their own alternative coaching scheme which could also be extended to 
the North and the Midlands.60  
As the AAA no longer had the financial support of the Sportsman, they had to source income from 
other means and as such, an appeal was placed in the Daily Mail in which they requested donations from 
all affiliated clubs and also appealed to the board of trustees to release £250.61 Despite all the fundraising 
efforts, the response was poor, and the amount raised was not deemed enough to secure the services of 
Alec Nelson, who had requested £150 per annum for four years to fulfil the position of chief athletic advisor. 
The alternative was to appoint Frederick. W. Parker, who agreed to an honorarium fee of £50. It was 
apparent, however, that the AAA did not want to lose the expertise of Nelson altogether and they 
endeavoured to secure his services at a fee not exceeding £50 ‘for two months from the 1 June in order to 
take charge of the selected representatives and accompany them to Stockholm.’62 Parker began his duties 
immediately, and began visiting training centres around the country so he could offer training and 
preparation advice to all the athletes who had been chosen to participate in the Olympic trials.63 Parker had 
already sent a letter to all the trial hopefuls in order to establish what advice they required in order to 
progress with their training and the responses he received highlighted just how beneficial a centralised and 
structured coaching scheme could be. He commented in his report that the ‘list of points on which they 
wished for advice practically necessitated an essay on the “A.B.C” of training, dieting, arm action and 
breathing’, and in a rather ironic turn of events, he had sent the applicants a copy of Walter George’s book 
Training. (Interestingly, the ‘100-Up’ exercise which George developed, and had referred to in the text, was 
rediscovered in 2011 by a New York Times journalist, which caused widespread interest in the running 
world. His training principles were deemed so applicable to modern running conditions that his methods 
were re-published in a book in 2011).64 George, the very man the AAA had refused to appoint was now 
apparently indispensable, because he was considered ‘the only means of answering their many queries.’65 
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Upon Parker’s recommendation, the AAA also agreed to appoint a number of ‘subsidiary trainers’ who were 
to be paid £5 each to provide assistance at the centres during training, although the total sum allocated for 
this was only £100, so once again, coaching progress was limited by the lack of funding available. Of these 
trainers, W. W. Cross and W. J. Parish were selected to accompany the team alongside Parker and 
Nelson. The selection of Cross and Parish did not occur because they had a greater level of coaching 
expertise compared to the other trainers, quite the opposite in fact. It was predominately due to the amount 
of (or lack of) payment they were willing to accept to fulfil such role. Cross was willing to accept £5 and 
Parish had offered his services for free, which when considering Nelson was to be paid up to £100 to 
attend the Games, was a financial saving the AAA were required to make. There was clearly some 
trepidation amongst the AAA regarding the coaching knowledge of the four chosen trainers and their ability 
to coach the athletes appropriately because a decision was taken to insure the trainers ‘against accidents 
of all the athletes.’66  
Despite favourable support for the coaching schemes leading up to the Games, and comments that 
the athletes who had been under the guidance of Parker had improved noticeably in training, the scheme 
did not ensure the success of British athletes at Stockholm.67 However, it could be suggested that it was 
not the mediocre level of the scheme that resulted in a poor showing at the Games, but the amount of time 
in which the new developments were expected to make an impact. Years of amateur tradition and lack of 
structured coaching and training could not be reversed from a coaching scheme initiated only months 
before it was required to come to fruition and produce success. As Sidney Abrahams explained,  
 
With this appointment of a coach our troubles are not over; in fact, they have only just begun. 
It seems to have been thought in many circles there is something magical in the very words 
“coach” and “trainer” that it was only necessary to appoint one of the very numerous and 
perfectly competent professional experts...it does not seem to have struck such optimists that 
a successful coach must be developed like a successful athlete, and even more so, for the 
born coach in the strictest sense can hardly be said to exist.68 
 
It was also apparent that the coaching and training environment in which Parker and associates were 
expected to make improvements was not particularly favourable to producing successful athletes. Parker 
noted that athletes ‘appeared to have no regular system of training’, many had ‘never been able to train on 
a track’ and there was a ‘lack of implements’ available for field events.69 It was becoming clear, that if 
success was to be achieved by British athletes, not only were consistent coaching improvements required, 
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but also a change of attitude was needed. If British athletes were to improve on the international stage, 
then some of the debilitating manifestations of amateurism would need to be dismantled.  
 
1912 Stockholm Games and its Influence 
The 1912 Stockholm Games saw for the first time participants from all five continents competing. This 
ensured a particularly strong competition, something which up until this point, Britain had not had to 
contend with. The Games were an organisational success for Sweden, and Brundage later recalled that 
‘the efficiency and almost mathematical precision in which the events were handled and the formal 
correctness of the arrangements made a great impression on me.’70 Not only did they take the organisation 
seriously, the Swedish Olympic Committee also made methodical arrangements for the training and the 
preparation of Swedish athletes. Unlike the Olympic Report of 1908, which had dedicated an entire section 
to amateurism and its definitions, the 1912 report devoted eighteen pages to the ‘training of Swedish 
athletes for the Olympic Games.’71 Adverts for trainers were placed in English and American journals, and 
after receiving many replies, Ernie Hjertberg, a Swede by birth who had been living and coaching athletics 
in America for forty years, was appointed as athletics trainer.72 British coaches had been engaged to work 
with Swedish teams in swimming, tennis, rowing and football, and as a result the training and coaching 
budget for these sports exceeded many others.73 Training of the Swedish athletes began in 1910, some 
two years prior to that of the British athletes. The athletes followed a carefully designed training plan 
developed by Hjertberg and the professional trainers, which included break periods for the athletes to 
recover and opportunities for the athletes to participate in international competition prior the Olympics.74 
This investment paid dividends when Sweden achieved sixty-five medals compared to the sixty-two won by 
America. However, the Games were anything but a success for Britain, who only managed to gain forty-one 
medals, placing them third in the medal table. It was patently obvious that the British approach, which relied 
heavily on its amateur traditions and superficial training methods, had been far outranked by the 
specialised, well-equipped methods now in place in other countries. The nation, which Roberta Park 
suggests, ‘taught the world to play’, subsequently regarded the failure at Stockholm as a ‘tale of national 
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disaster’, and this caused a torrent of criticism from both the British public and the British press.75 The 
Times argued that,  
 
Our representation at Stockholm was deplorable, not because we do not possess abundance 
of first-class material, but because the arrangements made for our share in the Games, the 
training and the preparation for our athletes, and the care taken of them at Stockholm were 
almost pathetically farcical.76  
 
Similar comments were made by athletics coach and writer Frederick Annesley Michael (F. A. M.) Webster, 
who expressed a ‘feeling of shame that we should fall so low as to be beaten by even the lesser European 
nations, who for generations past have been our pupils in all sporting pastimes.’77 Other press reports 
accentuated the harm that international sporting failure could do to Britain, since ‘whether we took that 
result very seriously ourselves or not, it was widely advertised in other countries as evidence of England’s 
“decadence”.’ It was clear that similar feelings were widespread, and that a decision needed to be made; 
either Britain was to take Olympic competition seriously or it ought to withdraw from the Olympic Movement 
altogether.78 However, some men took a more pragmatic approach. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle suggested that 
in order for British athletes to be successful at the Olympic Games, ‘liberal funds’ were needed to offer 
some form of coaching and preparation to British athletes. He went on to suggest that if the public would 
not provide the funds ‘then they can blame no one but themselves for our failures.’79 Reflecting on this 
initiative, Tom McNab suggests that Conan Doyle was supportive of the idea of coaching, and that he had 
called for an introduction in Britain after seeing what America and France had achieved with the use of 
coaches. However, McNab believes that he may have faced opposition because it was too ‘contrary to 
everything they thought for years beforehand.’80 His proposal to raise funds to train and prepare athletes 
received much criticism. Rowing coach R. C. Lehmann suggested that ‘the scheme...means specialisation, 
and I cannot help saying that, in my opinion, sport would be ruined.’ He commented that achieving success 
at the Olympics would require making ‘professional slaves’ of the men who took part and that Britain would 
be much better off with ‘the old idea of games for games’ sake.’81 Similar disapproval was expressed by 
Hugh Legge, who observed that those individuals who were not interested in who won at the Olympics 
generally had a concern ‘for the interest of amateur sport, and they are by no means convinced that these 
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interests will be served if the proposals which are now being set forth are carried out.’82 On the other hand 
some commentators supported allocating funds to train British athletes. Arguing that Britain would travel to 
Berlin regardless of the levels of support, one individual observed that, ‘it only remains to settle whether the 
British contingent is to consist of a keen but inglorious mob, or of a properly selected, properly trained team 
which will, it is to be hoped, do credit to the country.’83 
Prompted by the poor results at Stockholm, and the calls of many for an improvement in British sport, 
the AAC called a meeting soon after the Games in order to address ‘England’s failures’ and develop a 
‘scheme to restore British prestige.’ Some believed that importing a trainer from America who could 
implement ‘American methods was absolutely necessary’, but others argued that English methods of 
training were just as comprehensive and ‘provided men were willing to submit to them’, they would achieve 
similar success to that of the Americans. The overall sentiments of the meeting were, that in order for 
British sport to develop, large sums of money were required; Laffan commented that a minimum of £30,000 
would be needed for athletics alone in order to prepare a team for the Games in 1916. However, aware that 
the sporting public rarely donated the financial support required, it was hoped that ‘a rich philanthropist 
would take up the Olympic Games as a hobby.’84 Although these suggestions appeared somewhat 
revolutionary, it seems that British sport remained focused on volunteerism and philanthropy. Wealthy 
individuals with disposable income and time were still required to organise and control sport in order to 
ensure its development. 
Perhaps one of the most influential publications surrounding the debate concerning how to improve 
British sporting performances was the 1913 British Olympic Council (BOC) Aims and Objects of the 
Olympic Games Fund. This signalled a more specialised approach, since it provided an in-depth and 
comprehensive report of the way in which British sport should progress.85 The production of this type of 
report was fairly novel, and since it was published at a time when the amateur debate surrounding 
international sport was particularly current, it could be considered as being somewhat ground-breaking. By 
presenting their own evidence and supporting it with newspaper reports, the BOC drew comparisons 
between Britain and other countries, particularly the United States. It highlighted Britain’s lack of 
organisation with regards to Olympic preparation, suggesting that the United Kingdom’s failure to improve 
in ‘chief stadium events...is only the inevitable result of slackness which grows only more slack when all the 
rest of the world is becoming much keener and taking the Games more and more seriously.’ The report 
fully supported extra funding, and called for a complete reform of British sport. The contributors suggested 
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that as time progressed and ‘there was no sign of any serious awakening to the danger that awaited us at 
Stockholm...the need of some drastic reform became more and more imperative.’86 The report provided 
both sides of the argument for the development of a ‘Special Committee’ and the creation of an Olympic 
appeal for £100,000 to send a well prepared team to Berlin, and it closed with the observation that:  
 
Those who, for a dislike of the whole notion of the Olympic Games and an attachment to the 
old Arcadian village-green era of British sport, choose to indulge in more or less diffused and 
impractical criticisms of the Committee’s plans make very hard work for those who...are bent 
on seeing it carried to a successful conclusion.87  
 
Both of these initiatives could be considered somewhat unusual for a time when amateurism appeared to 
be so highly valued in Britain. This potentially signifies that although amateur hegemony remained, it did 
not possess the same level of control it once had, and that perhaps amateurism was to undergo a process 
of evolution, which again highlights the fluidity of its principles. Although not all recommendations of these 
initiatives were fully supported, it is apparent that the men involved in both the AAC and the ‘Aims and 
Objects’ scheme wanted to encourage the adoption of a more rigorous approach within British sport. 
Encouraged by the debates, the BOC took it upon themselves to develop a ‘Special Committee’ in 
March 1913. This consisted of both members and non-members of the BOC in an attempt to bring ‘them 
into closer touch with the public.’ Both Cook and Doyle were inaugurated into the committee, as were Mr 
Foster and a Mr Bosanquet, who were both ‘all-round sportsman’ and, therefore, represented ‘the best 
amateur traditions.’88 The primary duties of the committee were to control the financial arrangements 
associated with the British preparation for Berlin. During the stages of preliminary planning, each NGB was 
requested to submit an ‘ideal scheme’ which would ensure the best possible representation in their chosen 
sport in 1916.89 It was not intended that the principal outcomes of the schemes would be to produce a 
‘team of gladiators’ but it hoped to encourage a widespread improvement in ‘national hygiene and physical 
development’, so any schemes submitted were required to reflect this.90 From the responses received, it 
was established that a ‘scheme of awards’ should be initiated so that the discovery of suitable athletic 
talent could be encouraged by providing the ‘man in the street’ with the benefit of ‘expert coaching.’91 
However, in order to attain a ‘badge’ an individual was required to compete in five out of the offered nine 
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events, which spanned across a number of different sports.92 Perhaps this clause was included because 
the schemes were required to adhere to the ‘strictest amateur principles’ and these proposals would 
encourage the cultivation of the much admired ‘all-round sportsman.’93 Each NGB was required to draw up 
standards and provide instruction and training in their sport, so the AAA proposed the development of 
multiple training centres throughout the country and the Amateur Swimming Association (ASA) 
endeavoured to appoint ‘professional instructors’ for twenty-five weeks during the summer at an estimated 
cost of £1000.94 This widespread preparation would require substantial financial backing and the Special 
Committee launched a public appeal for £100,000.95 However, despite repeated pleas in the media, the 
‘public response to the appeal for funds underlined the nation’s apathy’, and by September 1913, only 
£7,000 had been donated.96 There was a feeling in some quarters, that the amount Britain was trying to 
raise appeared excessive, but in an attempt to ‘save’ the appeal, The Times pointed out that Germany 
would be spending much more and that in 1912 the United States had spent ‘between £30,000 and 
£40,000 just on taking its men to Stockholm.’97 Highlighting how much more Britain’s ‘rivals’ had invested in 
their sport appears to have been an attempt to play on British insecurities, but the public remained 
unmoved, and in January 1914 a decision was taken to close the appeal after only managing to achieve 
£11,000.98  
Even though the appeal had failed, as a sign of good faith to the individuals who had donated money, 
a decision was taken to allocate the gathered funds to various sports. The actual sum at the disposal of the 
committee was calculated to be £5,393, of which, £3,850 was allocated for training purposes. The AAA 
were awarded £3,000 and the ASA and National Cyclists Union received £600 and £250 respectively.99 In 
January 1914, the AAA appointed the first full-time national athletics coach, Walter Knox, a Scottish-
Canadian professional Highland Games all-rounder and the Canadian Olympic coach at the 1912 Games, 
and he was given a salary of £400 per year and travelling expenses worth £150.100 Nine supplementary 
trainers were also appointed to work under the direction of Knox at an annual cost of £700; four coaches 
were located between Scotland and Ireland, two in the North and two in the South of England, while the 
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Midlands were allocated one trainer.101 Due to the outbreak of the First World War in July 1914 and the 
subsequent cancellation of the Berlin Games, Knox did not hold the position of chief national coach for any 
notable period of time; in fact some mini-biographies and reports which have been published on him do not 
even acknowledge his time as chief national coach in Britain.102  
 
Aftermath 
The war, coupled with the general indifference of the majority of the British public towards supporting 
Olympic athletes, meant that the practical suggestions and promising advances which had been put in 
place by the likes of those involved with the BOC Aims and Objects and the AAA, with its creation of a 
national coaching post, failed to be developed further after the end of the war in 1918.103 There are a 
number of possible reasons for this, and they predominately relate to those who were in positions of power 
in British sport prior to the outbreak of the war, and a desire to return to “normal” after the war. Although the 
individuals associated with the BOC report had made attempts to alter the state of British sport, the barriers 
of amateurism remained strong; altering years of traditions would require a change in mind set, and due to 
a culmination of factors, this was something that these pioneers had been unable to achieve successfully 
prior to the war. The individuals associated with these coaching initiatives were invariably Oxbridge 
graduates and current students who had enlisted in the Officer Training Corps, and there is evidence to 
suggest that that in the Great War, mortality varied significantly by class, with those of higher social class 
much more likely to lose their lives than those of lower ranks.104 The deaths of thousands of educated and 
wealthy individuals, who potentially would have become the nation’s leaders, and who later became known 
as the ‘Lost Generation’, resulted in a loss of some of these early sporting visionaries.105 Once the conflict 
had ended, these individuals were replaced with those who did not share their views about the direction of 
sport, and as a result, British sport returned to improvised and impromptu organisation. McNab suggests 
that, ‘the people weren't around, it's often…two or three people who trigger it off and get support and once 
those guys have gone it's as if it's never been…the idea of doing what they were doing, that had gone.’106 
An alternative explanation relates to what Mike Huggins and Jack Williams refer to as, ‘conservatism in 
sport.’ The experiences and loss of war may have caused many individuals to view the pre-war era as a 
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time of security and reason, and this may explain the nostalgic desire of some to return to a world before 
the war.107 Although some ad-hoc coaching developments were being initiated prior to the war in the hope 
of stimulating change in British sport, for the most part, many individuals would have been unaware of 
these schemes, so for the majority, it was natural to desire a return to the traditional values of sport in 
which amateurism continued to provide a philosophical direction.  
In summary, elite sporting preparation in the pre-war period essentially relied on ad-hoc arrangements 
which were rooted in heritage and tradition. Even though some sporting pioneers were attempting to 
integrate new coaching methods and schemes, because British sport continued to be controlled by 
amateurism, they failed to gain support from the British public. Until some of the traditional barriers were 
broken down there would continue to be a resistance towards coaching in British sport. The following 
chapter traces the development of the centralised coaching schemes in the interwar period and suggests 
how the continued prevailing influence of amateurism prevented the schemes from having significant 
impact on British performances at the Olympic Games. 
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Chapter Two: Interwar Sport and the Formation of Early Coaching and Training Schemes 
Despite the fact that the pre and inter-war periods saw a marked increase in coaching utilisation and 
availability, particularly with regards to Olympic competition, British sport continued to align itself to the 
principles of volunteerism and amateurism, so professional coaching struggled to find acceptance. 
Although poor performances in 1936 once again encouraged the adoption of additional coaching, this 
chapter emphasises, that because these methods signalled a shift towards the American system and 
greater specialisation, British administrators remained wary of its integration. In addition, by investigating 
the ad-hoc approach taken to coaching schemes in the interwar period it is possible to show how their 
indirect connection to government came about because of anxieties associated with the military and 
sporting threat of Germany. Finally, the chapter demonstrates that, although the integration of these 
coaching schemes appeared to indicate an acceptance of greater professionalisation and specialisation in 
British sport, the main purpose of these schemes was to create a contingent of honorary coaches rather 
than to improve the standard of Olympic athletes. This amateur approach to the schemes appeared to 
satisfy the National Governing Bodies (NGB) because it would ensure that any appointed professional 
coaches would remain under their tight control and jurisdiction. 
 
Interwar Period 
By the end of the war in November 1918, Britain had suffered a significant loss of life since 745,000 of the 
country’s men, most of whom were under 45, had been killed.1 This loss was multiplied further when a 
worldwide Spanish Influenza Pandemic broke out in June 1918. Although it is not possible to know the 
exact number of British deaths, because wartime censors deliberately underreported its effect, it has been 
estimated that approximately 200,000 people died.2 These factors, coupled with a large amount of debt as 
a result of the war effort and the discharge of four million men from the armed serves, led many to believe 
that Britain would enter a period of economic depression and high unemployment. However, Britain actually 
experienced an immediate post-war boom. Businesses thrived as they tried to fill the vacuum of the war 
years and the returning soldiers were quickly absorbed into industry. The awarding of demobilisation 
bonuses, which encouraged individuals to purchase items which they had postponed during the war, also 
ensured that that the British economy remained stable. For a short period following the war, Britain 
appeared to be the ‘land fit for heroes’ that Prime Minister Lloyd George had promised, but that was soon 
                                                     
1 Arthur Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total War: War Peace and Social Change 1900-1967 (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, 
1968), 62. 
2 Spencer C. Tucker, The European Powers in the First World War: An Encyclopedia (Oxon: Routledge, 1999), 360; George C. 
Kohn, Encyclopedia of Plague and Pestilence: From Ancient Time to Present (New York: Facts on File Inc, 2008), 46. 
 39 
Tegan Carpenter July 2012 
to change.3 There was an early indication that Britain could be heading for a period of instability when, 
although unemployment remained low, the number of strikes throughout the country increased 
dramatically. Niall Johnson suggests that, because the ‘political and social order’ in Britain was undergoing 
a period of change in which Lloyd George’s administration shifted from a laissez-faire to a more 
interventionist approach, particularly regarding the life of British citizens, it was inevitable that the transition 
would involve some difficulties.4 By the end of the 1920s, a culmination of over-production and rising costs, 
which had been attributed to high wage levels, caused a ‘slump’ or economic decline. Employers made 
attempts to convince the trade-unions to accept partial wage cuts, but when they refused, there was no 
alternative but to reduce the size of the workforce.5 Between 1920 and 1921, industrial output had fallen by 
10 per cent, and this decline was particularly apparent in the export-orientated trades such as cotton, coal, 
iron and steel, causing large regional disparities in the levels of unemployment.6 Once the economic 
recession had hit almost all of the basic industries, the unemployment rate accelerated inexorably, and in 
the three months between March and June 1921, unemployment rose 17.8 per cent to 2,171,000.7  
However, high levels of unemployment, reductions in the average working week and improved 
transport links all prompted an increase in the popularity of sport.8 As John Hargreaves highlights, 
‘spectator sports expanded...this was the golden age of football and cricket attendances, professional 
football had ceased to be so strongly associated with the North and spread Southwards in popularity; 
County Cricket became a truly more popular game.’9 Average football attendances for the first division had 
risen from 23,000 in the 1913-4 season, to over 30,000 by 1938-9, and attendance at cricket test matches 
during the interwar period was considerably higher than anything recorded previously.10 For example, at 
the Lord’s test match against Australia in 1930, 115,000 people had watched over the four days, with an 
average daily attendance of 29,000.11 Although this may have had a beneficial impact on how the British 
Olympic team were perceived and supported by the public, for those who cherished amateur hegemony it 
was particularly alarming, because as Norman Baker highlights, ‘spectatorship was far removed from 
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participatory experience and the appeal was thus more simply entertainment’ and this potentially marked 
the ‘end of sport for sports’ sake.’12 
Sport had also been strongly connected to the war effort, and many sporting organisations did what 
they could to support by encouraging a large number of professional and highly talented amateur athletes 
to enlist. It was noted that no prominent sports player declared themselves a conscientious objector, and as 
a result Britain lost a large contingent of its promising sportsmen.13 Following the end of the war, there was 
a suggestion, that while Britain would still be capable of competing at the 1920 Antwerp Olympics, the 
athletes who remained would not be prepared enough to participate. Despite this, there was an 
acknowledgment that the ‘Olympic movement should...lead to the better coordination of sport within our 
own country by bringing into closer touch and cooperation the governing bodies of the various branches of 
sport.’ However, there was a concern amongst some, that because nothing had changed in British sport 
since 1912, rather than having a successful Games in 1920, there would be a repeat of the ‘debacle at 
Stockholm.’14 A number of factors suggested that Britain would not actually compete in Antwerp, but an 
accidental acceptance of the invitation by the Foreign Office resulted in Britain having to attend.15 Once the 
decision was taken, rushed attempts at the preparation of the British team got underway. Some believed 
that adopting American methods would ensure British success, because by now the United States had 
been firmly established as both a sporting and industry leader. Mark Dyreson argues that ‘American culture 
was the primary motor of America power’ and that ‘culture produced industrial might.’ Nations that looked to 
emulate the United States needed to do more than simply copy their production techniques, they also 
needed to reproduce their culture.16 However, the late entry of America into WWI had not been well 
received by the British, and this resentment continued to build in the interwar period, not least because of 
the Paris Peace talks in 1919, which witnessed disagreement over war debts and the refusal of America to 
join the British led League of Nations.17 This general resentment towards America was further heightened 
with the Wall Street Crash of 1929. Many British citizens, therefore, had no desire to look to America for 
guidance, especially in sport, where it was well-known that ‘American methods’ consisted of a programme 
of intensive training, in which ‘picked athletes’, often children, were ‘encouraged, watched, guided.’ As a 
result of this ‘encouragement no other country in the world has anything approaching them’ for they 
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outclassed everyone in athletics and athletic effectiveness.18 A belief that these methods could potentially 
be contravening the amateur values enshrined within the Olympic Movement, ensured that Britain 
remained distant from American training techniques and continued to rely on their heritage and tradition  as 
a truly ‘amateur’ sporting nation.19 However, the realisation that Britain could not possibly contend with the 
‘professional’ methods of the American athletes resulted in, once again, little support for the British team. 
Theodore Andrea Cook was so frustrated by the lack of response, he suggested that although other 
countries clearly saw benefit from the Olympic Games and would undoubtedly continue to support them, he 
hoped they would ‘never misunderstand our motives if we finally declined to enter English teams until 
English public opinion and the present framework of international Olympic arrangements are each very 
different from what they are today.’20 
Although Cook may have been trying to provide some sort of impetus for an increase in financial 
support for the team, the growing instability throughout the country, highlighted particularly by the eventual 
General Strike in 1926, appears to have been a factor in a continued lack of public support.21 It was not 
until 1927, when Gerald. F. Ellison, a retired army lieutenant, who had been encouraged by the success of 
an Australian training centre, called for a similar venture to be adopted in British athletics. Through 
observations of army athletic meetings he had established that the athletes who had the opportunity to 
work with a professional coach performed significantly better than those that did not. As a result, Ellison 
claimed that developing a training centre, which could also work with boys aged 14-18 and ‘put them on the 
right track from the start’, would ensure increased success in British sporting endeavours.22 This type of 
preparation would require a more ‘professional’ approach to be adopted, something which, thanks to the 
increasing popularity of horse racing, greyhound racing and speedway in the interwar period, was gradually 
becoming more integrated into British sport. Although these sports had always had a professional 
connection because of their close relationship with gambling, professionalism had also begun to permeate 
other sports which had historically always had a close affiliation with the amateur ethos. Coupled with this 
professionalisation was an increasing desire to win, which was exposed by the controversial ‘bodyline’ tour 
of Australia in 1932-3.23 However, this adoption of more specialised methods of training and competing was 
not universally welcomed and caused much debate, particularly within those organisations that guarded 
both their autonomy and amateur hegemony. The Amateur Rowing Association suggested that the 
intensive training which would be required to send a fully prepared team to the Olympics was ‘entirely 
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contrary to the true spirit of amateur sport’ and that ‘the exaggerated importance which is attributed to 
success in such contests endangers rather than stimulates the friendly relationships which ought to exist 
between rival competitors.’24 The British Olympic Association (BOA) were equally concerned with 
preventing professionalism from permeating Olympic sport when they objected strongly to the proposal for 
‘broken-time’ payments which would have allowed payment to amateur athletes while they were 
representing Britain.25 At the International Olympic Congress in Berlin in May 1930 it was decided that the 
BOA delegates would oppose any efforts to allow amateurs to receive payment for loss of salary.26  
The uncertainty surrounding the amateur versus professional debate was potentially a reflection of the 
changing pattern of class structure that had begun to emerge in Britain following the end of the war. As the 
issue of amateurism had always had a close affiliation with class, particularly in its association with 
‘gentleman amateurs’, it is unsurprising, therefore, that as class distinction became increasingly blurred, so 
too did the definitions of amateur and professional. A decline in British aristocracy was increasingly evident 
because not only had their numbers diminished as a result of the war, they also had to contend with death 
duties on their inherited wealth. Land reforms, which had been put in place by the Liberals, and the 
requisitions of stately homes for military and hospital use during the war had presented further 
challenges.27 The middle-classes were also affected financially, which is reflected by the decline in servant-
keeping in the interwar period, and as Arthur Marwick highlights, this helped ‘weaken the barriers between 
the middle and lower classes.’28 Other significant factors in reducing the differences between classes 
included the 1918 Representation of the People Act, which not only gave women over thirty the right to 
vote but also offered the entitlement to men over twenty-one, something which had previously been 
reserved only for home-owning men. The abolition of the workhouse in 1929 and the fact that upper-class 
officers and lower-class soldiers had fought together during the war, ensured that class distinctions, 
particularly amongst men, were weakened.29 Nevertheless, despite the diminishing divisions between 
classes, disparity in education remained. Free elementary schools were provided for the working-classes, 
in which it was not uncommon to have sixty or more children in one class, but by the time the child reached 
fourteen their education was deemed to be complete. Fee-paying schools, reserved for those with the 
available disposable income, offered students greater opportunities, but even then there were differences 
which were dictated primarily by wealth. The elite sent their children to preparatory and public schools, 
whereas the middle-classes had to be content with small private and secondary schools. Higher education 
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was predominately reserved for those who had emerged from a public school background, men who 
continued to assume the role of the ‘gentleman amateur.’30 As a result, despite the dilution of class barriers, 
these continuing educational differences meant that amateur hegemony remained firmly entrenched within 
British sport, particularly in those sporting organisations which had a long association with its ethos. 
However, the tentative arrangements for coaching and training improvement which had materialised 
prior to the war, did begin to resurface. Although a nationalised coaching scheme was yet to emerge, 
individual sports were beginning to establish their own coaching and training systems, but because these 
NGBs remained firmly under the direction of amateur administrators, these men continued to exert 
significant control over the way in which these developments unfolded.  
 
Interwar Athletics Coaching Scheme: 1933-1936 
Although there was still resistance, it was apparent that if improvements were to be achieved in British 
athletics then some form of intervention was required. In 1933, individuals associated with the Amateur 
Athletic Association (AAA), most notably Harold Abrahams and E. A. Montague, developed the idea of 
creating an ‘annual school of athletics science.’31 Influenced by F. A. M Webster, who had continually 
drawn attention to the lack of proficiency in field events amongst British athletes, which he suggested was 
due to a ‘lack of competent coaches’, the AAA decided that a body of amateur coaches was required.32 As 
a result, the AAA, in connection with Loughborough College, developed the Loughborough Summer School 
in 1934. Webster and Montague were appointed as organisers, and a decision was taken to make a two 
week school available to both ‘active athletes and would-be coaches.’ Around 160 athletes were in 
attendance at the first course, including a young Geoffrey Dyson who would become Britain’s first national 
athletics coach in 1947.33 Armas Valste, a Finnish athlete who had taken up coaching and later went on to 
coach the 1936 Finland Olympic team, was secured as head coach for the initial course. Valste agreed to 
attend without any payment apart from minimal travelling expenses.34 It became an accepted policy of the 
Summer School to invite foreign coaches to lead the course and other notable individuals included, Franz 
Stampfl (Austria), Pierre Lewden (France), Johannes Viljoen (South Africa) and Jaako Mikkola (Finland). 
Each year foreign coaches would teach techniques to schoolmasters, directors of physical training and 
athletes in an attempt to develop a body of amateur coaches who could ‘diffuse expert knowledge 
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throughout the country.’35 Given that many of the individuals who were heavily involved in the Summer 
School, most notably Harold Abrahams, held deep rooted beliefs about coaching and amateurism, it might 
appear somewhat surprising that the use of coaches, particularly foreign coaches, was so well supported. 
However, although foreign coaches were being used, they were not receiving any sort of payment other 
than expenses and as such they could be construed as amateurs. In addition, it was noted that the 
coaches were to remain under the direct control of amateur administrators for the duration of the course 
and this continuation of the traditional master-servant relationship ensured that none of these men posed 
any threat to the AAA’s authority. 
In 1936, Webster founded and headed up the School of Athletics, Games and Physical Education at 
Loughborough, and in 1937, as a result of their previous encounter at the first Summer School in 1934, 
Webster appointed Dyson as his assistant.36 Despite the perceived success of the Summer School during 
its initial years, the AAA were aware that immediate athletic results were not to be expected and it was 
accepted that it would be at least another five years before the full benefits of the programme would show 
itself in international competition.37 
 
1936 Berlin Games 
During the 1930s, there was a growing realisation, particularly by governments overseas, that sport could 
be used as tool to not only demonstrate the national prestige and superiority of a country, but also as a 
means to forge relationships with other nations. In 1931, the French government donated £240,000 to the 
French national sports development scheme, which was ‘probably the biggest windfall sport had ever 
received from government.’ A large proportion of this money was assigned to improving the ‘provision of 
sports grounds all around the country’ and undoubtedly went some way to ensuring the continued success 
of international athletes such as middle-distance runner Jules Ladoumegue and swimmer Jean Taris.38 
Peter Beck has demonstrated that, during the interwar period, the British Foreign Office also saw sport, 
particularly football, as a diplomatic tool.39 During a match with Germany in 1938, English players were 
strongly encouraged, indirectly by the Foreign Office via the Football Association, to give the Nazi salute, 
something which Stephen Jones suggests was a political decision designed to promote healthy relations 
between the two countries.40 However, the most salient example of a government intervention in 
international sport relates to the highly politicised Berlin Olympics in 1936. The Games had been awarded 
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to Germany in 1931, two years before the Nazi party had come into power, but Hitler soon saw the 
opportunity to utilise the Olympics for National Socialist propaganda. Staging the Games provided 
Germany with a means to demonstrate to other nations that they were willing to co-operate and interact, 
not only in sport, but also in other aspects of everyday life. This was achieved by putting in place initiatives 
that would improve training and coaching facilities and ensure that Germany was victorious.41 Germany 
subsequently headed the medal table with thirty-three gold medals, closely followed by the United States, 
who secured twenty-four, but Britain was much less successful, achieving only five gold medals. Although 
Britain had been greatly affected by the Great Depression of the 1930s, which saw unemployment levels 
reach 21.3 per cent in 1931 and led to protests marches such as the National Hunger Marches in 1932 and 
the Jarrow Crusade in 1936, the economic and social impacts were considered less debilitating than the 
experiences of the United States and Germany.42 The overall Olympic result was interpreted negatively and 
levels of criticism were high. 
The Daily Express observed that ‘with bad luck and in some cases very disappointing performances, 
our athletes have been left as far behind as a donkey’s tail’43 while the Observer  suggested that Britain 
had been ‘outstripped’ by Germany, America, France, Italy and Japan and even lesser nations such as 
Finland, Sweden and Hungary.44 These countries had ‘licked us hollow, what was worse, they made us 
look ridiculous.’ British training and coaching methods were questioned by those who believed that British 
performances were ‘lamentable, not because our luck was out, but because the majority of our 
representatives were not good enough.’45 Athletes needed to train harder for longer periods of time and to 
a level which would allow them to cope with the strenuous nature of Olympic events.46 Echoes of previous 
post-Games comments resurfaced, with the Daily Express urging Britain to keep out of the Olympics if men 
‘cannot train for them properly, and view them with the necessary seriousness.’47 Despite criticism, the 
British team was defended by some, and true to British tradition, excuses covered every facet of 
performance while avoiding criticising the sporting system. Athletes from many other countries arrived six to 
eight weeks before the Games, but the British only arrived four days before the start.48 Their 
accommodation, which was fifteen miles from the town centre, was also credited for their poor showing 
although this conveniently ignored the fact that other nations had been housed a similar distance from the 
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stadium.49 The major factor however, was that other nations employed different interpretations of the 
amateur definition.50 It was suggested that ‘our own particular amalgam of work and play expressed a 
better philosophy of life than those other codes which have reaped superior honours at Berlin.’51 While 
amateur values may have restricted the success of British athletes, there appeared to have been a certain 
satisfaction that they had not infringed any amateur rules and performed as a ‘gentleman’ should. This was 
more than could be said for many other nations, whose athletes ‘enjoyed government subsidies’ which had 
encouraged them to ‘train longer and more intensely.’ It was suggested that because foreign athletes were 
being ‘kept by their governments’, even prior to entering the Games, they already had an advantage over 
British competitors. Questions were also raised about how British athletes were expected to successfully 
compete against these nations, when not only did they have to treat the Games as their summer holidays 
and take unpaid leave, they also had minimal experience, a lack of support and mediocre training.52 Any 
hope that multiple poor Olympic performances might influence the structure of British sport was, however, 
clearly misplaced when Sir Noel Curtis Bennett (GB representative for the IOC) stated that, 
 
Sport should not become mixed with government...Olympic Games are now apt to be 
regarded as having some political significance and I think it is a pity that the running of a race 
should be considered a test of a country’s importance.53  
 
While the BOA report for 1936 concluded that devoting more time to specialist training and coaching 
would improve performance in the future it was questioned whether this would actually ‘demonstrate 
anything of national importance.’54 British sporting administration and organisation would continue to be 
rooted in its tradition and heritage, with its reliance on volunteerism and monetary donations.55 Remaining 
true to the belief that the ‘dear ol [sic] game is the thing that matters, and that results...are not of our 
concern’, would probably not continue to ensure success as it once had, but it would undoubtedly 
guarantee that British sport would remain amateur and ‘dignified.’56 
 
Coaching Schemes – Post-1937 
Following the Berlin Games, some individuals began to question why the German athletes had been so 
successful. Many attributed this to the ‘Strength through Joy’ movement which had been initiated by the 
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Nazi party in an attempt to improve the overall fitness of the German nation.57 But regardless of the root 
cause of German success, the Games had highlighted more than ever before, the impact that a poor level 
of national fitness was having in Britain. Fears were raised not only regarding athletes, but also for the 
quality of British soldiers if another war was to break out.58 Consequently, in 1937, the Physical Training 
and Recreation Act was established primarily in an attempt to improve and maintain the physical state of 
British citizens, although this Act was also to have an indirect impact on the level and quality of British 
coaching. The National Fitness Council (NFC) was established to organise and fulfil the requirements of the 
Act and to allocate financial assistance to organisations in order for them to educate and train teachers and 
physical training leaders, so that they could then disseminate their new found knowledge to others.59 In 
order to achieve a grant allocation, sporting organisations were invited to submit an application to the NFC 
for consideration. 
 
Athletics 
Prompted by the poor performances in Berlin and the possibility of a grant from the newly formed NFC, the 
AAA saw an opportunity to address the standard of coaching in Britain.60 Soon after the formation of the 
NFC in March 1937, the AAA submitted their proposals to Lord Aberdare, the Chair of the NFC, in an 
attempt to secure funding. It was repeatedly highlighted that ‘exercise for the multitude, rather than 
competition for the specialist’ was the underpinning rationale for their proposal. If the AAA were provided 
with the means to develop a ‘National Training College’, they guaranteed that ‘qualified instructors’ would 
be placed throughout the country so that they could ‘disseminate’ good coaching and technical 
knowledge.61 This ‘national scheme of instruction would be of great benefit’, not only to athletes, but also to 
those who have a desire for recreation because, ‘any game is more enjoyable when played properly.’62 
Despite this demonstration of interest from the AAA, the organisational ability of the NFC appears to have 
been somewhat ‘amateur’ itself because they failed to respond to the AAA until October 1937, some five 
months after the initial application. When the NFC finally did make contact they requested that a fully 
prepared proposal of the national scheme be delivered to them within a week. However, the AAA 
Committee, not a group who welcomed direction from others, responded accordingly, demanding that 
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‘more consideration’ be paid to them in the future and arguing that it was ‘hardly reasonable to expect a 
comprehensive national scheme to be produced at two days’ notice.’63  
The AAA, working to their own time scale, began to conduct research in order to asses to quality of 
coaching in Britain and develop plans for the scheme. A large number of questionnaires were distributed to 
clubs across the country and from the replies it was established that there were only seventeen paid 
coaches operating in England and Wales at the time, equating to only one available coach for every 200 
athletes who were interested in personal coaching. More promising for the AAA was that over 3,000 
individuals declared a desire to learn how to coach on a voluntary basis, if the resources were made 
available. However, the responses stressed just how serious the coaching situation in Britain had become. 
Although the AAA were taking steps to establish how to improve coaching and training facilities it was 
obvious that amateur hegemony still ruled sport in Britain. It was repeatedly highlighted by clubs around the 
country that ‘there are no grounds available. In city after city there is no running track and there are no 
facilities for field events.’ One response noted that in a city which had over a quarter of a million inhabitants 
there were no running tracks available for use. When it was questioned why large park areas could not be 
used to accommodate sporting endeavours, it was stated that ‘the chairman of the parks committee refuses 
to permit these sports to be held in any parks controlled by the corporation as he believes that they foster 
gambling.’64 There was still this underlying amateur fear in Britain that money could be used to corrupt 
sport and in some cases, the situation had degenerated into a scenario whereby the best way to ensure 
that sport remained ‘pure’ was by not allowing it to take place. The responses received were ‘sufficient 
testimony to the demand for coaching’ in Britain, and as such, the AAA submitted an official application to 
the NFC on 8 June 1938 requesting grant-aid for the employment of three full time paid coaches and an 
organiser ‘for the purpose of teaching running and field events’ and to ‘train other people likely to become 
coaches.’65 
On the 21 July 1938, the NFC awarded a grant to the AAA to enable them to ‘appoint a full time 
organiser to stimulate interest in physical training and recreation.’66 However, the AAA’s application for a 
grant to enable them to appoint three full time coaches remained ‘under consideration’ by the NFC. It would 
appear the idea of full-time coaches did not align itself to the NFC’s principles since, ‘at first sight we were 
a little doubtful about the proposal, as it is scarcely one of the purposes of the Act to train budding Olympic 
champions!’67 The NFC were apparently just as conscious, if not more so than the NGBs, that the first 
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priority for British coaching was not to coach elite athletes. The main emphasis of the NFC was 
volunteerism, a central tenet of amateurism. Deliberation continued over the grant to appoint three coaches 
and the AAA began to take action to appoint an organiser for the scheme by placing an advert in the Daily 
Telegraph. After receiving multiple applications, six individuals were selected for interview, and C. F. R. 
Hilton was subsequently appointed at the agreed sum of £450 per annum.68 Hilton was twenty-nine years 
of age and had considerable experience in the ‘organisation of all types of recreational work’ having 
previously been involved in the Physical Education department at Loughborough College.69 His references 
included one from J. W. Bridgeman, head of the Loughborough Summer School, who acknowledged that 
Hilton was ‘a man of good speech and attractive personality’, although ‘from an education point of view, 
Hilton lacks profound or deep knowledge of physical training or athletics.’ Bridgeman suggested that 
because such experience ‘are of secondary importance to you, I can recommend him well.’70 Apparently 
Hilton was well-known and popular amongst both the AAA and NFC Committees, so while he may not have 
been the most qualified candidate, he was probably selected because of his previous relationships with 
both associations. The AAA, in particular, would have wanted to select someone sympathetic to their 
approach and there appeared to be no threat from Hilton. He was amenable to accepting the traditional 
master-servant relationship required by the NGB and would go about his duties without questioning the 
committee. 
After much deliberation by the NFC they were finally satisfied that the scheme aligned itself to their 
ideals and a grant for 75 per cent of the salaries of three coaches was agreed. However, this was on the 
basis that they would visit local clubs and schools and ‘pass on enough of their own knowledge to some 
among those they teach to enable these in their turn to instruct their fellow members on an amateur 
basis.’71 However, the association were not satisfied with the offer, and initiated negotiations to secure a 
larger grant, arguing that the newly appointed coaches could not only be employed to train honorary 
coaches, but could also be used at the Loughborough Summer School.72 This would suggest that, despite 
outwardly accepting the use of coaches from abroad at the Loughborough Summer School, there remained 
an underlying uneasiness about the employment of foreign coaches to train British athletes, and the AAA 
saw the allocation of the NFC grant as an opportunity to remedy the situation. However, the NFC refused to 
allocate more money and the initial offer was, somewhat begrudgingly, accepted by the AAA. Although it 
                                                     
68 Amateur Athletic Association, Physical Fitness Committee Minutes, July 28, August 13, 1938, File 1/2/9/1, AAA Collection, 
Birmingham Archives; £450 in 1938 would be the equivalent of £24,088.50 in 2012. Information gathered from 
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/bills/article-1633409/Historic-inflation-calculator-value-money-changed-1900.html 
69 Amateur Athletic Association, Qualifications of Mr C F R. Hilton, File ED 113/54, NFC Collection: AAA, NA. 
70 F J. Davis to E J. Holt, August 22, 1938, File 113/54, NFC Collection: AAA, NA; J W. Bridgeman to E J. Holt, August 8, 1938, 
File ED 113/54, NFC Collection: AAA, NA. 
71 H B. Usher to D B Davidson, July 19, 1938, File ED 113/54, NFC Collection: AAA, NA. 
72 Amateur Athletic Association, Physical Fitness Committee Minutes, August 13, 1938, File 1/2/9/1, AAA Collection, Birmingham 
Archives. 
 50 
Tegan Carpenter July 2012 
 
soon declared that it did not have the funds available to appoint three coaches at £450 per head, even 
though it would only be required to cover 25 per cent of each of the salaries. The solution was to appoint 
three coaches, but at a reduced salary of £300 per annum, ensuring that the association would only be 
liable to pay a maximum of £225 for each coach. Advertisements were placed in the Daily Telegraph, 
Manchester Guardian and Birmingham Daily Post to ensure that coaching opportunities were widely 
circulated.73 Although these initiatives heralded the prospect of a AAA coaching scheme finally being 
initiated in Britain, it was declared in February 1939, that the AAA had made such a substantial loss in 1938 
that they could no longer afford to appoint coaches in the Midlands and the North. If these districts still 
wished to appoint coaches they would have to finance it themselves. In the South, however, a position 
could be filled immediately. Hilton, the scheme organiser, suggested that instead of appointing professional 
coaches, they could use students of the Loughborough Summer School as voluntary coaches. Each coach 
would serve four clubs and the AAA would pay them a maximum of £2 per week to cover expenses.74  
Despite efforts to move away from the traditional approach to British coaching it seems that 
amateurism still exerted a considerable influence. By using a lack of money as an excuse for why 
professional coaches could not be appointed, the AAA, for the most part, would continue to function as it 
always had, relying on, and having a preference for, amateur honorary coaches. The exception was the 
appointment of a single professional coach to work in the South. After receiving few applications for the 
post it was decided that Franz Stampfl, an Austrian by birth, would be appointed. Stampfl who was twenty-
nine years old had himself been a successful athlete until 1934, when he decided to take up coaching. He 
had been involved in the Loughborough Summer School and taken various coaching positions throughout 
the country where he had given ‘complete satisfaction.’75 The quality of his coaching attributes were well 
known within the AAA and made him an ideal candidate for the position. However, the appointment of a 
foreign coach was not supported by everybody for it highlighted the deficiencies which existed in the quality 
of British coaches. Henry Pelham, who was a member of the NFC Committee, stated ‘I do not much like the 
idea of the appointment of an Austrian refugee to a post the salary of which will be mainly found from 
Government funds’ and went further to suggest that he would ‘very much prefer the appointment of an 
Englishman.’76 Fearful of the matter being raised in Parliament, Captain Lionel Ellis contacted two former 
Olympic athletes and now MPs, Lord Burghley and Phillip Noel-Baker, to solicit their views on ‘the 
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appointment of a foreigner’ to such a position.77 Both Baker and Burghley agreed that Stampfl was ‘more 
likely to be satisfactory’ than any British coach, stressing that the only alternative would be Alec Nelson, 
who was currently employed at Cambridge, but would soon be seventy and had not even applied for the 
role.78 Although the NFC were ‘surprised to find that we have no British coach really capable’, after much 
persuasion from the AAA Committee and various other sources, they agreed to allow the appointment of 
Stampfl.79 The uneasiness surrounding Stampfl’s appointment soon became irrelevant when the Home 
Office became involved. In the build-up to the war they had been placed on high alert and the ‘Security 
People’ had a ‘serious objection to Mr. Stampfl being employed by the Amateur Athletic Association as 
their principal coach’, not only because he would potentially be required to visit ‘Service Depots’, but also 
because they had doubts regarding his credentials as a coach.80 At the outbreak of the war in 1940, 
Stampfl was interned as an enemy alien and sent to Australia on board the ‘Dunera’. The ship was 
torpedoed by a German U-boat, but Stampfl survived and he returned to Britain after the end of the war in 
1946.81 Similar to the fate suffered by previous attempts to establish a national coaching contingent, the 
outbreak of the war caused an abrupt end to the scheme.82 However, unlike the programme which involved 
Knox in 1914, it would not be another thirty-three years before another full time professional coach was 
appointed, because soon after the war had ended immediate attempts were made by both the AAA and the 
Amateur Swimming Association (ASA) to re-establish coaching schemes.83 
 
Swimming 
Sir Henry Pelham of the NFC wrote to Alderman Harold Fern (ASA honorary secretary, 1921-70 and 
President of FINA, 1936-48) on 21 October 1937, indicating that grant aid for ‘games and athletic bodies’ 
would soon be available to enable them to ‘appoint a whole-time organiser to go about the country 
gingering things up.’ Pelham asked if the ASA ‘have in mind putting in an application of this sort’, and if this 
was the case could he be informed quickly so that it could be raised at the next meeting of the sub-
committee.84 It is not clear why Pelham had written to the ASA directly, particularly when there is no 
evidence to suggest that this was done for other sports. Perhaps the ASA was offered this ‘luxury’ of an 
early indication that the grants would be available because Fern was an active member of the NFC 
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Advisory Council and had a number of contacts within the NFC. Fern responded quickly, some four days 
later, indicating that ‘for some time past I have been working on a scheme for submission to the Grants 
Committee’ and he began formalising plans so that an official application could be submitted.85 Similar in 
scope to the AAA proposals, the aim was to ‘create swimmers, not would-be champions’ and, therefore, 
when an individual had become a ‘competent swimmer, he or she would no longer be eligible for 
instruction.’ However, it was hoped that once an individual had been taught how to swim they would join 
the local clubs, but this needed to be kept in perspective because this was ‘not the purpose of the 
scheme.’86 The ASA believed that the ‘appointment of a whole-time paid organiser would be of great 
assistance in spreading cult of swimming’, so much so that they suggested two organisers should be 
appointed, one for the North and one for the South.87 Although the ASA valued the amateur tradition, and 
did their upmost to uphold its values, it was clear that this ethos, coupled with a lack of finance, had 
significantly impacted on the scale of work they had been able to accomplish. Fern also emphasised how 
‘over-worked’ the officials of the ASA were because they all donated their time freely and carried out their 
duties on an entirely ‘honorary basis.’88  
The NFC agreed that providing financial support would potentially improve the running efficiency of the 
ASA but they declared that they would be unable to authorise grant-aid for two organisers because they 
had to ‘adhere to the practice which they had followed in other cases’, so they would only offer a grant of 
£450 a year to fund the appointment of one organiser.89 Fern responded unfavourably to this rejection 
arguing that during the discussions prior to the grant allocation, there was no suggestion that it would not 
be awarded. In fact, it had been unanimously agreed by the committee that ‘the work contemplated was 
much too heavy for one organiser, and that two was the minimum to warrant the ASA embarking on the 
scheme with any expectation of success.’ The ASA, but particularly Fern, interpreted the rejection as a lack 
of ‘sufficient confidence in the ASA Committee’s knowledge and experience.’ As a result, the ASA 
‘regrettably’ decided to reject the offer for one organiser and declared that there was ‘no point in troubling 
the Board further on the matter’, because it would appear that neither party was willing to compromise.90 
The NFC appeared irritated by the ASA’s stance, stating that ‘there was never any lack of confidence in the 
ASA’ and that they were merely following procedure because, until a scheme had proved worthy, it would 
not be justified to provide further grant-aid for a second organiser. They also added, in a somewhat 
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disgruntled tone, that ‘other bodies have found it possible to start with one officer’ and that, to date, the 
ASA was the ‘only organisation so far to reject…help.’91   
At the next meeting of the NFC Grants Committee in December 1937, Fern took the opportunity to 
once again raise his ‘protest’ against the committee’s refusal to fund two organisers. Although he stated 
that he was ‘not seeking to re-open the matter’, it was clear he was trying to provoke a reaction from the 
committee when he highlighted that ‘the Association only sought to help forward the work which the 
National Fitness Council was formed to undertake, and I thought that some advance might be made by the 
appointment of two organisers.’92 Fern tried to build a case for his argument by suggesting that the sport of 
swimming was potentially of greater value than others and, therefore, financial support should be more 
forthcoming. He emphasised that ‘all the officials work in an honorary capacity and there is no paid staff as 
in the case of a good many other governing bodies of sport.’ It was clear he viewed swimming as a superior 
activity, because although he was ‘all in favour of helping other sports’, he suggested that as the 
‘circumstances’ and ‘opportunities’ were different in these other governing bodies, unlike swimming, they 
were not as well placed to gain immediate results. The NFC Committee had previously claimed that the 
grant allocation was refused, because ‘hitherto no voluntary organisation had been given financial 
assistance for more than one organiser.’ As a result of this, Fern wished to register his protests ‘against 
such a rule of thumb attitude.’93 The committee responded by highlighting that the NFC ‘attach the greatest 
importance to the development of swimming along with other sports and are very sorry to think that we are 
not to co-operate to the fullest extent with the Amateur Swimming Association.’ Although they agreed that 
some amount of ‘elasticity’ was desirable when considering applications from various governing bodies, 
they were not willing to compromise on the decision they had already made but would be willing to 
‘consider the matter again at a later stage.’94 
Encouraged by this, the ASA decided to submit a further application in March 1938, to enable them to 
establish training centres and classes for candidates for the ASA certificate which would be open to 
amateurs and professionals alike.95 In order to fulfil the proposal and ensure its efficient running it was 
claimed, once again, that there was a need to appoint two organisers. Following much discussion and 
indecision, the committee eventually agreed to allocate funds towards two appointments.96 The NFC was 
willing to contribute ‘up to £450 a year each in the case of a man or £350 for a woman’ as well as £150 a 
year towards travelling expenses. Conditions were also attached to the intended appointments, whereby 
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the NFC Committee were only willing to offer a grant up until the end of March 1939 (less than a year), and 
the selected organisers would be required to submit reports to the NFC, describing in detail the work they 
had carried out so that the committee could monitor their activities.97 A sum of £300 per annum had also 
been made towards the ASA’s headquarter administrative expenses but the committee declared that such 
a grant was ‘contingent on the appointment of the two proposed organisers.’98 Fern was less than satisfied, 
stating that not only would the appointment of two organisers ‘take some time to arrange’, but also that the 
‘administration expenses of the Association have increased considerably because of the activities of the 
National Fitness Council’, something Fern was having to cover personally.99 The NFC responded by 
explaining that because the Grant Committee had recently changed their policy, thereby allowing the ASA 
funding for two organisers, it was necessary to attach conditions to the grants for headquarters 
expenses.100 The grants were ‘intended to cover the increased work which the newly appointed organiser 
would create if he were doing his job properly’ and, therefore, ‘one half of the…grant would begin with each 
of the two organisers.’ However, it was suggested that if the ASA ‘did not feel satisfied with the conditions 
attached’ they should submit a case in writing so that it could be re-considered.101 Fern took it upon himself 
to complain, and this time the NFC was willing to compromise on the matter, stating that the ‘special 
situation of the ASA renders it desirable to make some concession.’102 It was agreed that two-thirds of the 
administrative grant would commence from 1 May 1938, and the remaining one-third would be payable 
upon the appointment of the two organisers.103 
The ASA began advertising for organisers and in June 1938 the NFC were informed that Miss Molly 
Laxton Lloyd had been appointed for the North of England and Miss Elaine Frances Burton for the 
South.104 The appointment of women in such a position could be considered unusual, not only for the time 
period, but also because no women had been appointed in a coaching or organising position by any other 
governing body to date. It was emphasised by the ASA that ‘people of the right type and quality are 
obviously not attracted by an appointment for such a limited period’, which suggests that women may have 
been selected because not only would it cost the ASA less money than if they were to appoint men (£350 
per annum compared to £450) but also because the length of appointment was so short.105 Burton was 
thirty-four years old and held a diploma in teaching; although she possessed ‘time certificates of the ASA’, 
there is no mention in her application that she held any swim coaching or teaching certificates. It was also 
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noted that she was unemployed at the time of application because she wanted to utilise her time efficiently 
and did not want to accept ‘minor posts.’ As a child she had been successful in athletics, achieving the title 
of ‘world sprint champion’, and later went on to become an honorary coach for Leeds City teams.106 There 
is no suggestion that she had much experience in swimming, from either a coaching or administrative 
perspective, but it can be assumed that the ASA believed her skills would be transferable from one sport to 
another. Laxton on the other hand, could be considered somewhat more qualified for the position; she was 
thirty-five years old and held a Physical Training Diploma and Advanced Teacher’s Certificate for the 
ASA.107 The ASA Teacher’s Certificate had emerged in 1919 as part of a reform to the Professional 
Certificate, which had been first introduced in 1899 when there had been difficulty in securing enough 
amateurs to take up teaching roles, causing the ASA to concede that ‘professional teachers were 
necessary for the widespread propagation of swimming.’108 This introduction of a teaching certificate could 
be interpreted as a shift towards a greater acceptance of professionalism, particularly when it is considered 
that very few other sports developed such schemes, but closer analysis suggests that its creation was less 
to do with progress and more the result of the ASA’s desire to remain in control. By introducing certification, 
professional teachers and coaches could be regulated under the ASA’s jurisdiction ensuring that they 
would not confront the authority of amateur administrators and thereby maintain the preferred master-
servant relationship.109  
The first report which Burton sent to the NFC Committee highlighted a ‘crying need…for leaders’ 
noting that, although the ‘enthusiasm is there’, individuals’ contributions were restricted for financial 
reasons.110 Burton and the ASA proposed that six courses should be developed around the country, so that 
those interested in voluntary service could ‘improve their own swimming, learn the art of imparting it to 
others and thus enable the clubs who have not the means to provide their own coach to have equal 
advantages with others better off than themselves.’ Individuals ‘would contribute to the cost according to 
their ability, but nobody would be debarred’, and it was hoped that the remaining costs would be covered 
by a grant from the NFC Grants Committee. It was intended that the course would last for six months and 
each candidate would attend one night per week. On completion of the course it was envisaged that each 
candidate would have gained the ASA Teachers Certificate and the Bronze Medallion and Intermediate 
Certificate from the Royal Life Saving Society.111 The time and effort required to achieve teaching and 
coaching qualifications in swimming was considerably greater than in other sports, and this continued to be 
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a factor as these courses progressed and developed. For example, the ASA Coaches’ Certificate, 
established in 1955 had a consistently low pass rate. In 1957, out of the nineteen candidates who took part, 
only six completed the course successfully, while in 1959, of the nineteen candidates, nine were 
successful.112 The NFC Grants Committee could see the benefit of running teaching and coaching courses 
and agreed to provide a grant of £300 to enable the ASA to organise the proposed six courses.113  
The NFC Grants Committee were so satisfied with the work of both Burton and Lloyd that, after three 
months of service, they agreed to extend the grant for their salaries until March 1940.114 Also, they 
proposed to Fern that they would be willing to offer a 75 per cent grant towards the employment of a full-
time coach so that a contingent of honorary coaches could be produced. It was envisaged that this 
programme would be organised and run along similar lines to those seen in other sports, in particular the 
AAA.115 However, far from welcoming the offer, Fern remained cautious, suggesting that the ASA would not 
be able to raise the remaining 25 per cent of the salary and the required travelling expenses, because they 
‘were already finding it difficult’ to cover the cost of the two organisers. Fern highlighted that ‘by employing 
two women organisers, we are spending less in salaries than was authorised had men organisers been 
engaged’, and even then they still found it difficult to provide the required finance.116 It was concluded, that 
with regards to the appointment of a full time professional coach, the ASA ‘had no funds available for such 
a purpose- desirable as it is.’117 The development of the ASA had apparently, once again, been limited by 
lack of funds, as was the case with so many of the amateur national sporting bodies during this period. 
However, these problems were ultimately inconsequential because on the outbreak of the war in 1939, the 
country was placed in a state of ‘National Emergency’ and all the grants offered under the Physical Training 
and Recreation Act were terminated.118 Much progress had been made with regards to producing teachers 
and potential coaches in swimming, but this now ceased. Opportunities for similar ventures would once 
again become available after the end of WWII, but unlike the AAA, the ASA was somewhat slower in its 
uptake, and it was not until 1959 that the ASA accepted a Ministry of Education Grant to appoint Bert 
Kinnear as its first full time National Technical Officer. 
Regardless of the continuing decline of British sporting performances in the interwar period, partly 
because British athletes were now no longer able the contend with the coaching and training techniques 
being utilised in other countries, British sporting administrators still felt they had little to learn from foreign 
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coaches and athletes. Even though athletics were willing to accept some input from foreigners, their advice 
appeared to have little impact on British sport and administrators, who continued to organise sport in the 
way they had become accustomed to, along amateur lines. These factors, coupled with the state of British 
society following WWI and the general indifference of the British public regarding the issues of sport, did 
not create an environment which was conducive to the development and formalisation of British coaching. 
The following chapter will trace the progress of British coaching in the immediate post-war period and 
examine how and why professional coaches continued to struggle to find acceptance within British sport.  
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Chapter Three: British Sporting Decline and Post-War Coaching Developments 
Despite the significant social changes that marked British society in the immediate post-war period, 
evidence suggests that much of British sport returned to its pre-war values. This chapter explores how this 
return to pre-war practices and values, which was characterised by the retention of control by amateur 
administrators, was reflected in the intended purpose of the revitalised coaching schemes. Firstly, this 
chapter analyses the relationship between society and sport and reveals how post-war sporting 
performances appeared to mirror the widespread decline in society and demonstrates how this may have 
encouraged the uptake of coaching schemes. The adoption of the coaching schemes are also explored 
and while this uptake appeared to indicate that the National Governing Bodies (NGB) seemed willing to 
accept a small amount of fluidity regarding the amateur definition on coaching, they ensured that they 
remained in control by continuing to exert the master-servant relationship over their coaches. Although 
coaching schemes had become more widespread, this section demonstrates how, similar to previous 
coaching developments which had an indirect connection to government, the emphasis of these new 
coaching initiatives remained with the production of a contingent of honorary coaches, rather than 
exceptional athletes. Finally, this chapter examines how the refusal of the Amateur Swimming Association 
(ASA) to not only apply for grant-aid, but reject it when it was offered, potentially indicates that this NGB did 
not want to lose its authority or autonomy by relinquishing some of its control to an external organisation. 
 
Post-War Context 
During the war the government began to have a much greater role in the everyday lives of the British 
public. In 1940, rationing was introduced as part of the war effort, and although it was not initially 
welcomed, it was gradually acknowledged that such measures had been introduced to safeguard people’s 
welfare, regardless of their social status. This increase in government involvement in individual’s lives was 
believed to have a positive impact, and as a result, there was a growing opinion that many did not want a 
see a return to the pre-war order. People began demanding some form of reassurance about post-war 
society and a guarantee that the sacrifices and hardships that the majority had endured, would be 
‘rewarded with a more just and egalitarian society’ once the conflict was over.1 In other words, the majority 
of working class people wanted to see ‘an end to the tradition of “privileged” and “leisured” classes.’2 Thus, 
after the government commissioned a report in 1941, which would address some of the most prominent 
issues in society, there was a widespread assumption that the government were fully committed to post-
war reform. However, the wartime government consisted of an all party coalition and the primary drive 
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behind the creation of a committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services, which would develop into the 
Beveridge Report, had come from Labour.3 The Conservative, Winston Churchill, believed that too much 
emphasis on social policy and reconstruction issues would only encourage the redirection of efforts away 
from the war effort and he was keen to delay the official publication until after the war.4 On the other hand, 
William Beveridge who had headed up the committee, believed that regardless of how controversial the 
recommendations were, and how they might be received by some, they needed to be in the public domain. 
As a result, in December 1942, the Beveridge Report was published with a solitary signature, Beveridge’s, 
after the remaining civil servants of the committee, for fear of repercussions, had removed their names from 
the final report.5 The principal points of the publication called for an extension and expansion of the current 
social services and a minimum subsistence for all, which was to include full employment, family allowances 
and a national health service.6 The report seemingly appealed to the public desire for an improved post-war 
society because within the first year alone it had sold over 600,000 copies.7 Eric Chamberlain suggests that 
if the Beveridge Report had been published before the war then it would probably have been dismissed as 
just another academic publication but the wartime conditions, which had created a desire for social 
revolution, ensured that it ‘set the agenda for social reconstruction for the next decade.’8  
Despite public and press response, to what was now being referred to as a ‘plan’, being positive and 
supportive, the government reaction was one of indifference. Although the wartime coalition presented a 
united front it was frequently interpreted that the ‘lukewarm attitude’ expressed towards the Beveridge 
Report was the result of the Conservative majority. It was widely believed that under Conservative rule, the 
changes required to ensure that post-war society was markedly different would never be implemented. 
Labour seized the opportunity to present themselves as the party who were ‘most likely to fulfil the public’s 
demand for post-war social reform.’ The strategy was to enhance their already strong working class appeal 
by ‘metaphorically linking arms with those who had fought the “people’s war”.’ Such an approach appeared 
successful when, on 26 July 1945, Labour achieved a 126-seat majority in the first general election after 
the war.9 
In the immediate post-war period, Britain underwent a ‘political revolution’ which, amongst other 
things, saw a change in political authority and the introduction of a welfare system. However, the much 
sought ‘social revolution’, which it was hoped would alter the British class system by blurring the barriers, 
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was not so forthcoming.10 Robert Mackay suggests that ‘while the war had highlighted some of society’s 
defects and given an impulse to social reform, victory seemed to imply that, for all its faults, the 
social...order was basically sound’ and consequently any impetus for change had been lost.11 In addition, 
prompted by the lack of suitable housing in the post-war period that stretched far into the 1950s, and the 
continuation of rationing, which had actually became more stringent after the war and did not fully cease 
until 1954, there was an increasing desire to return to normal in everyday life.12 ‘Normality’ for most would 
involve at least a partial transition to pre-war life, because although this time had become increasingly 
difficult, it was what the majority had become accustomed to. Post-war British sport, therefore, emerged as 
a reflection of a society in which ‘continuities were prized and came generally to prevail over any significant 
impulse for fundamental change.’13 Perhaps it was inevitable that sport would align itself to such principles 
in this way, because as Martin Polley highlights, ‘sport is not passive: it co-exists with its society.’14 This, 
coupled with a government that continued to distance itself from sport for fear of threatening the much 
cherished voluntary tradition, ensured that sport in Britain reverted back to its pre-war arrangement 
whereby ‘the amateur ethos continued to exercise significant influence over the practice and administration 
of English sport.’15  
This somewhat rapid return to the pre-war values of sport had been expected by some. Not only had 
wartime developments helped solidify the ideals of amateurism, they had also offered an early indication 
that any post-war shift from amateurism would be resisted. Throughout the war, a number of restrictions 
had been placed on both spectating and participation in sport. Sporting grounds had been requisitioned for 
the war effort, sporting equipment gradually began to deteriorate and there was also a shortage of 
personnel for public transport, which when coupled with the blackout regulations, significantly reduced the 
opportunity for public activity.16 There was also a growing debate, particularly amongst government 
officials, as to whether sport was actually negatively impacting on the war effort. Whilst it was 
acknowledged that participation in sport positively contributed to morale and fitness levels amongst both 
civilians and military personnel, there was a belief that spectator sports were directing attention away from 
critical areas.17 Such debates were in fact nothing new, similar sentiments had been raised during WW1 
when it was agreed that professional football ‘kept the man who played from the trenches, it kept the man 
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who watched from the factory.’18 Nobody added more weight to this argument during WWII than Sir 
Stafford Cripps, who exclaimed that ‘dog racing and boxing displays…are completely out of accord with the 
true spirit of determination of the people…no longer [should they] be allowed to offend the solid and serious 
intention of the country to achieve victory.’19 Consequently, unlike the previous war where some 
professional spectator sports, such as football, had continued to function for some time during the conflict, 
tight limitations were imposed by the government to ensure spectatorship was significantly reduced.20  
Although these restrictions were predominately directed towards spectator sports, in reality, despite 
the widespread acknowledgement of the benefits of sports participation, playing sport was somewhat 
confined to the armed services. These limitations may have helped solidify and ensure the longevity of 
amateurism. Critics of gambling in sport suggested that the reduction in the availability of professional 
sports during the war ‘added strength to their already well-established campaigns.’ This weakening of the 
bonds between gambling and sport may have slowed the process of professionalisation in British sport, 
ensuring that traditional ‘amateur’ values remained dominant.21 In addition, military sport, particularly the 
army, was governed by a set of ‘amateur’ rules which had been established by the Army Sports Control 
Board in 1918. These rules suggested, amongst other things, that games should be played ‘for the game’s 
sake’ and that an individual should always play ‘for his side and not for himself.’ The list of eight published 
guidelines, which were strictly enforced by army officers, would ensure that all soldiers were ‘good 
sportsmen.’22 It was noted in one press report that a number of ‘Olympic Probables’ for the 1948 Games 
had been introduced to their chosen event while serving in the forces during the war, so it could be 
assumed that many British athletes in the immediate post-war Games had been indoctrinated with an 
unquestioning respect for amateurism, something which may also have had an impact on their level of 
performance.23 
Towards the end of the war, some sports had begun to appoint committees to plan for post-war 
developments. Although these initiatives appear to indicate that certain sports were willing to incorporate 
change, for the most part the majority of the more radical suggestions were opposed by influential 
administrators. Considering that a large proportion of administrators remained largely unchanged from the 
interwar period, it appeared inevitable that suggestions which indicated a possible shift towards a more 
professional approach would be rejected. For example, in 1943, the football ‘War Emergency Committee’ 
presented plans to the Football Association Council which suggested that the ‘game for game’s sake’ 
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attitude which had been adopted during the war should be encouraged once the conflict was over to ensure 
that the nature of football was kept in ‘perspective.’ While this proposal was welcomed by the Council, other 
suggestions which ‘departed radically from past practices’, such as the formation of a Sunday football 
association, were not well received, somewhat surprisingly given the relationship that football always had 
with professionalism.24 Similarly, the plans for cricket, which were published in an interim report in 1945, 
proposed the formation of a knockout cup, which it was stressed, had been the result of increasing public 
demand. However, the ‘ultra conservative elders of the game’ strongly resisted its implementation which 
ensured that such a competition, in the form of the Gillette Cup, did not emerge until 1963. These examples 
of resistance to rule changes highlight that for all the planning and proposed developments, the ‘old school’ 
elite still remained very much in control of sport.25 
This return to the traditional means of sport organisation and administration, which was guided by 
amateur hegemony, ensured that gradually diminishing international performances, which had become 
commonplace before the outbreak of the war, stretched far into the immediate post-war period. The 
prominence of British sport continued to decline rapidly, particularly between the periods of 1948-53. British 
tennis players were convincingly defeated at Wimbledon, boxers lost their world titles to opponents from 
abroad, the English cricket team were beaten by Australia, New Zealand and the West Indies, and the 
football team were defeated by the United States in their first appearance at the World Cup in 1950, a 
defeat compounded further with the loss of its unbeaten home record to Hungary in 1953.26 Many critics 
began to emerge in a multitude of sports, none more so than in rowing where Britain, considered the 
birthplace of the sport, was now being beaten by ‘lesser’ nations. This lack of achievement and loss of 
prestige within Europe was being made even more humiliating due to the fact that successful scullers, who 
had been acting as honorary coaches in Britain, were now being appointed as full-time coaches abroad. 
Eric Phelps, for example, a rowing coach who at the time was coaching Britain’s best amateur rower, ‘had 
been forced to accept a post in Argentina where excellent terms were offered for the very work he wanted 
to do here, and was never invited to undertake.’27 Poor results of British athletes on the international 
sporting circuit were something the nation was seemingly becoming accustomed to, partly as a 
consequence of the coverage given to their meagre performances within the British press. Papers such as 
the traditionalist The Times and the conservative Daily Express passed judgement on the sporting 
performances of the era, perhaps in an attempt to stimulate improvements to the British sport system.28 For 
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example, in 1947, it was suggested that ‘British boxing has never been so severely crushed’ and that its 
prestige and quality had ‘descended into the ground floor.’ The only consolation that could be taken from 
such a situation was that America was faring just as badly.29 American defeat in sporting endeavours was 
particularly welcomed in Britain, because the resentment towards America noted during the interwar period 
had became further entrenched in the post-war period. Beginning in 1942, many American service 
personnel were stationed in Britain, a process which eventually saw nearly 3,000,000 American GI’s 
residing throughout the country.30 They were highly paid, receiving £3 8s 9d a week compared to a British 
soldier’s 14s, and they filled the void left by the missing British men.31 Wartime conditions were already 
conducive for many married women to ‘drift’ but the high concentrations of US service men made this more 
possible, and the return of British soldiers after the conflict was over resulted in a marked increase in the 
number of divorce petitions. Whereas only 9,970 had been filed in 1938, by 1945 this number had risen to 
24,857, of which, 70 per cent claimed adultery as grounds for divorce.32 Additionally, many GI’s had taken 
brides whilst in Britain, and once the war ended endeavoured to take them home to America, but because 
not everyone approved of these relationships, numerous young women left the country without informing 
their families. From a British perspective, not only had the Americans been the highest paid soldiers in the 
world, which they made no attempt to conceal, they had also made family life increasingly difficult for many, 
particularly following their departure, which when coupled with post war conditions and low morale, 
contributed to a growing dislike for America in general.  
Although there were some isolated examples of sporting defeats experienced by the United States, 
American athletes continued to fare much better than Britain, which only led to further criticism in the press. 
With regards to tennis it was argued that it ‘is more poverty stricken than ever before. The complete 
annihilation of our Davis Cup team in Paris last summer was humiliating.’33 Wimbledon, the much 
cherished home-grown competition, had now descended into a ‘foreign-dominated championship’ and it 
was realised that the ‘Perry days are but beautiful memories for British tennis and that Wimbledon titles 
have been added to the long list of extravaganza for exports only.’34 It was clear that the very public defeats 
being suffered by British international sportsmen were less than satisfying for the British sporting public, 
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who were apparently beginning to get ‘a little tired of seeing their representatives laid in the dust more 
times than they are not.’35 
In many ways poor sporting results were merely a reflection of what was occurring in society in 
general. As a result of the war, Britain had suffered a significant drain on resources and was verging on 
bankruptcy with debts exceeding £3,000 million.36 Shortages were apparent in nearly all aspects of life, 
which were exacerbated by Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s secret £100 million investment in British atomic 
bomb development.37 Stephen Lee suggests, that Britain wanted to emerge as a nuclear power because 
‘she acknowledged her decline on the world scene’, something which, since the establishment of the Soviet 
Union and the United States as new world super powers, had become ever more apparent.38 Loss of 
productivity and industrial decline, both the result of the residual impacts of the war, were made more 
evident by the severe winter of 1947. Fuel shortages became widespread and this not only had an impact 
on export-earning capacity, but also caused a wave of unemployment, which at its peak had reached 
800,000.39 Although the introduction of a welfare system had signified positive progress, shortly after the 
introduction of the National Health Service in 1948 it was clear that Britain was not equipped to cope with 
the escalating costs of welfare and a number of cutbacks were quickly introduced.40 However, it was the fall 
of the Empire which signified, perhaps more than anything else, that Britain had entered a period of 
significant decline. Following the war, it had become clear that Britain would be unable to retain its position 
of authority, so the government initiated a process of decolonisation, which saw Britain grant independence 
to all its major colonies, beginning with India in 1947.41 
Whilst it was recognised that British economic and imperial decline would have inevitably impacted on 
sporting performances, there appeared to be a tendency to attribute all sporting failures to the war and its 
aftermath, to the extent that other factors failed to be acknowledged.42 Such an attitude disguised 
significant deficiencies in the British sport system, particularly those caused by the intransigence of 
amateurism, such as coaching and quality of training. It was also a common belief that Britain had suffered 
the greatest impact as a result of the war. However, the reality was that other countries, particularly France, 
had actually suffered a much more considerable drain on resources and yet were still achieving success in 
sport and beating Britain in the process. Even so, British sporting administrators still felt that they had little 
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to learn from individuals overseas and the suggestion to import foreign coaches was quickly rejected. 
Leading athletics coach, F. A. M. Webster, commented in The Times,  
 
The suggestion has now been made that we must employ foreign coaches. But why? We 
have the material and the men to handle it. No department of national life stands alone, and 
we shall lose more in prestige than we might possibly gain in performance by going hat in 
hand to some foreign country for a so-called expert.43 
 
As Norman Baker notes, there was still this belief that as the originators of modern sports, the British were 
the ‘teachers not the students.’ Britain would remain true to the virtues of amateurism, especially playing by 
the rules, even when there was increasing evidence that other nations, particularly America, were taking 
sport seriously.44 The British interpretation of this rigorous approach was that it would inevitably lead to 
athletes being willing to cheat to achieve success while their own approach would lead to athletes being 
respected for retaining respect for the amateur ethos. One press report, commenting on the British defeat 
by the Americans’ at the Walker Cup in 1947, suggested that it was ‘very sad’ but Britain could remain safe 
in the knowledge that they had played the game in the intended way, unlike the Americans.45 
Although the traditionalists had a desire to remain true to the virtues of amateurism, it was becoming 
clear that a proportion of the British public wanted an improvement in sporting performance and so 
changes needed to be made. The Daily Express argued that Britain ‘must stop playing games’ if they 
wanted to attain anything like their former standards of performance. Simply turning up to golf courses and 
sporting grounds and ‘playing at it’ was no longer enough to guarantee success. The British professional 
golfer, in particular, had a tendency to ‘arrive by car, look into his shop, look over the names of those 
members who may want a game, and, if there is nobody good enough for him, he steps into his car and 
drives off again.’ Although there had been a time in which this casual approach had been sufficient to 
ensure victory, all these athletes were doing was ‘deluding themselves that they can compete 
internationally.’46 It was now apparent that if individuals wished to succeed in the demanding world of sport, 
then not only would they require regular training and some form of coaching, but they also needed a 
‘keenness’ and ‘impudent confidence’, something it was argued, that was ‘entirely lacking amongst the 
Englishman.’47 James Rivers concluded, 
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For years Britain ruled the world at many sports. In more recent history there have been 
countless examples of the pupils outplaying the masters. Our stock attitude to this 
development has been one of complacency; our favourite phrase: “The game’s the thing.” So 
the first requisite of our plan must be a radical change of attitude, the inculcation of a new 
national idea that if a game is worth playing it is worth playing well…We have a glorious past, 
but let us not make the mistake of dwelling in it, and so ignoring the great task which lies 
ahead.48 
 
Echoes of post-1912 Stockholm debates could be heard when it was it was suggested, if British sport could 
not adapt to the modern requirements of competing and make the best possible showing then it was time to 
‘get-out’ of international sport altogether.49 Perhaps prompted by these calls to improve the quality of British 
athletes, and encouraged by their previous attempts to develop coaching schemes, two sports in particular, 
athletics and swimming, began to make preparations to develop and improve the quality of coaching 
available to British athletes. 
 
Post-1945 Coaching Scheme Developments 
Athletics 
In April 1946, discussions began within a number of Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) Committees 
regarding the possibility of creating a suitable national coaching scheme for British athletics. Encouraged 
by this, Lt Col Roland Harper, with the help of the newly formed Coaching Committee, began to develop 
ideas for a potential scheme, which included a suggestion for the appointment of a professional coach, and 
this was circulated to members of the AAA in September 1946.50 The ‘Development Committee’, of which 
Harold Abrahams was chairman, was satisfied with the proposals and made suggestions ‘regarding the 
appointment of a professional coach.’51 They recommended that Major Geoffrey Dyson be ‘tentatively 
approached’ regarding the position and that he be offered a two year contract at a salary of £700 for the 
first year which would then rise to £750 in the second. If he was not available it was suggested that the 
AAA should look to approach Austrian coach Hoke, and failing him, look to re-appoint Franz Stampfl. 
However, Dyson was satisfied with the terms of employment and consequently, in February 1947, with the 
aid of a £522 donation from the News of the World (not a Ministry of Education grant, which is the common 
                                                     
48 Geoffrey Cousins, ‘Golf’, in Sports Book 2: Britain’s Prospects, 188. 
49 John Macadam, ‘We Must Stop Playing Games’, Daily Express, November 10, 1947, 4. 
50 Amateur Athletic Association, Development Committee Minutes, April 27, July 27, 1946, File 1/2/10, AAA Collection, 
Birmingham Archives. 
51 Amateur Athletic Association, Development Committee Minutes, October 12, 1946, File 1/2/10, AAA Collection, Birmingham 
Archives. 
 67 
Tegan Carpenter July 2012 
misconception) they were able to provisionally appoint Dyson for two years.52 The AAA were happy with 
their appointment, and it would appear their judgement of his qualities as a coach were correct considering 
that he would later be repeatedly credited with the success of the coaching scheme and for, ‘laying its 
foundations.’53 However, initial satisfaction over their appointment would soon alter as conflict began to 
emerge between Dyson and AAA officials, primarily over the implications of amateurism. 
Dyson’s duties included, taking charge of the AAA coaching courses, co-ordinating the work of the 
AAA honorary coaches for the whole of Britain, and acting as chief coach at the yearly Loughborough 
Summer School.54 It should be noted that, although it was not stipulated that the duties of the national 
coach included the coaching of elite athletes, it was clear, initially at least, that this was to be one focus of 
his work since it had been a prerequisite of the donation from the News of the World. The AAA were only 
able to consider appointing a coach because of the significant contribution from the News of the World 
(who organised both the British Games in 1946 and various other athletics meetings). But this financial 
backing had been ‘specifically given for the purpose of employing a coach or coaches to help towards 
development for the Olympic Games 1948.’55 In a somewhat uncharacteristic disclosure, the amateur 
officials of the AAA commented: 
 
We realise that it is impossible to accomplish much in the way of producing first class athletes 
in such a short space of time for 1948, but a start has been made along these lines, not so 
much with the idea of producing world beaters, although we are keen to hold our own from a 
prestige angle.56 
 
It is apparent, that although amateurism was still highly valued within the AAA, the loss of prestige as a 
result of repeated defeats, particularly by American athletes, had begun to leave its impression. They would 
not directly contravene the ethos of amateurism, but they might be willing to compromise on certain areas. 
Perhaps this signalled one of the many shifts in the definition of amateurism which is highlighted in the 
opening of this thesis, whereby ‘amateurism was a state of mind, its rhetoric ever changing to justify 
itself.’57 As part of this new approach to coaching, the appointed professional coach could be ‘loaned to 
Oxford and Cambridge’ at a charge of £10 per week to train individual athletes. The use of professional 
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coaches to train athletes at Oxford and Cambridge was actually nothing new, since both Alec Nelson and 
Bill Thomas had been heavily involved in coaching duties during the 1920s and 1930s.58 It seems, 
therefore, that although the AAA may have compromised on some of their principles regarding amateurism, 
the developments which occurred as result were not particularly advanced, even in Britain.  
As time progressed, it was becoming increasingly evident that not only was the workload which had 
been delegated to Dyson far too demanding for just one individual but they were also struggling to pay his 
salary and so the AAA began to explore other options to expand their coaching scheme.59 Fortunately for 
the AAA, prior to the end of the war there had been significant, albeit inadvertent advances, most notably 
the 1944 Education Act, a by-product of the Beveridge Report, which had led to the development of the 
Ministry of Education, that would offer them the opportunity to gain the support they required.60 The newly 
formed Ministry took control of the 1937-9 NFC Grants Committee, and part of their remit was to provide 
financial support to sporting associations so that a national coaching scheme could be developed. Despite 
the availability of grants to enable the AAA to appoint further coaches, the AAA initially decided that the 
need for equipment was of greater importance, and so their first bid to the Ministry consisted of a request 
for £3,000 for javelins, discus, hurdles and other implements.61 This reinforces the low esteem afforded to 
coaching in Britain at the time, because although there were a number of honorary coaches already in 
place, the number of professional coaches was limited. But despite this, the acquisition of equipment was 
being prioritised above employing more coaches. As Britain’s failure in international sport had been 
repeatedly attributed to poor facilities and lack of equipment (rather than the restrictions of amateurism) it 
would appear that as soon as the money was available to remedy this, the AAA took the opportunity. But 
without a solid coaching foundation and the correct organisational structures, it was unlikely that simply 
supplying equipment to clubs and athletes would improve the quality of British athletics, but this was the 
typical ‘side-ways’ looking approach often taken by the AAA.62  
The second application was sent to the Ministry in August 1947 in hope of obtaining a grant for 80 per 
cent of the cost of the salary of three national coaches. When the grant was awarded, it provided the 
coaching scheme with the opportunity for ‘wider significance and much greater possibilities of expansion.’63 
However, both the grant, and the opportunity to work in co-ordination with the Ministry, came with 
conditions. The Ministry had to approve the AAA’s coaching appointments and the majority of the coaches’ 
time would be ‘devoted to the training of teachers, organisers and club coaches’, or as Peter Lovesey 
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describes it, ‘coaching the coaches’ and teaching the teachers.64 As the Ministry also requested six-weekly 
reports of the work undertaken by the national coaches, it was clear they were being closely monitored. 
The AAA were not in a particularly good financial position, and so decided to use the grant of one of the 
salaries to pay a proportion of Dyson’s wages, which meant that his role would now be required to meet the 
Ministry’s stipulations. Thus, the original intention of Dyson’s employment, which was to prepare the 1948 
Olympic squad, now became obsolete because the Ministry’s coaching scheme was not established to 
‘polish up a few stars’, but rather to disseminate a good knowledge of coaching and athletics around 
Britain.65 When Dyson subsequently trained Maureen Gardner to a silver medal in the 80m hurdles at the 
1948 Games, he did so on a voluntary basis. With the remainder of the grant money, Tony Chapman and 
Dennis Watts were appointed in September 1947 and 1948 respectively, although Chapman resigned in 
1949 ‘to take up a similar appointment in another country at a better salary.’66 Despite the coaching 
scheme still being in its formative years, coaches were already beginning to feel undervalued, and disputes 
between coaches and administrators over their value, status and monetary worth would soon become a 
common characteristic of the coaching scheme.  
Encouraged by their successful grant applications, the AAA requested further financial support for 
additional coaches, and in late 1948 they appointed Allan Malcolm and Jim Alford.67 However, despite 
British sport gradually beginning to build an affinity with coaching, for some it was proving a difficult 
adjustment. For years it had been acceptable to be a ‘good loser’ and the ‘important thing is taking part and 
not winning’, so the use of a coach had been considered unnecessary.68 Now coaches, albeit only a small 
number, were being appointed on a national scale, some readjustment would be required. However, the 
traditions of amateurism remained powerful and for some the shift from such an ethos would prove too 
difficult. Prior to the appointment of Jim Alford, who eventually took up his post for the Welsh AAA, some 
individuals questioned the need for a coach, even though the money had already been allocated. Mr Ray 
Thomas of the Welsh AAA ‘expressed the doubt of his association as to whether there would be sufficient 
work to occupy a coach for all the weeks of the year.’69  
A few of the coaches, like Dyson and Chapman, had been selected because they had previously been 
connected to the AAA through various coaching circles, but the remainder of the coaches were appointed 
via job advertisements. It was clear that coaching and training knowledge amongst British individuals was 
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limited, because when discussing applicants for the role of national coach, the AAA commented that ‘none 
of them possessed outstanding qualifications for the post.’70 However, a lack of expertise was to be 
expected since Britain, unlike other nations, did not yet have a system of wide-spread coaching. In order to 
be a successful coach, an expert technical knowledge is required which demands a professional approach 
and a willingness to commit a substantial amount of time and finance. The environment created during a 
time when sport was controlled by a ‘committee of part-time officials’ was not conducive to the development 
of coaching proficiency, so it is unsurprising that coaches such as Watts, Malcolm and Alford did not initially 
possess a comprehensive knowledge of successful coaching techniques.71  
Although the original intention of Dyson’s coaching role had been to train Olympic athletes, now that 
his salary was partially controlled by the Ministry, this was not his primary responsibility. Nevertheless, it 
was clear that some individuals could see the potential advantages of utilising the national coaches to train 
active athletes, and it was suggested that a small proportion of their time should be devoted to this. 
However, far from promoting the development of a system which could benefit both coach and athlete, the 
honorary secretary of the AAA promptly dismissed the suggestion, arguing that their roles needed to be 
kept in perspective and ‘that the employment is to be mainly to teach coaches and teachers.’72 Fear of 
reprisals from the Ministry was regularly used as a reason for not supporting the use of the national 
coaches to train elite athletes, but the AAA never appeared to question the Ministry regarding such a 
matter so it seems that they were quite content with such an arrangement. For amateur officials, this 
ensured that the work of the national coaches would remain “amateur” but without giving the appearance 
that they were insisting on this approach. However, the success of Gardener at the 1948 Olympics, who 
had been given voluntary training by Dyson, influenced this school of thinking. Following the 1948 Games, 
there appears to have been a greater degree of flexibility regarding the coaching of promising athletes, but 
this was only to be allowed on the proviso that the coach’s role was to be kept in perspective. 
 
Swimming 
In November 1946, the ASA appealed to the Ministry for financial support, not so they could appoint 
professional coaches, but so they could ‘develop courses of instruction in swimming for youth leaders and 
organisers’ in order to expand the ASA Teachers Certificate. In addition, because the ASA was in such a 
‘parlous state financially’ following the war, it was hoped financial support would be forthcoming for the 
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‘provision of clerical assistance.’73 Although the Ministry sympathised with the ASA’s situation, they were 
unable to provide this kind of monetary assistance because the capacity in which they could support was 
‘essentially in the direction of coaching personnel.’74 However the ASA Committee, in particular Alderman 
Fern, were not satisfied with this response, and Fern stated that he was ‘seriously thinking of giving up the 
work connected with the ASA Teacher Certificate’ because he did not feel ‘warranted’ to spend so much of 
his own money on such a cause. He hoped he would not have to ‘give up a life of work’ but the Ministry 
was making it difficult to see any other option.75 This type of outburst by Fern was nothing new, as can be 
seen from his previous behaviour in 1937 involving the NFC Committee. However this time, unlike the last, 
the Ministry were not willing to compromise. Although as a form of compensation they were willing to offer 
the ASA, as they had with every other sport, 80 per cent of the salaries for three to four coaches. 
Considering the ASA had not requested this and the Ministry had not been willing to support their previous 
proposal, it is unsurprising the ASA were not particularly receptive to the offer. They claimed they were not 
‘in a position financially to take advantage of it’ because unlike other amateur organisations, they were 
unable to raise their own income from events and ‘meets’ as there was not a pool in the country that was 
suitable.76 They thanked the Ministry for their offer but decided to reject it, urging them to re-consider the 
matter in the future.77 Considering the ASA did not submit another request for grant aid for coaching until 
almost ten years later when they were looking to appoint Bert Kinnear, it seems the Ministry were not 
prepared to compromise on the type of support they were willing to give. 
Although the ASA had not requested financial assistance from the Ministry for the employment of 
coaches they were still aware that some amount of coaching and training was required if British swimmers 
were to represent the ASA in a positive light. Prior to their grant rejection from the Ministry, the ASA had 
initiated a national appeal which was placed in the Swimming Times in order to raise monies to enable the 
British swimmers to make ‘an adequate contribution’ to the 1948 London Games. It was claimed that ‘six 
years of war and no income have left the Association very impoverished’ and the only way they could 
produce a ‘worthy team’ was through donations and fundraising from swimming clubs around the country.78 
Similar to the rationale behind Dyson’s early employment, the national appeal had been initiated so that 
British swimmers would be fully prepared for the impending Games. However, the training of Olympic 
athletes was to be kept in perspective. Although it was accepted that athletes must prepare for the Games, 
the scheme would remain true to the amateur ethos and it was imperative that this ‘training must not take 
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precedence over the training of school children.’79 In 1946, at the first ASA meeting since 1939, it was 
declared that £2,000 had already been raised through the national appeal, but if a ‘comprehensive training 
scheme’ was to be inaugurated then a further £4,000 was required.80 The appeal continued and a decision 
was taken to appoint Harry Koskie as ‘Chief Swimming Advisor’ (note how he was not referred to as a 
‘coach’) to make periodical visits to each district for the purpose of ‘seeing trainees in action’, and to 
discuss training with various coaches. Preparations also involved providing training facilities in 1947 and 
1948 at ‘Summer Camps’, which would eventually become the ‘Advanced Swimming and Coaching 
Course’ at Loughborough College.81 However, unlike the AAA, the ASA had raised enough funds to pay 
Koskie’s salary themselves and, therefore, they did not require further assistance from the Ministry. 
Although this meant that only one ‘advisor’ could be appointed, because Koskie was not controlled by the 
conditions of the Ministry grant, the ASA were able to continue to use Koskie’s coaching abilities as they 
had initially intended, and that was to coach potential Olympic athletes. As a result, resources began to be 
funnelled towards the preparation of British Olympic swimmers in order to make the best showing possible, 
and shortly after his appointment, Koskie addressed the Olympic hopefuls. Koskie’s coaching and training 
knowledge was significant and it was clear he had an understanding of the dangers of overtraining, even if 
it was not referred to as such. He suggested that competitors ‘in their own and the nation’s interest’ should 
refrain from participating in exhibition swims because the involvement of ‘long and tiring journeys and loss 
of sleep’ could inadvertently impact on the swimmers’ physical state. He went further to suggest that 
‘swimmers who wish to attain the highest honours should be prepared to accept reasonable guidance.’82 
These statements appear somewhat ambiguous, it is not clear whether it was said to reassure athletes 
they would receive the support they required, or to prepare athletes to accept some amount of coaching. 
For each athlete who wanted some form of coaching there was probably another who was wary of allowing 
a coach to ‘tamper’ with their training. Nevertheless, it was obvious that with the assistance of Harry 
Koskie, the ASA were beginning to address the coaching and training issues within British swimming. 
The ‘First Special Course’ was held at Loughborough College for two weeks in August 1947. Forty-
seven swimmers and seven coaches who had been recommended by Koskie were invited to attend by the 
ASA. Max Madders, once an international swimmer and now a lecturer in Physical Education at 
Birmingham University, had been persuaded to contribute to the course by organising sessions and talks 
on the benefits of physical and relaxation exercises.83 Although the intentions of the course were good, and 
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this was the first course of its kind in British swimming, because the course was held at Loughborough, 
pool time was extremely limited and on average each swimmer would only be in the water for 
approximately two hours a day.84 However, it would appear that water fitness was not the primary objective 
from Koskie’s perspective; he had recognised the benefits of creating a good rapport between the Olympic 
hopefuls which could then be successfully utilised during the Games. Methods of building team spirit were 
to constitute a ‘special feature’ of the course, something which Koskie confessed he was ‘fanatical’ about. 
The programme received good publicity thanks to the initiative of Koskie in inviting the BBC to attend and 
this certainly raised the profile of British swimming, which was undoubtedly Koskie’s intention. In his final 
observations, Koskie commented on the potential benefits of the whole Olympic team training together for 
one month prior to the Games, but he went on to explain ‘as we are all amateur, I realise this cannot be 
considered but it also does not prevent one from wishing it was possible to complete the job.’ It was 
obvious to Koskie, the amateur ruling had a restrictive impact on the quality and possible achievements of 
British swimming. Whether because of his frustrations or because of a desire to direct his attention 
elsewhere, Koskie, while stating that without question a Loughborough school should be held every year as 
it ‘could not fail to raise the standard of British swimming’, requested that he ‘not be invited to be 
responsible.’85 
The second Loughborough Summer School was held in March 1948, and made up the final part of 
Koskie’s two year plan to prepare Olympic hopefuls for the London Games. This course compared with the 
previous one, aligned itself more closely with some scientific principles (Loughborough is discussed in 
detail in chapter nine). Dr Richard Bolton, from Birmingham University, examined every swimmer on the 
course and monitored them for the duration. Max Madders was again in attendance, this time offering 
physiotherapy to the swimmers. There appeared to be great deal of variation in the amount of science that 
was incorporated in the first two Loughborough Summer Schools. However, compared to the sports 
science and training occurring in other nations at the time, it could be considered fairly basic, and rather 
than being used to improve performance, it was primarily used to monitor responses to exercise. To 
guarantee the programme did not appear too professional and to ensure it remained in keeping with 
amateur principles, all the individuals who donated their services had done so in an honorary capacity.86 
One benefit to arise from the course was the opportunity for the ASA to select swimmers for the 1948 
Olympic team, including Bert Kinnear (who would go onto be the first National Technical Officer for the 
ASA). It is safe to assume that he had been in attendance at the first two Summer Schools and this is 
reminiscent of Dyson’s experience since both men attended Loughborough as athletes and then went on to 
                                                     
84 Ibid., 36. 
85 Ibid. 35, 38. 
86 Amateur Swimming Association, Annual Report 1948-‘Olympic Games (1948) Preparation 2nd Special Training Course 
Loughborough College, March 26-April 4, 1948’, 29-31, ASA Headquarters. 
 74 
Tegan Carpenter July 2012 
 
ensure the further development of the course. Both were probably influenced by their encounters and 
experiences at Loughborough, Dyson by Webster and Kinnear by Koskie. 
Koskie had been appointed as chief swimming advisor in 1946 on the premise that he would gather 
and condition a group of swimmers to represent Britain at the 1948 Games and ‘lay foundations for the 
future’ which would include preparations for Helsinki in 1952.87 As Koskie possessed a comprehensive 
technical swimming knowledge, it might be assumed that part of that role would include selecting the best 
potential swimmers for the 1948 Olympic squad. However, although the ASA were willing to take his 
recommendations into consideration, the final decision on who was selected was their responsibility and 
‘the Committee reserve the right to make such additions or alterations to the list as circumstances 
demand.’88 This is a clear example of the ASA’s determination to remain in control of their professional 
coach. Although they would allow an advisor to ‘assist’ them, crucial decisions would be managed by them, 
even though the committee themselves would almost certainly have lacked the expertise of a man like 
Koskie when making these judgements.  
This desire of the administrators to maintain control was common at this time, and comparisons of 
such instances can be drawn across the sports between both Koskie and Dyson. In 1958 during an 
interview, Dyson commented that it should become a requirement for the British team coach to be in 
attendance during team selection because throughout his eleven years of duty this had only occurred on a 
single occasion. He went further to explain, that apart from one exception at the 1952 Games, the team 
coach ‘had little to say in determining relay running orders’ and Dyson saw this as ‘most unsatisfactory.’ He 
suggested that the desire of the amateur officials and administrators to remain in control, and the 
resistance they displayed towards professional coaches, was due to a belief, that if the ‘influence of 
professional coaching increases it will dominate athletics to the detriment of the sport.’ However, Dyson 
claimed that this was an error, and that ‘professional coaching seeks no more power than is needed to 
serve our international athletes efficiently.’89 It was obvious that amateur administrators would continue to 
rule their sport and employ mechanisms to prevent powerful professional coaches from gaining control. 
Evidence from elsewhere suggests that the hostile environments experienced by Koskie and Dyson were 
not isolated cases. In 1949, the Oxford University Athletic Club (OUAC) had established the ‘need for a full 
time professional coach’ and, based on the advice of the AAA Coaching Committee, they employed John 
Jeffrey.90 He was twenty-two and had qualified at Loughborough College, where he had undoubtedly 
interacted with, and been influenced by Dyson. Essentially, he was a product of Dyson’s teaching and 
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coaching, and this was inevitably going to be an issue for the OUAC, especially considering how badly 
Dyson had been received by them in the summer of 1947. (This will be covered in depth in the following 
chapter). It was noted that after Jeffrey had completed two terms, the ‘standard of performances at the top 
of the OUAC had probably never been much higher.’ But the committee were less than satisfied with 
Jeffrey because his coaching methods were not considered ‘the Oxford approach’, and ‘if given a free 
hand’, he would endeavour to organise training along American lines. There was a fear that if this situation 
was allowed to continue, and Jeffrey was allowed to become established within the club, that he would be 
able to manipulate ‘officials of the club who are younger and less experienced than him.’ To avoid Jeffery 
gaining too much influence and to ensure that he realised ‘the coach is the advisor to the club and not the 
controlling brain behind its organisation’ restrictions were put in place. With regard to team selection, the 
president retained ‘complete discretion in selecting teams’ but could, on occasions, seek consultation from 
the coach. Jeffrey was not allowed to be a member of the OUAC Committee or attend any Annual General 
Meetings and he was not to be included in any of the team photos or ‘listed amongst the officials of the 
club.’ The lengths to which the OUAC Committee were willing to go to ensure that a coach did not assume 
any real authority within the club, accentuate how amateurism continued to be valued within the club. This 
scenario resonated with Dyson’s comments about the influence of professional coaching and its 
relationship to power. There was evidently an underlying fear within the OUAC, that a strong-willed 
(professional) coach would somehow have the ability to overpower a weak committee and then alter the 
direction of Oxford athletics, something which they had fought so hard to build and maintain. Despite 
improving the performance of many OUAC athletes, Jeffrey was viewed as a threat to both the committee 
and their sporting values and, as a result, he was dealt with accordingly. It is therefore unsurprising that 
Jeffrey did not stay at the OUAC for long. In 1953 he resigned which was a satisfactory outcome for the 
OUAC because he had on ‘many occasions taken offence’ to their decisions and as such was ‘not the ideal 
type of coach’ for the club.91 The committee did recognise however, that ‘while lacking the personal 
understanding of the great coach’ he had brought with him a scientific approach which had undoubtedly 
made the OUAC ‘less of a slapdash, haphazard affair.’92 Although they were not comfortable with an 
‘American type’ coach like Jeffrey, perhaps the barriers towards specialisation in the sport were gradually 
being lowered. 
In the immediate post-war period, there was a continued assumption that ‘amateurism was a more 
morally superior basis for sport’ and so it continued to exert significant influence over certain aspects of 
British sport, including that of coaching.93 Consequently, the poor sporting results of British athletes in the 
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interwar period declined further following the war as other nations began to integrate more sophisticated 
methods of coaching and training. Initially at least, sport did not rank highly on the government’s post-war 
agenda, but developments put in place before the end of the war would offer some support for British 
coaching development.94 However, the reluctance of the NGBs to relinquish too much of their control to an 
external body prevented their coaching schemes from developing fully. The following chapter analyses the 
influence of the coaching schemes on performances achieved at the 1948 Olympics and how the results 
achieved by one athlete and coach encouraged greater flexibility with regards to coaching. 
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Chapter Four: The 1948 London Games and ‘The Father’ of British Coaching 
The aftermath of war was not conducive to the staging of an Olympic Games and the impact of this 
austerity surfaced before and during the 1948 Olympics. As a result, a greater emphasis was placed on the 
successful organisation, rather than the performance of British athletes. This chapter explores the social 
climate of the London 1948 Olympics, and highlights how attempts were being made to encourage the 
greater integration of coaching and medicine into British sport. The chapter begins by demonstrating, that 
although developments at the 1948 Games had the potential to further the relationship between medicine 
and sport, sports science and medicine still struggled to become established aspects of British sport. The 
ongoing difficulties experienced by coaches are explored by considering the performances of Maureen 
Gardener and her coach Geoff Dyson. Although their collaboration encouraged greater provision for the 
coaching of individual athletes, it failed to radically change the primary aims of the coaching schemes 
which continued to emphasise the coaching of coaches. Lastly, the chapter examines how the Amateur 
Swimming Association (ASA) coaching schemes continued to develop differently to that of the Amateur 
Athletic Association (AAA), and while this allowed coach’s greater freedom with regards to coaching 
athletes, administrators remained cautious of giving their coaches too much control. 
 
1948 London Games 
Following the many sporting defeats suffered by British competitors after the war, there was a desire to 
demonstrate that the nation still possessed some credibility in the sporting world and that the lingering 
amateur tradition had not adversely affected athletic performance, although in reality it undoubtedly had. 
One of the ways it was hoped to do this was through the staging of the 1948 Olympic Games. The British 
press and public also hoped that the newly formed national coaching schemes would demonstrate their 
potential, and help British athletes achieve success. Although not all the national coaches had been directly 
involved with British elite athletes, there was an underlying optimism amongst many, that because they had 
travelled the country and educated a large contingent of honorary coaches, these men would then be able 
to transfer their knowledge to British competitors. 
As both the previous scheduled Olympic events, the 1940 Tokyo and 1944 London Games, had been 
cancelled because of World War II, there was keenness, particularly within the IOC, to restore the Olympic 
Games as soon as it was feasibly possible.1 Discussions regarding the 1948 Games had begun in August 
1945 at meeting in London between Sigfrid Edström of Sweden, Lord Aberdare of London and Avery 
Brundage of the USA.2 Four American cities, Baltimore, Los Angeles, Minneapolis and Philadelphia made 
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strong claims to stage the Games and received support from Brundage, who believed that, ‘London, half 
destroyed by bombs, will have a lot more important things to do than stage an athletics meeting.’3 Despite a 
solid case being presented for an American host, particularly Los Angeles, the committee eventually opted 
for London, concluding that not only had London been awarded the cancelled 1944 Games but also that it 
would be far too costly for countries to travel to the USA given the tough economic climate which was being 
faced as a result of the war.4 The awarding of the Games to London that closely after the end of the war 
was seen by some as a ‘gift’; London had been crippled as a result of the bombings and it was hoped that 
the Olympics would go some way to restoring Britain to its former glory.5 Norman Baker suggests, that 
regardless of the circumstances under which London was selected as host, in order to ensure a successful 
staging of the Games, an ‘appearance of normalcy’ was required, and this further encouraged a rapid 
return to the pre-war values of sport.6 
From the moment it was revealed that London would host the Games, there was wide-spread concern 
that the impact of the war would affect the staging of the Games. It was generally accepted that it would be 
a much more modest affair than that seen in Berlin some twelve years earlier, and this was welcomed by 
many because this would ensure that the connection between political propaganda and the Olympics would 
be severed, in the short term at least. In addition, it would seem that the British were keen to offset the 
damage of post-war decline and to resurrect a supposedly glorious sporting past, which due to war and its 
ramifications, had suffered dramatically.7 A correspondent to The Times suggested that although British 
sport had experienced a period of decline in recent years, the Games could provide the perfect opportunity 
to demonstrate ‘on equal terms’ that British athletes could hold their own ‘in amateur sport with all comers.’8 
The Daily Express commented further that the Olympic Games could be ‘decisive not only in the morale of 
rebuilding of the work weary Britain, but in selling the British idea to the world.’9 However, the large amount 
of reconstruction required following the war, the monetary crisis and the on-going food rationing did not 
provide the best environment for staging a mega-event such as the Olympics, and as a result, excitement 
levels amongst the British public were low.10 There were also fears amongst some that, far from providing 
an opportunity to display a return to athletic supremacy, the event would actually demonstrate to other 
countries quite how disastrous the sporting situation in Britain had become. Frank Butler of the Daily 
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Express warned that ‘something must be done or else the gloomy procession of British defeats since the 
end of the War will reach the humiliating climax of the Olympics being staged in London without a single 
British victory.’11 When it became apparent that the number of acceptances to attend the London Olympic 
Games had reached an all-time high it was comforting that, ‘if we do have the lowest winning figure on 
record we shall at least have the highest entry, which is something.’ It was also anticipated that Britain 
would not suffer the lowest spot on the medal table, not because their athletes would discover some new 
found sporting success, but purely because Jamaica and Trinidad had accepted invitations to attend the 
Games.12 
There was a feeling that a commitment to a ‘luxury’ such as the Olympic Games was a waste of 
money, especially when resources were so desperately needed elsewhere.13 Although sections of the 
press continued to express reservations about the staging of the Games, most notably those of Lord 
Beaverbrook of the Evening Standard, who continually called for a withdrawal from organising the Games, 
for the most part public opinion and the press remained divided on the issue.14 A poll published by the Daily 
Express reported that supporters for holding the Games had a small majority.15 It appears that media 
outlets had not always reflected public opinion accurately, and that regardless of having to contend with a 
degree of adversity, many citizens could see the potential benefits of the Games; not only in boosting 
morale but in pulling Britain together to work towards something that could aid recovery following the war.16 
Despite the pessimistic press coverage, and fears from around the world that Britain could not cope with 
organising the event, on Thursday 29 July 1948, the XIVth Olympiad, subsequently dubbed the ‘Austerity 
Games’, got underway.17   
Provisions had been made prior to the Games to ensure that the medical services would be anything 
but austere. The Organising Committee had agreed that free comprehensive medical support should be 
available to all officials and athletes, and they were so confident in their ability to provide such a service 
that they even discouraged other countries from bringing their own doctors.18 Arthur Porritt (who would go 
on to be one of the founding members of the British Association of Sport and Medicine in 1952) was 
appointed as director of the Olympic Medical Services and placed in charge of the medical sub-committee 
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which included a number of notable individuals, including Professor Archibald Vivian Hill and Sir Adolphe 
Abrahams. The committee had been allocated £1000 and set out to provide a variety of medical services at 
all sports arenas and at the athlete accommodation. It was intended that this provision would include 
medical officers, nurses, physiotherapists, x-ray facilities, bacteriological examinations, and an ‘Olympic 
hospital’ outside the Wembley Arena.19 The intention was that any injured athlete at the Games would be 
able to receive the medical attention they required without travelling any great distance. On evaluation of 
the scheme at the completion of the Games, the Organising Committee commented that ‘in general the 
medical services worked smoothly and, although...ample cover was provided at all points, at no time was 
any real strain thrown on the organisation.’20 However, previously unpublished responses to medical 
questionnaires, sent out in 2001 by Dr Malcolm Bottomley to surviving pre-war and immediate post-war 
athletes, do not appear to fully support this positive appraisal of medical provision at the Games. The 
intention of the questionnaires was to establish how the athletes were affected by injury and what sort of 
medical support was available. One athlete commented that she had never met any of the team doctors 
and she was not aware of any medical provision being made available at the Games. The only medical 
contact she had had throughout her athletic career was with her own doctor in order to get a certificate to 
prove she was female. Another athlete remarked he was not conscious that doctors were available for 
treatment, but explained that if he had any serious medical problems he would ask his mother for advice as 
she had taught him how to ‘live a normal clean life’ consisting of no smoking, no drinking and plenty of 
rest.21 Of the thirty responses received, the general consensus was that athletes had been unaware of 
medical support at the Olympics and that if treatment was received either at the Games, or throughout their 
athletic careers, it was via personal contacts. Roger Bannister referred to the ‘old-nineteenth-century 
masseur, or rubber’ being commonplace in athletics before the war, and this seems to have also applied in 
1948 since a number of these respondents mentioned an individual called Micky Mays.22 One respondent 
commented that he was ‘untrained’ but still attached to the team and noted that, he ‘treated all the famous 
athletes of my time in a tiny room in a council house.’23 
Once the Games had begun it became apparent that visiting nations, in particular the United States, 
were surprised by the severity of post-war austerity. Clifford Bourland, American 4x400m gold medallist, 
recalled that ‘they still had rationing for everything including meals. You could only have one meal in a 
restaurant. I remember that distinctly because I was hungry and I had to go to a second restaurant to get 
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enough to eat.’24 Despite Britain’s efforts to provide all the essentials under the difficult organisational 
circumstances it would appear that some American coaches had to improvise with what was available. 
Melvin Patton who went on to win gold in the 200m and 4x100m relay for the United States, explained that 
while travelling on the Underground in and out of London, athletes were made to stand. The American 
coaches believed that this may have been detrimental to performance and so they chartered buses to 
create a shuttle service between the arena and the housing at Uxbridge.25 Although criticism of the Games 
was to be expected considering the climate in which they were required to function, negative comments 
from the Americans were not well received. The resentment from the war remained, but it was also the way 
in which the American team had approached the Games that caused a particular issue with many in Britain. 
While visiting teams had been encouraged to bring their own food in order to reduce the burden on Britain, 
the actions of the Americans were seen as unnecessary. They imported over 15,000 chocolate bars and 
5,000 steaks, and they arranged daily flights from Los Angeles to RAF Uxbridge to provide enriched white 
flour and fresh fruit, most of which had not been seen in Britain since 1939.26 These initiatives were 
resented in Britain, where American complaints were construed as an attempt to demonstrate American 
superiority by emphasising how much Britain was struggling in the post-war period. 
However, criticisms regarding the Games were not isolated to the American team. The British swim 
team, who had initiated comprehensive training and coaching in order to prepare for the Games, argued 
that the accommodation and training facilities available had prevented these developments achieving their 
potential. In his post-Games analysis, Koskie commented, that although he appreciated that the Olympic 
Games Organising Committee were ‘faced with the problems’ of post-war austerity he believed that the 
preparation and availability of resources were ‘in some respects, unsatisfactory.’27 Even though he 
accepted that it was ‘customary to segregate’ the sexes when housing Olympic competitors he ‘greatly 
deplored’ a separation of seventeen miles, an arrangement which he suggested had reversed the team 
spirit that he had fought so hard to build.28 The distance between the two groups prevented them training 
together in the final stages before the Games, and as a result, it had become the responsibility of the 
female chaperones to prepare the women’s team. In addition, despite the male swimmers being able to 
train with Koskie, they faced great difficulty in organising training swims. An arrangement had been made 
with Uxbridge Pool, but because this facility was privately owned, the result of favourable weather during 
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the Games was that the pool refused to close their doors to the public and the pool was ‘swamped with 
bathers.’29 Clearly, although British swimming had made an attempt to improve coaching and training 
provision for its athletes, these developments had been hindered by the post-war climate. Koskie 
commented that, ‘after all the hard work of preparing for the Olympic Games, it will readily be understood 
just how we all felt about the final set-up.’30 He suggested that these arrangements had taken the ‘edge’ off 
the whole team, which was reflected in the results achieved. Although many British swimmers had 
managed to reach finals, the best placing achieved was a bronze medal. Koskie was far from complacent 
about these results and his forward thinking attitude allowed him to ‘profit from the experience’ and ‘plan for 
the future.’31 He suggested that arrangements should be made immediately by each District to occasionally 
bring together their ‘best’ and ‘most promising’ young swimmers to train under one chief coach.32 It is 
interesting to note that such a system is now commonplace across the country, whereby swimmers from 
local clubs gather together, usually on a weekly basis to train in a squad under a selected coach. Koskie 
also made recommendations about ‘spotting’ promising young swimmers, and again, this is now regularly 
used, although, some sixty years on, it is being argued that talent identification programmes in the UK are 
still not successfully organised. Bill Furniss comments that the system is ‘still pretty poor...they’re not as 
clinical and as ruthless as we like to pretend.’33 Given that these programmes are still unable to be 
successfully implemented, even in an environment where money and resources are readily available, 
Koskie’s visions for sport and swimming really were advanced for their time. There is evidence then, that 
Koskie had the technical knowledge that would allow British swimming to progress, but this would only 
occur with a shift towards a more formalised and specialised system of sport. 
Despite complaints from British and American athletes and coaching staff alike, the general British 
perception was that the 1948 London Games had been a success, at least from an organisational 
perspective. This success was not reflected in the number of medals won, however, because as Norman 
Baker states, the London Games ‘had been, athletically, a disappointing Olympics for the British.’34 
Emphasis had been placed on the successful organisation of the Games before they had even got 
underway, and perhaps in an attempt to overshadow the expected poor performances of the British 
athletes, it was commented, 
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Even if all goes badly for the British competitors and we do not provide a single winner, it will 
not be by such failure that we shall be in danger of losing what is so often called international 
prestige in sport. Our success in these Games will be judged primarily by our organisation.35  
 
As the Games were drawing to a close, many press reports appeared to agree with this sentiment. Amateur 
Britain had not achieved in athletic terms, but as the Games were not about the ‘winning but the taking 
part’, positives could be taken from the fact that, they had for the second time, successfully managed to 
organise the event in a limited amount of time and under difficult circumstances.36 The Daily Express 
praised the efforts of everyone involved stating that ‘the great gamble has paid off...a critical world and a 
half sceptical England can safely say that the first British Games for 40 years is a triumph of performance 
and organisation.’37 The International Olympic Committee went further to suggest that to undertake such a 
‘herculean task’ given the circumstances, was a ‘tremendous undertaking’ and that Britain could be proud 
of what they had achieved, for it had been a truly successful games in terms of organisation.38 
Nevertheless, it could not be ignored quite how badly Britain had done in the medal tables, although in 
traditional British style, excuses were once again made for the poor performances. In the press, failure in 
the medal tables was repeatedly attributed to poor diet and lack of facilities. The Daily Express seemingly 
pre-empted the poor result of 1948 and argued that ‘ever since the war the sporting boys and gals of this 
hungry island have been hit for six.’39 Far from taking the opportunity to question coaching and training 
methods, it was argued that the reason British athletes had not achieved was not because they were 
mediocre but because other nations were improving rapidly. The Sporting Mirror commented that ‘the world 
has moved on a stage since Britain taught the rest of the nations a great deal in sport. The pupils have 
caught up their masters.’ However, it was argued that the Olympics were not just about focusing on the 
winners but appreciating ‘the standard achieved by all the competitors.’40  
There also appeared to be an acceptance in Britain that because the Games had been held so soon 
after the war, there was never any expectation that British athletes would have regained ‘former standards 
of performance.’41 On the other hand, there was a belief that advances made in coaching and training prior 
to the end of the war should have resulted in more medals than twenty-three, of which only three were 
gold. The potential benefit of increased coaching were highlighted, when it was noted that ‘the one athlete 
who obtained whole time professional coaching broke a world record’ and far from suggesting that British 
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coaches did not have the technical knowledge to produce medallists, it was argued that ‘our coaches are 
as well-equipped in the details of their craft as any foreign land.’42 It was becoming increasingly clear, if 
Britain was to keep pace with countries where professional coaching was commonplace, then some sort of 
initiative was required. As a result, similar to the responses seen after the poor results at Stockholm, the 
AAA vowed that ‘in the future, some personal instruction will be given.’ It was suggested that this would 
result in a ‘much better showing’ at the 1952 Games, but it was recognised that these developments would 
probably not achieve their full potential until 1956.43 There always appeared to be an assumption that any 
coaching developments would eventually prove their worth on the Olympic stage, but because they were 
not directly focused on improving athletes, it is unsurprising that this was never the case. 
 
Post-Olympic Games Coaching Developments 
Athletics 
During, and shortly after the 1948 Games, there was a realisation by the AAA that the one athlete, 
Maureen Dyson nee Gardener, who had received intensive training, had also achieved success.44 It was 
obvious that Dyson’s prediction had been correct when he commented that ‘her competitive temperament 
is excellent. We need to have no fears of her “going to pieces” in the Games.’45 Despite Gardener failing to 
achieve gold in the 80 metre hurdles, she had managed to equal the world record after only one season of 
hurdling by following a thorough and methodological coaching programme developed by Dyson. During the 
build up to the Games, Gardener had been training on average four times a week, and although this does 
not sound particularly strenuous compared to modern training practices, this would have been considered a 
relatively heavy schedule in 1948. Each training session included a warm-up and cool-down and would 
work towards a specific aim by minimising faults. Dyson provided Gardener with a set of ‘Golden Rules’ 
that he would instil every session, one of which read: ‘If there is any question of leaving work out for the 
day’s training, leave out the work you LIKE. Discipline yourself in this way - tackle the not-so-pleasant task 
- and you will reap your reward the next day.’ He had also encouraged her to keep a daily training diary so 
that he could monitor not only her physical state, but how she was coping mentally.46 
It was clear to members of the AAA Committee, that the level of personal coaching attention provided 
to Gardener had made her more successful than if she had trained alone, and that there were many similar 
athletes ‘not receiving the assistance from a coach who is qualified to coach them up to international 
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standard.’47 In November 1948, a scheme entitled ‘Coaching Active Athletes for International Competition’ 
was proposed, and this was initiated in January 1949.48 The purpose of the scheme was to ‘provide 
coaching or advice for athletes who show promise of reaching international standard’, and although there 
was some initial hesitation from both members of the AAA and the Ministry, it was tentatively approved, 
provided that it could be ensured that no more than one-third of the national coach’s workload would be 
devoted to coaching athletes.49 Provisions were made so that each national coach could work with up to 
eight athletes of ‘particular promise, and may coach them over a period of many months or years.’50 The 
remaining athletes (it was established that saturation point of the scheme would be 150 athletes) would be 
placed with honorary senior coaches and other honorary coaches recommended by the AAA. The AAA 
Committee wished to make it clear that ‘no athlete shall be compelled to join the scheme: he may continue 
with no coach’ and, although they had made allowances to provide support to exceptional athletes, it was 
obvious that the AAA’s main focus remained on the development of a contingent of ‘amateur’ honorary 
coaches.51 They may have been willing to compromise and allow the coaching of athletes, because from 
their perspective, it was still essentially amateur and the coaches would remain under their control. The 
programme relied heavily on volunteerism, which had always been a strong pillar of amateurism, and 
although the national coaches were involved, they would receive no extra money for their work with elite 
athletes, so they too would be doing it on a voluntary basis. Although initially the scheme only catered for 
applications from athletes who had placed first, second or third in ‘National or Area, Senior or Junior 
Championships’, as it expanded and grew in popularity the AAA were able to consider applications from the 
top six finishers.52 By 1954, the ‘Active Athletes’ programme had successfully provided assistance to over 
250 athletes and a review of the ‘long term efficacy of the scheme proved that it remained effective in about 
75% of cases.’53  
However, although the Ministry had authorised the national coaches to work with athletes, they 
continued to carefully monitor the programme, and as the scheme expanded, the Ministry began to regard 
it with a degree of suspicion because they felt the main purpose of their grant aid was ‘being overlooked.’ 
Although they could see the benefit of the national coaches working with elite athletes, they regarded ‘this 
side of the work as incidental to the main function of the coaches.’ The Ministry were ‘a little concerned that 
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employment in other fields may possibly interfere with their full use in being available for the work which 
they are primarily appointed.’54 The AAA assured them that the coaching of athletes consisted of no more 
than one-third of the national coach’s work and the reports sent to the Ministry confirmed this. Somewhat 
reluctantly, the Ministry allowed the scheme to continue, but now the AAA were aware of how the Ministry 
regarded such a programme, it may have made them more cautious about developing the scheme further.  
Dyson played a significant role in the success of Gardener at the 1948 Olympics and it was because 
of this performance that administrators even gave consideration to allow the national coaches to work with 
individual athletes. Tom McNab suggests that Dyson had to battle with the administrators in order to gain 
access to athletes and it was because of him that this became an established, albeit small aspect of the 
national coaching role.55 Dyson was the leading coach during this period and continued to influence the 
sport until his resignation in 1961. The following section presents a short biography of his life, because 
while it is accepted that the trajectory of British coaching traditions and amateurism cannot be summarised 
by analysing one individual, as Dyson has more recently been labelled as the ‘father of modern British 
athletics coaching’ an exploration of his life course is deemed appropriate at this stage.56 
 
Geoff Dyson ‘The Father’ of British Coaching 
 
‘You have heard a lot about playing for the game’s sake, that winning does not matter but my 
advice to you is to PLAY TO WIN with every fibre of your being.’57 
 
Major Geoffrey Harry George Dyson was born on 22 June 1914 in Camberwell, London and raised in 
Croydon where he attended Croydon British School. It was here that his passion for sport developed and 
he regularly represented his school at football, cricket and hurdling. Despite his eagerness at school, his 
home life was far from settled; he had never forged good relationships with his parents and the only person 
he felt he could rely on was his grandfather. In 1930 at age of fifteen, his life was to become even more 
difficult as a growing resentment over his mother’s affairs and the death of his grandfather (about which he 
was not told until after the funeral) culminated in him running away from home. Dyson commented, ‘things 
were pretty tough for a while, I sold newspapers, did odd jobs and sometimes slept on the Embankment...It 
wasn’t much fun in the early thirties.’58 On 2 March 1931, Dyson falsified his age and enlisted with the 
Somerset Light Infantry, and perhaps in an attempt to compensate for his lack of education, he undertook 
extra classes in English, mathematics, geography and map-reading, in which he achieved first-class 
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honours. He later became a teacher in regimental schools.59 In 1933, he had gone to the army stores and 
requested the use of a high hurdle which he then trained with every day until he achieved his army colours 
in 1936. Dyson commented that ‘choosing a technical event like hurdling and having no coach made me 
begin to examine the how and why of athletics.’60 His success in coaching himself impressed F. A. M. 
Webster, so much so that when he visited Colchester Garrison where Dyson was stationed in 1934, he had 
asked his Commanding Officer if he could use Dyson at the first Loughborough Summer School. At the 
school, Dyson was immersed in athletics and he experienced coaching from some of the most prominent 
foreign coaches of the time, including Valste, Hoff and Mikkola. He also met many of the British trainers 
and administrators, and this was probably one of his first meetings with Harold Abrahams. As a result of 
such encounters, his athletic and coaching ability continued to improve, and in 1937, he recorded 14.9 
seconds in the high hurdles, faster than the current Army record but not considered official because he had 
not achieved it at an Army Championships.  
In 1936, while Webster was in the process of establishing the School of Athletics, Games and Physical 
Education at Loughborough College, Dyson was being transferred to the Army reserves. Webster seized 
the opportunity to appoint a talented individual who had the potential to become a successful coach and 
invited Dyson to join staff at Loughborough as chief instructor for athletics. In 1938, after nearly seven 
years of service in the army, Dyson left to take up the position at Loughborough, and he later commented 
that he did not miss Army life because he was ‘too much of an individualist to enjoy service life fully.’61 
Webster was very satisfied with his appointment and described Dyson as an ‘excellent lecturer’ and ‘very 
good demonstrator’ in both running and field events. Considering the poor standard of British athletics in 
field events, Dyson’s expertise was welcomed, and he later referred to his initial Loughborough 
appointment as his ‘golden days’, a time when he ‘learnt so much about the coach’s art.’62 Such an 
environment also allowed Dyson’s own hurdling talent to develop and in 1937, at the AAA Championships, 
he had come a close second to Don Finlay who had achieved silver at the 1936 Olympics and would go on 
to win the 1939 European Championships in Berlin. Dyson had the potential to represent Britain at the 
planned 1940 Olympic Games but on the eve of the AAA Indoor Championships at Wembley, where it was 
hoped he would achieve his qualifying time, AAA administrators, including Abrahams, had decided that 
Dyson could no longer be considered an amateur because he had been a lecturer in athletics at 
Loughborough; from that point on, Dyson the athlete, disassociated himself from the sport and never 
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hurdled again. There seems little doubt that this incident underpinned subsequent confrontations between 
Dyson and AAA administrators regarding the professional status and value of British athletes and coaches. 
Dyson had been working at Loughborough for eighteen months when Germany made its first 
aggressive move on the continent, and as he was still on the army reserves list, he was recalled to serve in 
the war in 1939.63 Webster suggested that the Second World War was the ‘making of’ Dyson as it allowed 
him to develop and mature, and he quickly gained a reputation for ‘brilliant organisation combined with hard 
discipline.’64 Initially he was deployed in the Garrison at Gibraltar, but soon returned with the rank of 
Sergeant. Encouraged by the speed of his own progress he applied for a full position in the regular army 
and was first posted to the Durham Light Infantry and then to the King’s African Rifles (KAR).65 He was 
transferred to one of the KAR battle schools in Nakuru, Kenya, where he took up the position of instructor 
and he gradually progressed to Major in charge of Physical Training. It was Dyson’s duty to train and 
develop men to make them physically and mentally prepared for battle, and he achieved this by 
establishing a physical training and athletics centre in all the places he served in, Nakuru, Germany, Italy 
and Austria.66 Developing these centres allowed Dyson to continue coaching athletics as part of the generic 
PT that soldiers were subjected to, and such an experience no doubt went some way to refining and 
developing his coaching ability which he was then able to transfer to British athletics when he returned in 
1945.  
On his arrival back to Britain he returned to his post at Loughborough where he began to apply some 
basic principles of engineering and mechanics (both areas being of keen interest to Dyson) to the 
movements and actions of athletics. In 1957, Chris Brasher commented that Dyson soon became restless 
with his Loughborough post because ‘he could see the limitations of his job’ and he made plans to emigrate 
to New Zealand.67 However, the Coaching Committee of the AAA were in the process of appointing their 
first national coach and as Dyson was the only Englishman on the list of possibles, he was offered the job 
and began his duties in February 1947.68 Harold Abrahams had supported the appointment of a British 
coach and was satisfied with the selection of Dyson, because after all they ‘certainly did not want an 
American type demagogic coach.’69 However as Tony Ward indicates, while unknown to them at the time, 
‘this was exactly what they were getting.’70 Dyson’s first six weeks were spent at Oxford University in an 
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attempt to improve the standard of University athletics, but his ‘ebullient almost aggressive personality 
came into shattering collision with the traditional Oxford lackadaisical approach to physical exercise.’71 Tom 
McNab recalls that during Dyson’s first visit to Oxford, one of the lecturers had approached him and warned 
him ‘not to speak to the athletes unless they speak to you first.’72 One positive to come out of his Oxford 
visit, would be the discovery of Maureen Gardner. She had originally trained as a ballet dancer and would 
commute from Oxford to the Espinosa Ballet School in London on a daily basis, but when she was sixteen 
she contracted bronchial pneumonia and was no longer able to dance. Whilst recovering from her illness, 
her father had suggested she take up running in attempt to regain some of her strength. She joined the 
Oxford Ladies Athletic Club and with the help of Walter Morris, the Oxford Illfey Road grounds-man, soon 
became an accomplished sprinter. While Dyson was in Oxford he had noticed her training and could see 
that her potential was in hurdling, not sprinting. He suggested that she should change her event and 
although she was initially reluctant, soon took up the 80 metre hurdles. Within three months she was 
national champion and within eighteen she had equalled the World Record and achieved a silver medal at 
the 1948 Olympics.73 Dyson and Gardener developed a close relationship and soon after the end of the 
1948 Games they were married. They went on to have two children, Timothy and Judith, and remained 
together until Maureen’s early death at the age of 45 in 1974.74 
Dyson had a talent for spotting the potential in athletes and commented that he had two preferences 
when doing so, ‘first, to start them from scratch (it’s easier!) and second, to tackle events which the British 
have previously neglected.’75 The majority of his team of ‘all-stars’ as they became known, which included 
John Disley, Maureen Gardner, John Savidge, Geoff Elliott and Shirley Cawley, had all been discovered in 
a similar way to that of Gardner.76 Disley, for example, was a promising middle distance runner when 
Dyson had encountered him at Loughborough in 1947, but Dyson could see that his potential was in the 
steeplechase and suggested that this is where Disley should be directing his training. Disley took the 
advice, began to re-focus his training, and at the 1948 Olympics, Dyson offered him his coaching services. 
Within four years, he had achieved a bronze medal in the steeplechase at the Helsinki Games. Savidge 
was a similar example of Dyson’s ability to spot athletic potential. They had met when Dyson was 
conducting a course for the Navy in 1949, during which, Dyson had commented that Savidge would sit in 
the front row of his lectures and ‘would stretch out his long legs and get in my way. After one or two near 
trip-ups I asked him to stand up and up he rose for all of 6ft 7ins.’77 Together they raised the profile of 
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British shot putt when Savidge achieved 55ft 2ins, making him the first British man to achieve over 50ft. 
Without Dyson’s ability to identify their potential, many of these athletes may not have achieved the feats 
they did. Dyson commented that, ‘even when you have international colours for sprinting you may still be in 
the wrong event!’ and it was his ‘coaching eye’, which he stated was the ability to differentiate between a 
‘fundamental movement, a mere idiosyncrasy and a fault’, that made him such a developed and 
accomplished coach.78  
As well as his ‘coach’s eye’, Dyson’s ability as a coach stemmed from his belief that to be successful it 
required not only a coordinated effort from the coach and the athlete, but also the incorporation of science 
and alternative methods. Dyson had a constant desire to increase his coaching knowledge, but he was 
conscious that because Britain was the ‘last of the great sporting countries to turn to coaching’, in order to 
improve it would be necessary for him to observe the techniques and methods being used in other 
nations.79 In 1949, Dyson submitted a request to visit Sweden so that he could improve his own knowledge 
and expertise in the events which the Swedes were considered leading experts. Although the AAA agreed 
they could see the potential benefit of such a venture, they did not consider they had the ‘funds for this 
purpose at present’ and suggested Dyson approach the Ministry in an effort to secure some financial 
backing. However, the Ministry also claimed that they were unable to provide a grant for such a visit and, 
as a result, Dyson took it upon himself to write to Swedish governing bodies in an attempt to gain 
assistance. He successfully secured backing from the Anglo-Swedish Society in London and other Swedish 
authorities and he was able to visit Sweden during February and March in 1950. The general consensus 
was that ‘great benefit had been brought to the coaching scheme from his visit.’80 Without Dyson’s initiative, 
and his realisation that in order to improve personally as a coach he would require guidance from others, 
then such ventures would never have been instigated, because although they did not prevent such 
schemes, the AAA were not willing to provide material support. 
Encouraged by his interest in foreign methods of coaching, Dyson gradually refined his own 
knowledge in human movement and engineering and this developed into a vital aspect of his coaching 
work. He incorporated the use of slow motion ‘loop' films in which the movements of an athlete could be 
projected onto a screen and analysed. He also encouraged his athletes to purchase ‘peepscopes’ so that 
they could take Dyson’s analysis away with them and study it individually. He believed that once an athlete 
had the ability to identify their own mistakes using a film, they were more likely to successfully alter the 
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action. Dyson would also plot the films frame by frame onto a graph so that he could establish the athlete’s 
acceleration and deceleration or the angle of release in shot putt.81 Another key aspect of his coaching was 
the use of a wooden model which his athletes affectionately renamed ‘His Nibs.’82 With the model he was 
able to demonstrate to the athletes in real time, the correct position they needed to adopt during a 
particular movement and this ensured that he was successfully able to eradicate errors as soon as they 
occurred. Dyson believed that ‘one can analyse the technique of an athlete with almost mathematical 
precision’ and he began working in collaboration with various universities, in particular Loughborough and 
Leeds, in order to gain greater understanding and knowledge about motion muscle control and its 
relationship to respiration. The universities not only assisted him with research but they also monitored 
American techniques which they would then report to Dyson.83 This dialogue between coaches and 
universities in Britain is now commonplace, but during the 1950s when Dyson was carrying out such 
studies, the use of a university to improve athletes would not have been particularly widespread. Sport in 
America has always been inextricably linked with the universities, and as such, has long had the 
opportunity to incorporate various methods which otherwise may not have been available. However, prior 
to the appointment of Dyson as chief coach, the use of such techniques were fairly uncommon, if not non-
existent in British athletics. The incorporation of scientific ‘foreign’ methods was exactly what amateur 
officials were trying to prevent because this signalled not only a shift towards greater specialisation, but 
also a potential threat to their level of authority. Professionalisation and the use of science in sport were 
always going to create difficulties in the AAA and, because it was Dyson who was initiating such actions, it 
was inevitable that the amateur officials would begin to resent their national coach. 
By 1961, the disagreements between Dyson and the administration had reached such levels that he 
felt compelled to resign from his position. It was suggested that there was ‘still too many officials at the top 
who are jealous of his influence and the authority which his great knowledge gives him’ and, until these 
barriers were broken down, individuals with a coaching vision similar to Dyson would never be welcomed in 
British sport.84 Dyson later commented, ‘I don’t think that…I made much impression on the British as far as 
coaching was concerned’, but Canada quickly saw the availability of Dyson as an opportunity to further 
their own standard of performance in international sport.85 Following his resignation from the AAA, he was 
soon offered a five year contract as the Director of the Royal Canadian Legion Sports Training Plan and it 
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was expected that ‘the Canadians will benefit from one of the greatest crimes of British sport.’86 News of 
Dyson’s resignation and relocation to Canada was not well received by either the British press or athletes 
and it was argued that ‘Britain’s loss is Canada’s gain - apparently they place far greater importance on 
athletics coaching in Canada than we do.’87 It was commonly believed that Dyson had been forced from his 
position of national coach because AAA officials did not appreciate his coaching knowledge and had been 
unwilling to compromise. One press report commented, ‘Perhaps when Dyson returns to Britain in five 
years time we might be ready to use his talents properly. But somehow I doubt it.’88 
Before Dyson and his family left for Canada, a presentation was organised by individuals who 
accepted, that although Dyson’s abilities had not been utilised in the most efficient way, he had 
undoubtedly made a difference to British sport. However, at this farewell event it was noted that only one 
AAA official, Pat Sage, was in attendance, which is a clear indication of the low esteem in which Dyson was 
held by contemporary athletic amateur officials.89 Tom McNab, who had been appointed as an AAA 
national coach shortly after Dyson resigned, explained that, in association with his farewell event, a 
monetary collection had been organised in order to thank Dyson for his work. Far from receiving significant 
support from all the clubs and athletes he had assisted over the years, only twelve out of 2000 clubs made 
some sort of donation to the fund. Although it was frequently reported that the athletic community were 
unhappy about the circumstances of Dyson’s resignation, when it actually came to expressing appreciation 
for his services very few were actually willing to contribute. McNab suggests that Dyson’s resignation, and 
the subsequent lack of support for him did not provide a great advert for being a national coach. It 
potentially ‘tarnished’ how people viewed the role, so much so that there was very little competition for the 
coaching roles, primarily because,  
 
People didn’t want to be involved in it. People advised against it, said you don’t want to do 
that, look at what happened to the other guys that were in it, look what happened to Dyson. If 
they get rid of people like Dyson, what do you think is going to happen to people like you?90 
 
As a result, the role did not attract particularly skilled people with much experience in coaching and many of 
the individuals who were subsequently appointed had to learn ‘on the job’ how to be a successful national 
coach.91 
Dyson worked in Canada from 1962-70, at which point he and his family returned to England. Dyson 
took up a teaching post at Winchester College and Maureen returned to ballet and opened a dancing 
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school. However, she soon fell ill and passed away in 1974. Timothy Dyson, Geoff’s son, suggested that 
his father was never the same after Maureen died and never re-connected with his life or his coaching role 
back in England, retiring soon after Maureen’s death.92 In 1980 he was awarded an OBE, although it has 
been suggested that he only accepted it after receiving confirmation that he had not been recommended 
for the honour by anyone associated with the AAA or the British Amateur Athletic Board (BAAB).93 Dyson 
suffered a heart attack and died in 1981. Because he ‘couldn’t adapt himself to officialdom’ he had never 
received the recognition he deserved while he was alive and even after his death, although he had been 
acknowledged for the work he did during his lifetime to further British sport, he remained a relative 
unknown.94 In fact, his entry into to the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography did not appear until 2012.95 
Even though he was inducted into the England Athletics Hall of Fame in 2008, and his book, which has 
only recently gone out of print, continues to be sold around the world, to the majority of the British public 
who do not work within athletic circles, the name Geoff Dyson is meaningless. 
 
Swimming 
In reviewing the Olympic Games, Koskie commented that ‘with all things considered the team put up a very 
good performance.’ Although it was accepted ‘that world beaters cannot be developed in a few months’ 
there was strong desire to improve significantly on a single bronze medal before the Helsinki Games in 
1952. Koskie developed a list of ‘suggestions for the future’, which he hoped would ensure that the steady 
development which had occurred in British swimming would continue.96 He recommended that good 
relationships between leading swimmers and bath managers should be encouraged, commenting, ‘I 
consider an enthusiastic bath manager to be our best friend’ because ‘he can do more than anybody else 
in assisting the development of champion swimmers.’97 This may seem fairly odd to modern audiences, but 
because many swimmers in the mid-twentieth century would not have had their own regular coach, the 
amount of time swimmers were able to spend in the water would have had an impact on their development, 
whether that be positive from increased use or negative because of pool restrictions. Hamilton Smith 
commented on the situation from the experiences he encountered as a swimmer and explained ‘there was 
no coach, I coached from a book...I was coaching myself.’ He described how when he was in his first year 
of college he had the key to Paisley Baths in Scotland and he used to ‘get the 6 o’clock bus down, open the 
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baths...went in did my training, on my own, nobody else in the building.’98 This was an example of the close 
co-operation between the swimmer and bath manager that Koskie spoke of and, as Smith noted, if he had 
not been granted the use of the baths in this way there was no way he would have had the time to 
complete the training required to remain at the level he did. With regards to Koskie’s ‘suggestions for the 
future’, from a coaching perspective not only did he recommend that Loughborough Summer school 
become a fixed annual event under the direction of Max Madders but he also suggested that a ‘top-class 
American coach’ be asked to visit Britain. Koskie had noted how successful the American swim team had 
been at the 1948 Olympics and argued that if Britain was to attain similar levels of performance then they 
would need to learn from, and adopt, some of these principles. It was hoped that if this was arranged, the 
American coach would be able to attend the Loughborough Summer School to supervise the training of 
each swimmer and offer advice to coaches, as well as travelling the country to present lectures ‘on the 
principles of training and stroke technique’ and provide training sessions.99 
Encouraged by Koskie’s recommendations, Carl Wootton of the Hove Schiverers Swimming Club 
organised the visit of Coach Matt Mann and the Michigan State University team in August 1951.100 
Although the ASA Committee fully supported this arrangement they had made no plans to organise such a 
visit themselves and without the initiative of Wootton and others, this venture, which undoubtedly went 
someway to stimulating British swimming, may never had occurred. Considering amateurism was so highly 
valued amongst organisations such as the ASA it might appear somewhat surprising that they would allow 
the infiltration of these specialised ‘foreign’ methods of coaching and training. However, from their 
perspective, it was still an amateur venture, since not only was Mann British, having originated from 
Yorkshire, but he was also not receiving any form of payment for his services and he had even agreed to 
pay his own airfare.101 The ASA were not paying anything for these ‘professional’ services, which 
seemingly satisfied their ongoing amateur principles of volunteerism. Mann, who was the Michigan State 
University head coach and appointed American Olympic coach for the 1952 Games, visited Britain with his 
Michigan squad from 25 August-17 September 1951, and travelled the country to provide demonstrations 
and instructions to young swimmers.102 One of the swimmers who had attended these demonstrations was 
Hamilton Smith and he described his experience,  
 
We got there and we were put into groups and there was about a million of us...you just swam 
across the width and he was on the end and one of his swimmers was down the pool for each 
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group and I was in the shallow end for some reason and I started swimming breaststroke and 
this guy, I remember his name, he was Burwell Jones, and I'm 12/13 and he is watching, or 
Bumpy Jones he was called...he looked at me and he said 'hey coach,' he called Matt Mann 
over and he said, ‘what do you think of this’, and Matt Mann looked at me and he said 'oooh' 
he says 'son' I can remember it like it was yesterday, 'You should swim fly!' and I thought, 
really, oh well, and that made me think and I started swimming butterfly and I became the first 
Scottish butterfly champion and I was Scottish butterfly champion for five years. All because 
that man, that great coach, looked at me and he said 'you should swim fly!' and I can hear it 
like it was yesterday, and that's what started me swimming butterfly and I became Scottish 
champion and won medals at the British championships.103 
  
As in the case of Dyson, it seems that Mann also possessed an expert coaching intuition or a ‘coach’s eye’, 
and this undoubtedly contributed to the success of his coaching career. 
Towards the end of Mann’s visit to Britain it was agreed that he would run a ‘Swimming Clinic’ in Hove 
for Olympic ‘potentials’ and a number of coaches, so they could take be familiarised with American 
coaching methods.104 Each district had the opportunity to nominate two swimmers and two coaches who 
they believed would benefit. The ASA Committee clearly saw this as an opportunity to potentially raise the 
standard of the 1952 British Olympic swim team and agreed to cover the cost of the ‘Swim Clinic’, but they 
were saved from honouring this commitment when the News Chronicle agreed to pay all the expenses. The 
consensus of everyone involved was that time spent with Mann and his swimming squad had been both 
‘successful and ‘instructive’, but despite the ASA taking this somewhat revolutionary approach to coaching, 
there were those who believed it was too little too late to have any impact on the swimming results of the 
1952 Games.105 Unlike other countries, Britain had ‘not got down to selecting a team to get into training - or 
even get accustomed to playing as a team’, and although it was agreed swimmers would ‘benefit 
immensely’ from American coaching methods, considering the state of British swimming, it ‘needs all the 
boost it can get.’106 While such an arrangement may have hinted a shift away from the amateur tradition, 
commentators of the period recognised its ongoing hold over the organisation of British swimming with one 
journalist questioning ‘Why, oh why, do we always leave everything to the last moment.’107 
While British sport was gradually becoming more accommodating to coaching, the NGBs remained 
wary of the intentions of professional coaches, and in order to remain in control of their sports, they 
continuously placed restrictions on the activities of the national coaches. However, even though the 
national coaches had to function within limitations, they were gradually being granted permission to work 
directly with athletes - something which suggested a gradual loosening of amateur constraints. This 
emphasises the fluid nature of amateurism as it had once again been shifted to allow a greater amount of 
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coaching. However, even though British sport and coaching were slowly beginning to integrate alternative 
methods it is apparent that other countries continued to utilise ever more specialised techniques. In 
particular, the American approach to coaching and training far outstripped anything available in Britain and 
had all but guaranteed prolonged American domination at the Olympic Games. However, a new sporting 
power, the Soviet Union, was beginning to present a significant challenge to the USA. The following 
chapter traces the development of the Soviet sporting system and identifies the key factors which ensured 
that the Soviet Union superseded the United States as the leading sporting nation. It also analyses how 
Soviet sport was perceived by other nations, and what influence their success had on amateurism and 
sporting policies around the world. 
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Chapter Five: ‘Shamateurism’ and Sports Science: An Exploration of the Soviet Sporting Model 
The British approach to sport had never been the only exemplar for the international sporting community. 
The highly successful American model, which welcomed professional coaches and intensive training 
techniques, had gradually progressed and developed since the pre-war period. However, in the aftermath 
of WWII, a new sporting model was beginning to emerge in the Soviet Union. Whilst it is acknowledged that 
the American approach to sport was particularly efficient, this model has been extensively researched, and 
so the focus of this chapter is on Soviet sporting policies.1 The Soviet Union adopted sport as means to 
demonstrate the superiority of the communist way of life. In order to successfully achieve this they re-
directed vast resources from the government and developed a comprehensive sport system which 
included, amongst other factors, a sophisticated use of sports science techniques and methods to ensure 
optimal training and development for their athletes and an appreciation for the expertise of the coach. This 
approach had encouraged sport in the post-war period to ‘became a high-profile battlefield upon which 
representatives from both sides of the “Iron Curtain” competed...for primacy.’2 The aim of this part of the 
thesis is to examine the formation and development of the Soviet sporting system and identify the 
components of the system which ensured that they were able to achieve Olympic success, and also 
addressed how this success was subsequently interpreted in the West. In exploring the Soviet model, this 
section reveals how the Soviet Union used the Olympics as a means to demonstrate superiority and 
demonstrates how this directly contravened the International Olympic Committee (IOC) rules of 
amateurism. But more importantly in the context of this work, it also highlights how the success of the 
Soviets encouraged other countries to adopt a much more specialised sporting model.  
 
Soviet sport 
 
It is an open secret in the Soviet Union that the nation’s top sports figures are “shamateurs”. 
Highly competent experts who devote full time to their sport and get paid for it with a heady 
mix of money, cars, apartments and travel.3 
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Sport Organisation – Pre-WWII 
Prior to the Revolution in 1917, sport, for the most part, was relatively unknown to the majority of Russians 
because it was primarily reserved for the wealthy or the military and many workers were not entitled to join 
sports clubs.4 Despite this, Tsarist Russia had been one of the founding members of the modern Olympic 
Movement, although Russian athletes did not compete in the Games until 1908. After a reasonably 
successful Games in London, in which five Russian contestants achieved gold and two silver, placing them 
fourteenth overall, the government saw the opportunity to achieve prestige through sporting success and 
established a Russian Olympic Committee. The newly formed committee provided financial support to send 
a larger team to Stockholm, which was to consist of 169 athletes covering all events on the Olympic 
programme, but on the day the team were due to sail to Stockholm, many of the athletes failed to arrive, 
and as a result, a very compromised and much smaller team was sent to the Games. The team only 
managed to achieve one silver and three bronze, results which were perceived as anything but a success; 
the poor performances in Stockholm had exposed Russia as a ‘backward country in the sphere of sport.’5 
The failure of its athletes diminished Russian prestige, and in an attempt to remedy the situation and 
improve the state of physical wellbeing amongst individuals, the Tsarist government developed a state 
organisation to manage sport, known as the Office of the General Supervisor for the Physical Development 
of People in Russia.6 The outbreak of World War I in 1914 and the need for a large number of physically fit 
soldiers further emphasised the need for physical training. These two key aspects, nationalism and 
militarism, which had been prominent in early Russian competitive sport, would provide the key foundation 
stones for the Soviet sport system.7 
Russia organised their own ‘Olympiads’ in 1913 and 1914, and it had become obvious that with proper 
training and organisation, Russian athletes had the ability to demonstrate superior athletic performances on 
the international stage although it would be another forty years before Russian athletes, representing the 
USSR, participated in the Olympic Games again.8 Following the Russian Revolution in 1917 there was an 
increasing resistance towards ‘bourgeois’ and elitist sports competitions, particularly the Olympic Games, 
which it was believed were designed to ‘deflect workers from the class struggle and to train them for new 
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Imperialist wars.’9 The Russian Revolution is a collective term used to describe a series of revolutions 
which ultimately led to the formation of the Soviet Union in 1922. During the 1920s, as a result of an 
increasing resistance to the West in general, the Soviet Union tried to prevent the infiltration of Western 
interpretations of sport by declining, on ideological grounds, to affiliate with ‘bourgeois’ sporting 
competitions.10 Instead, focus was placed on an alternative system of sport, ‘based on a distinctly 
proletarian brand of sport and physical culture’ which shunned individualism and competition.11 Physical 
culture was developed as a means to promote healthy living and increase hygiene education, and these 
factors were encompassed within the field of physical education which became a dominant ideology in the 
early 1920s. There was a belief within the Communist party that physical education could play a vital role in 
influencing younger citizens and, in turn, reduce anti-social and anti-Soviet behaviour. As these principles 
of sport and physical education had been based on Lenin’s own ideals, following his death in 1924, Soviet 
sport lost its direction and underwent a period of instability.12 Attempts to establish a system of mass 
participation in sport, which was ‘class based, collectivist and mass orientated’ now failed to compete with 
the capitalist bourgeois centred sports culture, and as a result, opposition towards elitist sport gradually 
diminished in the late 1920s and early 1930s.13  
As James Riordan noted, if the 1920s ‘may be described as having been dominated by physical 
culture, the 1930s were to be a decade of competitive sport.’14 During this time, it became rapidly more 
widespread and fed into and supported Stalin’s industrial drive. Competitive sport also acted as a means to 
raise the widespread standard of health in order to ensure there was suitable preparation for military 
action.15 Various actions taken during the 1930s shaped and developed Soviet sport into the system that 
became familiar during its period of international sporting success from the early 1950s until the late 1980s. 
In April 1930, physical education and sport were placed under greater government control when an All-
Union Council of Physical Culture was established and charged with the responsibility of sport in the Soviet 
Union. The structural framework of the new organisation resembled that of a regular government 
department and essentially it would act as a ministry of sport.16 As part of this, all well-established local 
sport clubs were transferred to local workplaces and voluntary trade-union sport societies were developed. 
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These newly founded sport ‘collectives’ began to spread around the country and were primarily formed to 
help discover and train proficient athletes; the Soviet Union’s professionalised sport system was beginning 
to emerge and was gradually building momentum. Physical education now had a dual purpose. Not only 
was it helping to produce healthy workers to fuel an expanding industrial base, it was now also acting as a 
means by which talented athletes could be selected to participate in top trade-union teams. In order to 
allow these teams, or ‘sport societies’, to develop district and regional competitions were established in 
popular sports such as soccer, basketball and ice hockey.17 Another significant development was the 
creation and integration of a uniform ranking system known as the ‘Ready for Labour and Defence’ (GTO) 
programme. This was established by the Komsomol (Communist Youth Organisation) with an aim to 
‘improve the general level of physical fitness and to create a basis for raising the level of athletic 
standards.’18 In order to manage the increasing levels of sporting activity occurring throughout country an 
expansion of sporting facilities was required. It is suggested that during the periods of 1931-40, the 
construction of sporting facilities almost quadrupled, and by 1939, census records indicated that there was 
approximately 649 stadia, 8,000 playing fields, 20 cycle tracks, and 342 swimming baths.19  
Previous hostility towards Western sport was officially reversed in 1934, when the objective to ‘catch 
up and overtake bourgeois records’ was launched. However, unlike Western, particularly British sport, 
which continued to strictly adhere to amateurism, the Soviet Union viewed amateur principles with a degree 
of indifference and failed to fully embrace its ethos. The initial aim of Soviet sport was to surpass half all 
world records within three years but it soon became apparent that the enormity of such a task would make 
it virtually impossible to achieve. Instead, the new mantra was to ‘bring worldwide glory to Soviet sport’ by 
achieving as many top finishes as possible in international competitions. Paralleling this was the 
introduction of a second tier to the GTO badge, which came with the coveted title of ‘Master’ of sport. It was 
hoped that these new developments would entice more Soviet citizens to participate in sport so that 
international successes could be secured.20 In order to ensure the achievement of its athletes, the Soviet 
authorities began to monitor the progress of Western sport. By establishing a foreign department within the 
Physical Culture Council it was possible to examine foreign training methods by intercepting and translating 
training manuals, journals and newspapers. Despite this shift towards an acceptance of Western sporting 
methods and competitions in the years before the war, the Soviet Union failed to indicate any desire to join 
the Olympic Movement and International Sporting Federations (ISF). This possibly stemmed from a fear of 
losing the tight control maintained over sports teams because if the Soviet Union had made attempts to join 
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ISFs they would have been obligated to compete against all member countries, whereas by remaining 
absent they were in a position to choose their opponents.21 In addition, the Soviet government only wanted 
its athletes to compete in sports which they were guaranteed to excel at, and by joining federations such as 
the IOC and participating in the Olympic Games there would have been an expectation for them to send as 
many athletes as possible, covering a wide range of sports. 
With so much emphasis now being placed on sport, winning and achieving records, it is unsurprising 
that rigorous sport programmes had begun to penetrate Soviet sport. In order to produce a large contingent 
of talented athletes they were being placed in programmes of intensive training and were rewarded 
accordingly if they achieved the desired results. As the rewards and prestige of winning competitions 
increased so too did the assistance provided to athletes, who were increasingly being taken out of the 
workplace and placed in full time training facilities. In an attempt to embrace some of the attributes of 
Western amateur sport the Moscow Committee on Physical Culture of Sports Affairs condemned such 
practices in January 1937 but the illegal assistance provided to athletes continued to be a widespread 
problem. In 1939, it was reinforced that ‘half-trained sportsman should not receive extra money for fictional 
“work”, they should not receive subsidies and all manner of gifts for success in competition’ believing that 
such practice was ‘bourgeois’, and should not be allowed to ‘creep into Soviet Sport.’22 Despite many such 
warnings and the condemnation of these practices, assistance to athletes persisted and it gradually 
became commonplace amongst sporting societies. This may have occurred, because unlike Britain, the 
amateur ethos was not rooted within the fabric of Soviet sport. Although this type of practice was never fully 
removed from Soviet sport, immediately prior to the outbreak of WWII many of these focused systems and 
methods were curtailed in an attempt to direct resources to prepare for military conflict. Soviet involvement 
in the war began in June 1941, and it was at this point that the direction of the entire Soviet sports 
movement shifted. Having been geared towards excellence in elite sport at the outbreak of the war, now all 
sport societies, government sport departments and physical education in schools switched towards the 
development of military attainment and preparedness. Although Soviet athletes continued to participate in 
some sporting competitions throughout the war, this was mostly done to boost morale. The Soviet Union’s 
main objectives were now aligned toward their military capability, and any thought of a Soviet debut in the 
Olympic Games would be postponed until a time when they would have the resources available for such 
preparation.23 
Even though the foundations of what developed into the ‘Big Red Sports Machine’ can be traced back 
to the 1930s, at this time the Soviet Union did not yet have the wide ranging success in sport to have 
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considered them a major power in the sporting world. Although many resources had been devoted to sport 
during the 1930s, it was still not regarded as a primary objective. It was not until the period of the Cold War 
that it emerged as a key state priority. Despite facility availability expanding during the 1930s, they still 
remained in short supply, and any available sporting equipment was often of poor quality. Such factors, 
coupled with a lack of funding and low standards of living and hygiene, had a detrimental impact on the 
quality of sporting performances that Soviet athletes could achieve. However, the performance of the 
Soviet Union in WWII had reinforced to Soviet authorities that functionalising sport and placing physical 
education and physical training on a military basis had been ‘absolutely right’, and as a result, following the 
end of the war in September 1945, more money and resources were directed towards sport.24 Victory in the 
war had also restored pride in the Soviet people, because it acknowledged, that for all its hardship, the 
period of industrialisation had been absolutely necessary, and this was now reflected in the status of the 
Soviet Union on the global stage. Sport was now to take a more prominent role within society as it was now 
seen as a peaceful means through which the Soviet Union could demonstrate their superiority and continue 
to further their potential.25 
 
Sport Organisation - Post-WWII 
 
Massive government aid, based on recognition of the value of sport as a political and 
ideological weapon, has contributed to the successes of Soviet sportsmen.26 
 
During the Second World War, Soviet military power was so strong that it had successfully penetrated 
Central and Eastern Europe and resulted in the creation of ten aligned Soviet states. As the rest of Europe 
were debilitated because of the war, this had provided the Soviet Union with the opportunity to dominate, 
and as a result the balance of power, both in Europe and globally, was altered.27 The Soviets had a new 
target; they were determined ‘to catch up and overtake the most advanced industrial powers’, particularly 
America who had long been considered the most powerful political and military force in the world.28 This 
threat to American power ensured that after WWII had ended, these two nations who had once been allies, 
would embark on a battle of their own, generally referred to as the ‘Cold War’. Far from being a direct 
militaristic encounter, the Cold War was an opportunity for each of these superpowers to gain allegiance 
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from other nations via psychological conflict and propaganda.29 As a widely supported policy of ‘peaceful 
co-existence’ had been launched soon after the war, there was a realisation that success in international 
sport could offer a means to exert influence without fear of military repercussions, and so the sporting 
arena developed into a commodity of great significance.30 Lincoln Allison and Terry Monnington suggest 
that the Soviet drive to win international competitions was also a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign which could 
be used to convince those outside of its boundaries of the qualities of the ‘Soviet way of life.’31 It functioned 
as a demonstration of the power and success of the Soviet Union, particularly when it is considered that 
apart from the space programme, sport provided the only opportunity to demonstrate superiority over the 
world’s most advanced capitalist nations.32 It was, therefore, inevitable that sport would become an integral 
part of the Soviet quest for global prestige. International sport and athletes had become intertwined with 
both Soviet and American political philosophies, whereby they were now being used to sell their country’s 
ideologies to the world. From a British perspective, it was particularly alarming; the general feeling of 
uneasiness which existed in the country as a result of poor performances was now accompanied by a fear 
that more was at stake than a mere win on the playing field. National prestige was now inextricably linked 
with success in sport and international competition had far-reaching political and educational implications.33 
In order to ensure sporting success, the Soviet government established that the administration of sport 
required improvement, so they undertook a period of reconstruction. It had been determined that a more 
productive form of athlete incentive was required if they were going to secure top results, something which 
Riordan refers to as, ‘material interestedness.’34 In October 1945, the Council of People’s Commissars of 
the USSR developed a financial reward scheme to award monetary prizes to individuals who achieved 
athletic performance targets. Whereas such financial rewards had previously been considered illegal in the 
Soviet Union, they were now widely accepted within the new Soviet sport system. The use of bonuses and 
increased salaries for athletes, which were awarded according to their sport ranking, began to encourage 
the emergence of an exceptional breed of elite athletes.35 The improvement and progress of these athletes 
was ensured with the development of sports schools, which had also enlisted the services of highly 
qualified coaches.36 Establishing training facilities and offering financial incentives to athletes contravened 
the IOC and many other ISF rules on amateurism. However, and somewhat surprisingly, the Soviets had 
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shown little desire to seek inclusion within the IOC. Even after they had received an invitation from Sigfrid 
Edström to join the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) in an attempt to incorporate 
them into the Olympic family, they still regarded it with indifference; the Soviets were determined to keep 
other nations guessing about their Olympic and sporting intentions.37 
By late 1946, the Soviet Union had begun to participate in many global sporting competitions and was 
starting to develop plans to expand its involvement in international sport. The speed in achieving this was 
unquestionable. At the end of 1946, the Soviet Union was represented in only two international athletics 
bodies, but during the period 1946-55 that number increased to twenty-seven.38 This demonstrates their 
power of mobilisation; although they had not been heavily involved in international sport for almost two 
decades, and had lost countless individuals during the war, they still had the ability and the resources to 
ensure they could be incorporated rapidly into the international arena. Even so, the Soviet authorities had 
remained apathetic regarding the issues of amateurism and Olympic participation, until they arrived at the 
European Championships in August 1946. The Soviets were not members of the IAAF, and therefore under 
the regulations were not eligible to participate, but Lord Burghley, who was acting as head of the IAAF, 
granted them permission to compete. A similar instance occurred at the International Weightlifting 
Championships in October 1946 in which they were granted entry despite not being affiliated to the 
appropriate sporting body.39 The American Avery Brundage, recently elected as the first IOC vice-
president, commented,  
 
My own guess is that the real object of the Russians is to humiliate the West...Every time they 
force a Federation to break its own rules in order to let them compete, Russian prestige is 
increased and Western prestige is decreased. The trouble at the moment...is that about half 
the countries don’t want to annoy Russia, and any country which is anxious to obtain a World 
Championship or World Congress is reluctant to annoy the Eastern Bloc.40 
 
Each time Soviet athletes were granted the right to compete, even though they were not eligible, the Soviet 
sport system was provided with increasing authority, although in reality their system was never considered 
entirely legitimate due to suspicions over the payment of athletes and their state controlled sports 
schools.41  
There was a growing realisation, that in order to exert the greatest impact, the Soviets would need to 
compete in the world’s most widely recognised sporting contest, the Olympic Games. To achieve this they 
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would need to join the relevant sporting federations, and by January 1947 they had made their intentions 
clear when they applied to join the International Wrestling Federation and the IAAF. However, Soviet 
authorities attached several conditions to their application. They declared that Russian had to be 
introduced as an official language of the Federations, the executive board would need to include a Soviet 
representative and they also requested the ejection of ‘fascist’ Franco-Spain. Brundage, for one, was 
enraged by such ‘unprecedented’ demands and commented that their conditions exceeded ‘the 
requirements of common courtesy and no other country has ever been so favoured.’ He warned Edström 
that any application made by the Soviets to ISFs ‘must not be given any special consideration’, 
emphasising that their athletes would not be admitted to international and Olympic competition without 
positive confirmation that they were amateurs.42 Although the Soviet sporting authorities had previously 
manipulated other sporting federations to let them compete without fully adhering to regulations, this would 
no longer be possible. If they wished to compete legitimately in international sporting competitions, 
including the Olympic Games, they would now have to meet all the rules and policies regarding 
participation, or at least give the impression that they were complying, particularly with those relating to 
amateurism.43 Consequently, in January 1947, the Soviet government reversed its earlier decree ‘on 
remuneration of sporting attainments’, stating that Soviet athletes would no longer be entitled to monetary 
rewards for sporting success with prizes in future consisting purely of medals and badges. They also 
appeared to address the issue of occupational status, declaring that the title of ‘professional entertainer’ 
was no longer a legitimate profession and that athletes would in future be classified as a ‘student, 
serviceman or physical education instructor.’44 Regardless of this declaration, it would soon became 
apparent that these ‘students’ and ‘soldiers’ were in fact state-sponsored professionals, but because at the 
time, the Soviet Union gave the impression that they had now met all the requirements of membership, 
they were admitted to the IAAF in December 1947.45  
The Soviet Union did not participate in 1948 Games because they had failed to initiate provisions to 
develop a National Olympic Committee (NOC) and under the Olympic Charter this was a prerequisite to 
participation in Olympic competition.46 However, Soviet authorities sent a delegation to London in order to 
monitor Western athletes, and soon after the completion of the Games, the Soviet government declared 
that if they had participated they would have placed second overall, only marginally behind the United 
States.47 Inspired by this analysis, and a realisation that by beating Western countries the Soviet authorities 
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could advertise the perceived benefits of socialism to the rest of the world, the Communist Party Central 
Committee published policy targets in December 1948, stating that their overall goal was to ‘win supremacy 
in the major sports within the next few years.’48 Success in attaining this objective would provide ‘irrefutable 
proof of the superiority of socialist culture over the decaying culture of the capitalist states.’49 After altering 
their sporting policies in order to adhere with the Olympic Charter, it was inevitable that the Soviet Union 
would soon attempt to join the IOC although Olympic officials were apprehensive about admitting them. 
Brundage was adamant that while Soviet athletes now gave the outward appearance of being amateur, 
they were still aligning themselves to professional principles; he commented ‘from the Western point of 
view we must question ourselves if the Russian athletes can be considered amateurs. We must face the 
fact that many of them are professional.’50  
Despite trying to deny Soviet entrance into the Olympic Games on the grounds that they were in some 
way violating the amateur doctrine, it would appear that much of the resistance was politically driven. There 
was much uncertainty surrounding the Soviet Union at this time, with many countries fearful of their 
intentions, and this generated a desire to prevent them from competing to ensure that they did not gain 
further credibility by achieving international sporting success. There was an underlying fear that if the 
Soviet Union were allowed to compete in the Olympic Games, not only would it bolster their power in the 
global sense, it would also increase their sense of authority amongst its own citizens. Granting them entry 
to the Games would demonstrate the leverage that they possessed over other nations and would both 
solidify government authority and further increase support for the regime. However, others believed that if 
the committee allowed Russia to join the movement and ensured they adhered to the Olympic principles, 
then in turn her ‘Satellite States’ would do the same, and as a result this would boost the overall authority of 
the Olympic Movement. There was also an underlying fear amongst some that they could not realistically 
prevent the Soviet Union from joining the IOC because they were now one of the most powerful nations in 
the world. In 1951, as expected, the Soviet Union submitted a bid to enter the Games, and despite 
reservations, the Soviets were accepted into the Olympic Movement with a vote of thirty-one in favour and 
only three against. This action actually contravened the founding principles of the Olympic Movement 
because, as Lincoln Allison suggests, due to the very nature of the Soviet Union there was one condition of 
Olympic competition that they would never be able to meet. NOCs are required to be autonomous and 
independent of the state, but within the Soviet Union, this would have ‘contradicted the fundamental 
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doctrine’ of the government. By accepting the Soviets, the IOC had chosen ‘its universalist aspirations over 
a fundamental principle’ and from this point onwards the Games would be significantly different.51 
 
The Soviet Union and the Olympic Games 
At the XVth Summer Olympics in Helsinki, the Soviet Union made its debut. Two emerging superpowers, 
the USA and USSR, would now confront each other for the first time in international sport, and as a result, 
‘the cold, calculated pursuit of victory emerged as a dominating principle.’52 The extensive preparation of 
Soviet athletes soon became apparent. Soviet sporting authorities had ensured that not only would Soviet 
athletes compete in every event except field hockey, but they had also put measures in place to guarantee 
success.53 Where Soviet athletes had previously only excelled in a limited number of sports, the structure 
of the new system and increased resources would be conducive to ensuring favourable results in a 
multitude of events. However, despite the Soviet athletes achieving an early lead in the medal table, the 
American team successfully recaptured top place towards the closing of the Games. Even though they had 
not attained the most gold medals, what the Soviet athletes had achieved was considered significant. 
Despite lacking previous experience against high-level competitors, they had managed to win more silver 
and bronze medals than the American team. What damaged American pride and prestige most was that 
according to the official scoring system, the ‘Olympic Bulletin’, the Soviet Union and the United States were 
considered tied for points.54 As a result of the Soviet entry into the Games, and the inevitable intense rivalry 
between the United States and the USSR, a strong sense of nationalism was present at Helsinki. Bob 
Mathias, the American decathlon champion, described the atmosphere amongst the American team:  
 
There were many more pressures on American athletes because of the Russians than in 
1948. They were in a sense the real enemy. You just loved to beat ‘em. You just had to beat 
‘em. It wasn’t like beating some friendly country like Australia. This feeling was strong down 
through the entire team.55 
 
This rivalry would become commonplace in future Games. Whereas American athletes had dominated for 
so long, primarily because of their large pool of talented athletes, the indifference of the Soviet Union 
towards sport and the concerns of the majority of Europe over recovery from two world wars, the 
emergence of the Soviet Union and their use of sport as a means to demonstrate the superiority of the 
communist way of life would eventually result in a shift of athletic success away from America.56 
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The Melbourne Olympic Games in 1956 were particularly notable for a number of reasons. Political 
events which occurred prior to the Olympics resulted in the staging of two separate boycotts; Spain, 
Netherlands and Switzerland initiated a boycott as a result of the Soviet invasion of Hungary and Egypt 
while Lebanon and Iraq boycotted because of the Suez Canal conflict. They were also the Games that 
allowed the Soviets to demonstrate the outcome of an intense four-year drive to win at the Olympics. 
Following Stalin’s death in 1953, the new Soviet leadership under Nikita Khrushchev improved and further 
developed the established sporting policies by filtering more money and resources into the state-run 
system, which in turn ensured the widespread cultivation of elite ‘amateur’ athletes. This increased 
coordination of the sporting system guaranteed that the prowess of its athletes was increased, which 
further boosted Soviet prestige.57 The investment was deemed a success when Soviet athletes achieved 
ninety-eight medals, which compared favourably with America’s seventy-four. This 40 per cent increase on 
their previous gold medal tally not only demonstrates the power of the Soviets to mobilise and direct 
resources to achieve success, but also how amateurism was potentially limiting Western levels of 
performance. Since the Soviet athletes’ training and preparation regimes were not constrained by the 
Olympic rules of amateurism, as was the case in the West, particularly in Britain, they were able to produce 
athletes who were essentially training full-time. It seems, that although established schemes were going 
some way to ensuring the success of Soviet athletes, the perceived impact of such systems may have 
been exaggerated because amateurism was limiting the results which Western athletes were able to 
achieve. What is clear is that Olympic success undoubtedly provided a boost to Soviet prestige and built 
pride amongst Soviet citizens. Lincoln Allison interviewed Georgians in 1991, in which they reported that, 
although they now deeply regretted it, at the time ‘the sight of three Soviet athletes, complete with flag and 
anthem, standing triumphantly on the Olympic podium did make them feel proud to be associated with the 
‘Soviet Motherland.’58 
 
Western Reactions to Soviet Success 
The planned and strategic integration of sport into the political and social foundation of the Soviet state, 
and ‘a focus on elite, not mass, sport’ which was ‘supported by a systematic process of talent 
identification...scientific coaching; shamateurism; and reliance upon performance-enhancing drugs’ 
ensured that the Soviet Union continued to dominate the Olympics.59 Up until its dissolution in 1991, the 
Soviet Union “won” every summer Olympic Games they entered, with the sole exception of 1968. They are 
also considered one of the most versatile nations in Olympic history, competing in all winter and summer 
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sports, and winning medals in twenty-one of the twenty-three sports represented at the 1988 Games.60 The 
Soviet Union’s Olympic campaign culminated in a total of 1010 medals, of which 395 were gold, 319 silver 
and 296 bronze. However, even at the height of Soviet dominance, the attitude from the West, particularly 
America, was one of disdain rather admiration. Western press reports and opinions consistently trumpeted 
the capitalist system of sport and often condemned the Soviet Union and their methods.  
The American publication Sports Illustrated, repeatedly published negative portrayals of the Soviet 
system and used specific language and descriptors to ensure that both the Soviet Union and communism 
were always placed in an unfavourable light.61 Detailed interpretations of the Soviet strategies used to 
achieve sporting supremacy were repeatedly scrutinised and analysed, often presenting the system as 
‘machine-like’ and inhuman. It was commented ‘that every Russian athlete of international promise has 
been taken out of his job and given intense, year-round training which few in the West can equal and 
which, of course, is state-paid.’62 American press reports consistently argued that the Soviets defeated 
American athletes not because they were athletically superior but because of their unsporting practices. It 
was claimed that the Soviet sport system was violating the true meaning of sport because their athletes 
expressed no enjoyment when they were competing. One example of American reaction to the Soviets 
emerged in 1956,  
 
Their athletes are deadly serious…they seldom did anything but concentrate on the work at 
hand. Noticeably missing was the thrill and satisfaction of a fine performance. When Mikhail 
Krivonosov smashed the world hammer-throw record, he merely sat down on a bench and 
pulled a cap over his eyes. He had been given a job to do and he did it - that was all.63 
 
Sports Illustrated argued it was unreasonable to expect American athletes to compete successfully against 
the ‘machines’ of the Eastern Bloc, particularly when there was evidence that the Soviet authorities were 
‘buying their athletes, working them full time and making a mockery of the Olympic ideal.’64 Perhaps one of 
the most critical comments on Soviet sport came from US Senator John Marshall, who described the Soviet 
athlete as a ‘paid propaganda agent of the USSR, one more slave in the hideous chain gang of 
brainwashed individuals slavishly advancing the Communist cause.’65 During this time of course, American 
citizens were being treated to the spectre of the supposed dangers of communism through the publicity 
being given to ‘McCarthyism’, which had resulted in many anti-communist purges. During the early stages 
of the Cold War, in 1950 Senator Joseph McCarthy had accused the State Department of being ‘infested 
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with communists’ and he began to gain support from the American public and anti-communist 
organisations. This marked the start of a decade of investigations, or ‘witch hunts’, in order to uncover 
‘Communist infiltration in American life.’ Although McCarthyism eventually lost momentum and is now more 
commonly associated with ‘unscrupulously accusing people of disloyalty without evidence’, at the time, 
these factors, coupled with American defeat by Soviet athletes, continued to fuel the widespread anti-
communist hysteria and resulted in ever more strident criticism of the Soviet Union.66  
The majority of the accusations directed towards the Soviet sport system centred around the notion 
that the Communist state were exploiting sport in order to demonstrate the superiority of their way of life. 
However, as Jim Nendel highlights, this was somewhat odd considering there had previously been many 
claims made against the United States, particularly during the twentieth century, that they too had 
manipulated the use of the Olympic Games in order to ‘promote the supremacy of the American way of life 
to other nations.’67 By using the Games in this way they had been repeatedly accused of violating the 
amateur tradition of sport by British officials. It was rather ironic therefore, that when the Soviet Union 
began to manipulate the Games and the amateur regulations for their benefit, the United States claimed 
that this was unfair practice. Comparisons can be drawn here between the American reaction to Soviet 
success and British responses to American victories, particularly those at the London and Stockholm 
Games in 1908 and 1912 respectively. In both instances there were suggestions that losses at the Olympic 
Games would impact on prestige, and that an improvement in results would only be achieved if 
substantially more money and resources were directed into training and preparation. Although the Olympic 
Games had been founded on the principles of fair play and sportsmanship and were supposedly devoid of 
political involvement, it is obvious from the widespread association between athletic failure and national 
decadence that political ideologies and beliefs have always had a close relationship with the Olympic 
movement.  
From a British perspective, the criticisms published in the press regarding Soviet sport revolved 
primarily around traditional notions of amateurism. Although Soviet authorities claimed that professionalism 
did not exist in their country, British press reports claimed that ‘by Western standards of amateurism this is 
open to dispute.’68 Soviet athletes were beating the British because they were employing the use of 
‘shamateurs’ and British amateur athletes were ill-equipped to keep pace. There were repeated debates in 
the press regarding ‘shamateurs’, and because countries like Russia and Poland were not being prevented 
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from entering such athletes, there was a call from some in the West to allow the entry of professional British 
athletes into the Olympics so that Britain could compete on a level playing field.69 Despite an apparent 
disinterest of Soviet sport in the press, possibly because the Soviet Union were so convincingly beating the 
British that any attempt to compare or even suggest that Britain could challenge the Soviet Union would 
have been futile, Soviet sporting activity was placed under careful scrutiny through some official channels. 
In April 1950, a report had been sent from the British Embassy in Moscow to the Research sector of the 
Foreign Office which included a publication that had appeared in Komsomolskaya Pravda entitled, ‘Why 
Soviet Sportsmen Win.’ This raised concerns amongst British officials because it highlighted the ‘motives 
behind the importance attached to the supremacy in sport in the Soviet Union’ and it was clear ‘they would 
not rest’ until they were ‘supreme in all branches of sport.’70 Contained within the report were disquieting 
comments relating to the manipulation of children, and how they were being moulded to recognise the 
significance of sport within the Soviet Union. The ‘Soviet youth, educated by the Party, is hardening its 
character and will, and becoming insistent and stubborn because it sees before itself an honourable aim.’ 
When this strategy paid dividends, and the children developed into successful elite athletes, they would be 
accorded great respect and admiration, because they were now considered ‘worthy of their Motherland’ for 
‘defending the honour of an advanced state and the honour of their people.’ Soviet officials remained aware 
of the potential threat from Western athletes, but this was not given too much consideration because ‘the 
bourgeois system of physical education is in a state of moral decay. And its ruin, together with the ruin of 
bourgeois culture as a whole, is inevitable.’71  
Another report from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1980, raised fears surrounding the 
allocation of the Olympic Games to Moscow. The Soviet Government was manipulating the awarding of the 
Games and using it to their benefit to demonstrate to their citizens the power and authority of Communist 
states. The 1980 ‘Handbook for Party Activists’ had been intercepted and contained within was a thirteen 
page section devoted to the Olympics which emphasised the political importance the Soviet leadership 
attached to staging the Games. It was declared that ‘the decision to award the honour of holding the 
Olympic Games to the capital of the first socialist state in the world is convincing proof of the general 
acknowledgement of the historical importance and correct foreign policy of our country.’ British officials 
commented that political involvement would violate the rules of the Olympic Charter and that some form of 
sanction should be placed upon the Soviet Union to prevent such use of the Games. However, once the 
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Games had been awarded to Moscow there were very few options to prevent them from using the 
Olympics to boost their political prestige.72 
 
Components of Soviet Success 
The emergence of the likes of the Soviet Union, which used sport to demonstrate the superiority of the 
communist way of life, created an increased emphasis on winning and breaking records, and a shift in the 
role of international sport. The Soviet Union sporting system was a centrally controlled programme in which 
the government devoted ever more resources via a sophisticated and comprehensive sports system in 
order to guarantee success. Although drug taking and blood doping amongst athletes in countries such as 
the Soviet Union was endemic during the Cold War, it would be tenuous to suggest that their success 
rested solely on the use of performance enhancing substances. As Rob Beamish and Ian Richie highlight, 
the Soviet Union were never alone in their use of substances and unethical training methods and the 
manipulation of performance enhancing ergogenic aids was merely a small part of a much larger 
sophisticated system. They suggest that three main factors contributed to their success; the systematic and 
scientifically guided selection of children for a particular sport; the placing of these young athletes in fully 
equipped facilities with methodical and structured training programmes, which were guided by networks of 
qualified scientists associated with research in human performance; and finally, the concentration of effort 
and resources to selected sports.73 However, this list is not exhaustive because another major contributor 
to Soviet success was the focus it placed on its female athletes. For example, at the Montreal Games in 
1976, Soviet women comprised 35 per cent of the entire Soviet team and contributed thirty-six of the total 
125 medal tally. In comparison, the American and British teams’ female athletes consisted of only 26 and 
20 per cent respectively. It is also interesting to note that during the seventeen track and field meets 
between the USA and USSR during the periods of 1958 to 1981, in which the Soviets amassed a higher 
points total on thirteen occasions, Soviet men only won five times but the Soviet women only lost on one 
occasion, winning all the other sixteen meets. Without the presence of Soviet women, the USSR team 
would have lost the majority of events.74  
The success of female athletes in the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries was achieved by 
directed research into the female body and recognition of its potential for performance enhancement. This 
allowed for the development of training schedules which would actively complement the female metabolic 
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potential.75 One sports official from the Eastern Bloc commented that ‘we give our men no preference in 
training. While other nations can produce men’s teams as good if not better than ours, they lose to us 
overall because they are not tapping the potential of their women.’76 Although the American media initially 
made attempts to minimise the importance of women’s events, the emergence of successful Soviet women 
resulted in a realisation that if America was to re-gain control in international sport they too would need to 
direct greater focus and resources towards to development of female athletes. It was the emergence of the 
Soviet Union at the 1952 Olympics that altered the way in which women’s sport came to be approached 
around the world.77 
There were also technical sports science techniques being implemented in the Eastern Bloc countries 
during the Cold War, and they were for the most part, designed and developed by Soviet researchers. 
Michael Kalinski and Christopher Dunbar suggest that due to the inaccessibility of journals, lack of 
familiarity with the language and secrecy surrounding such work ensured that this research was scarcely 
known by those in the West. Particularly in the Soviet Union, the free dissemination of scientific ideas and 
research was suppressed in the early 1950s as a direct result of the actions of the Joint Sessions of the 
Academy of Science and the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR.78 This, coupled with the 
pressures exerted as a result of the Cold War, meant that any communication between the Soviet Union 
and Western scientists virtually disappeared. From this point onwards, what was occurring in the Soviet 
sport system became a mystery and caused much speculation regarding the reasons for their success. 
Hamilton Smith commented that ‘nobody knew what the hell the Soviets were doing’, and that he and Tom 
McNab often disagreed about the mechanics of the system. Although both men believed they must have 
been using some form of performance enhancing substance, Smith was convinced that the Soviets were 
working harder than anyone else and he points out that ‘you can’t take drugs and go faster, the drug 
enables you to train harder.’79 
Many individuals began to question the Soviet sport system and how they could produce athletes that 
were so superior to the rest of the world, and this uncertainty resulted in growing unease over the Soviet 
system. In an attempt to gain some evidence, Michael Speak and Victoria Ambler visited the Soviet Union 
in 1975 to observe the sporting and physical education programmes in use. They noted that the State 
would select gifted sporting children and develop their talents in well-equipped facilities under the guidance 
of many ‘excellent’ and ‘qualified’ coaches. In order to qualify as a coach in the Soviet Union, individuals 
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were required to attend university or institutes of physical education and sport for a three year period before 
they were granted access to athletes. This ensured that the quality and standard of their coaches was 
consistently high because they were all qualified to a similar level, whereas in Britain for example, anyone 
who was willing to donate their free time would have been welcomed to train and teach athletes.80 The 
average coach working in a Soviet sport school earned 200-300 roubles a month which roughly equates to 
£6.40, but if the coach was working with ‘Masters’ of sport he/she earned a considerably larger salary.81 
There was also a sense of loyalty towards their coaches in the Soviet Union, whereby once they 
approached an age where it was no longer suitable for them to coach or they were no longer considered in 
‘touch with current coaching methods’, they would be provided with other jobs and many moved into 
physical education teaching, talent identification of younger athletes and sports administration.82 These 
opportunities would never have been offered to British coaches, and some would argue that even in the 
modern era, coaches in Britain fail to be supported once their coaching career is over. 
Speak and Ambler observed that the Soviet knowledge of sports medicine was particularly advanced 
and widespread, far outranking anything previously observed in Britain. Each Sport School had a suite of 
medical rooms in which ‘many physiotherapists’ were available to assist, and children were ‘tested six 
months after they begin to attend, to establish whether they have enough potential to continue.’ The use of 
such methods would have been, and in many cases would continue to be considered inappropriate by 
those in the West. There were other rooms that were supervised by a qualified doctor which included ones 
for treatment, diagnosis and massage, but perhaps the most beneficial and advanced use of these rooms 
was the ability to establish whether illness or injury was the ‘result of physiological deficiency or 
overtraining.’83 
Although the use of these techniques is now commonplace in elite British sport, at the time that the 
Soviets were implementing these methods they would have been relatively unknown elsewhere. For the 
most part, Western athletes would have relied on the observations and medical knowledge of their 
coaches, which in some cases would have been very limited. It was made even more apparent that British 
and Soviet sport systems had been founded on different political, economic and cultural principles when 
Speak and Ambler described an incident at the Leningrad Sports School between the director of the 
gymnastic school, who was a former Olympic champion, and a group of three young (aged 14, 13 and 11 
respectively) female gymnasts. ‘The quality of the work appeared to be of international calibre and the 
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coaches were very, very demanding. At one stage the coach told the girl, “you’ll do it until you cannot 
stand”.’84 It was acknowledged that the work was very repetitive, and this essentially highlighted the exact 
nature of the relationship between the athletes, coaches and the system. The athletes were being utilised 
as a means to an end, cogs within a much larger machine. This is not to say that they were undervalued or 
not respected by their coaches, but there was a clear agenda to their participation in sport, something 
which would have been alien to British athletes, especially children. Vassil Girginov and Ivan Sandanski 
suggest that athletes in the East and West were ‘following different patterns of socialisation through sport’ 
which had been framed by different structures and ‘attitudes to sporting practice.’85 Speak and Ambler 
concluded with the suggestion that the focused direction of Soviet sport and physical culture ‘could solve 
many of the problems associated with the British system’, but that a sporting system which had been built 
on the values of amateurism, to which it remained fiercely loyal, would probably have preferred to retain its 
problems rather than ‘sacrifice personal and professional freedom’ by adopting Soviet methods.86 
Olympic coach Terry Denison also saw the Soviet sport system first hand when he and Adrian 
Moorhouse (Olympic gold medallist) arranged to visit and train with the swim team in 1981. Comparisons 
can be drawn between his experiences and those reported in 1975 by Speak and Ambler. He commented 
that ‘the whole Soviet system was really very, very efficient...they were more organised and planned on a 
national level, more back-up support, more scientific support...they were just like we are today.’ Denison 
experienced just how advanced the Soviet’s medical knowledge was when Moorhouse incurred an injury to 
his shoulder on the second day of the visit, 
 
If he had had that sort of an injury back home, it would have been physio treatment, if we 
could get it, it would certainly have been a number of days out of the water in recovery, 
however, as soon as he got the injury, they brought the sport scientists in and they sprayed 
him with, I didn't know what but it was obviously some sort of coolant thing that they had in 
these files that they had, they gave him physio treatment immediately, the physios told us 
what we should do over night and then the next day and he was back in the water. That would 
have been impossible over here at that time. It was all strapped up just like you see the 
athletes strapped up today, it was done well and he didn't lose a day’s training. Whereas, in 
England, it would have been quite a serious injury. So it was obvious that there were things 
available that we didn't know about or we weren't using in this country, not in swimming 
anyway, I don’t know if athletics was or whatever but swimming wasn’t.87 
 
Although Denison acknowledged that the Soviet coaches and swim team were ‘very welcoming’ and ‘very 
supportive’, it was clear that they had some reservations about sharing all their training methods. Denison 
commented ‘the only time in Russia it didn’t work was when I asked to see the science labs, to see what 
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they were doing, that caused a bit of consternation.’ After much deliberation he was allowed to view the lab, 
but far from seeing the methods and techniques being implemented, he was subjected to ‘a beautiful 
pristine lab with not a soul in it!’ It was obvious that they did not want outsiders to see what they were doing. 
However, Denison believes that this was not just because they were doing anything unethical, but due more 
to the fact that he was the opposition, and sharing such secrets and methods would have disadvantaged 
them.88 
Immediately prior to and following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it had begun to emerge that 
success in Soviet sport had been achieved by a comprehensive athletic agenda into which research into 
exercise biochemistry, physiology and psychology were fully integrated. Sport institutions received specific 
research assignments from the Union of Research Institute of Physical Culture and by 1970 more than 
twenty-eight of these institutions were in existence.89 Sport psychology, in particular, received considerable 
attention. Other nations appeared to disregard the benefit of the discipline, but shortly after WWII, having 
had a close association with aspects of sport psychology, primarily through the work of Avksenty 
Cezarevich Puni, the Soviet Union began to develop this as a self-contained science which continued to 
progress and be utilised alongside other aspects of performance enhancement. Puni had been a keen 
sportsman as a child, and following the Civil War, he was offered the position of a sport organiser, a 
combination of factors which created an interest in the area of sport psychology and its potential impact on 
training and performance. In 1929, Puni undertook undergraduate and postgraduate study at the P. F. 
Lesgaft institute of Physical Culture where he became heavily involved in research relating to psychological 
issues and sporting performance. Following WWII, Puni made attempts to formalise the discipline of sport 
psychology and developed a department at the Institute of Physical Culture. He successfully inspired 
others and they began to develop sport psychology courses for students and researchers as well as 
creating multiple laboratories so that relevant research could be conducted.90 Following the success of the 
Soviet team in 1952, in which the sports sciences were attributed as being significant factors in the teams’ 
performances, there was an increased demand for applied research and education in sport psychology so 
that coaches could effectively incorporate these methods into their training.91  
Although America, through the work of Coleman Griffith in the 1920s, had made attempts to develop 
the discipline of sport psychology, it had failed to progress because many did not appreciate the true value 
of the subject. By 1932, his laboratory at the University of Illinois had been closed, primarily because of a 
lack of financial investment although it has also been suggested that Griffith had lost the support of the 
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Illinois football coach, Robert Zuppke, because he failed to see any improvement in his team as a result of 
Griffith’s methods.92 It was at this point that Griffith ceased the psychological work he had undertaken with 
professional sports teams and sport psychology in the United States did not really surface again until the 
1960s. Unlike Puni, Griffith had been unable to ‘train or stimulate others to follow in his footsteps’ and 
consequently the discipline remained latent in America.93 However, perhaps the most influential and 
important development to emerge from Soviet sporting research was an alternative training paradigm 
termed, periodisation. Lev Pavlovich Matveyev analysed the athletic performances of a large number of 
athletes across a range of different sports and produced a systematic training programme which would 
encourage the optimal development of an athlete’s performance.94 In 1965, he published his theory in the 
Periodisation of Sport Training, and after it was translated into the majority of languages used throughout 
the Soviet Bloc, this encouraged the wide-spread dissemination of the training method to a large number of 
Soviet coaches and athletes.95 
 
Key Factors 
The sporting Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union had been far-reaching, stretching 
from the aftermath of the Second World War and lasting until the dissolution of the Soviet States in 1991. 
The rivalry reached its peak in the 1980s when the United States, in retaliation to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, staged a boycott of the planned Moscow Games. However, to suggest that this boycott was 
solely a reaction to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan would be simplistic. A multitude of factors, which 
cannot be covered in detail here, coupled with the awarding of the 1980 Games to a communist state which 
would obviously use it as a form of political propaganda, culminated in the eventual boycott. Initially not all 
countries were in support of the boycott and even those considered close allies of the United States 
appeared reluctant, but under pressure other nations gradually began to follow suit. British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher voiced her support for the boycott, which was approved by the House of Commons in 
March 1980. But since the Olympic Charter states that ‘the NOC have the exclusive authority for the 
representation of their exclusive countries’, the British Olympic Association (BOA) took the decision to defy 
the government and sent a team to Moscow.96 This seemingly placed a strain on the relationship it had 
forged with the government when the Minister of State at the time, Douglas Hurd, stated that ‘sport itself 
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has lost the support in Parliament by the BOA’s decision’ and that it was unlikely that the government 
‘would make an effort to repair the damage to sport in this country.’97 This rift undoubtedly influenced the 
willingness of the government to provide both the BOA and British sport with further financial support, and 
this will be explored further in the following chapter. In response to American actions, the Soviet Union 
staged a boycott of their own four years later when the Games were held in Los Angeles. Soviet authorities 
claimed their absence was because they feared for the safety of their athletes in a country that had such a 
strong anti-communist climate but there was an overriding belief amongst many that although there were 
various factors surrounding the Soviet decision not to participate, it was essentially orchestrated as a ‘tit for 
tat’ response to the American actions of four years previous.98  
A series of complex events, such as the political and economic reform of the Soviet Union which had 
been initiated by Mickail Gorbachev during the 1980s, and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 subsequently 
contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and this effectively marked the end of the Cold 
War.99 From this point onwards, the focus on success in elite sport at the expense of development in other 
areas of society was no longer a dominating principle, but the influence of the Soviets remained strong and 
not all aspects of Soviet sport disappeared. Long before the dissolution, it had become evident that Soviet 
athletes were paid professionals, or ‘shamateurs’, and that a system of open professionalisation had clearly 
worked dividends for them, so other nations began to actively encourage an alteration to eligibility 
standards for entrance into the Olympic Games. Although this did not cause an immediate removal of the 
amateur ruling at the Olympic Games, and it was not until 1988 that professional athletes were eligible to 
enter, nations began to shift towards a professional approach, particularly in the way in which internal sport 
systems were organised.100 However, the British, who considered themselves to have a different respect 
and appreciation for amateurism, would where possible, continue to control and organise their sport along 
amateur lines, whereby honorary officials continued to make executive decisions about the direction of their 
sports. Nevertheless, as pressures began to mount as more and more nations moved towards open 
professionalisation, Britain was encouraged to follow suit. However, even in the 1970s and 1980s when 
amateurism was no longer considered the guiding principle in British sport, its influence and impact 
remained ever present. 
It has been established here that there were two areas in particular, government intervention and 
sports science, had paid significant dividends to Soviet sport. The far reaching sporting success of the 
Soviet Union encouraged governments around the world to emulate some of their sporting policies and the 
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significant contributions made to the understanding of exercise biochemistry, sports nutrition and sport 
psychology, and the development of sophisticated methods of training such as periodisation, would 
transform sport worldwide. As government intervention and sports science were two key areas which 
apparently ensured the prolonged success of the Soviet Union, it makes sense to analyse the influence 
these two areas subsequently had on British sport. Consequently, the final four chapters specifically focus 
on these two areas from a British perspective, and try to establish how the continuing influence of 
amateurism, and attitudes to coaches, may have affected the rate of their uptake and development. During 
the 1990s, British sporting policies began to reflect some of those which had been in use in the Soviet 
Union, and while it could be argued that these systems would have been put in place regardless of whether 
the Soviets existed as an exemplar, it does seem to have been highly influential.101 However, while Soviet 
sporting policies encouraged greater specialisation in British sport, particularly through increased 
government intervention, there was less of a desire to utilise sports science techniques and its 
incorporation was not initially encouraged. There appears to have been a significant lag between the 
emergence of particular training techniques and their uptake in Britain. The first public, government funded 
example of research in British sport did not emerge until 1965 with the BOA directed Mexican altitude 
project, and this will be discussed in more depth in the following chapter. It should be noted at this point, 
that there was one Soviet training method, periodisation, which had an influence on British coaching, 
especially after 1975 when Frank Dick reproduced these Soviet principles for a British audience. However, 
even then it was not widely welcomed. This resistance to scientific training methods in Britain could well be 
due to some ethical concerns surrounding Eastern Bloc techniques since the dubious practices believed to 
be commonly in use within the Soviet schemes had become inextricably linked with sports science 
methods. An association, therefore, was made between the incorporation of science and cheating in sport 
because it was increasingly difficult to disassociate the two.102 In relation to this Terry Denison commented, 
 
The system was...fantastic at identifying talent, of putting talent in the right places, of getting 
the right coaches and the right sport scientists together, the system was brilliant but it involved 
the use of drugs, so that tainted everything...you couldn't justify the use of drugs on young 
people anyway...but also, you couldn't even look at the rest of it and say well, they did that 
well didn't they, well, yeah but...we can't be following that. It just tainted everything. But their 
systems were good; the Soviet sport school system was good.103 
 
According to Roberta Park another factor that delayed the introduction of sports science and scientific 
training methods into British sport, was the strict amateur ethos that continued to permeate and dominate 
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British sport.104 Consequently, while coaching was beginning to gain some acceptance in Britain, there was 
still an apparent uneasiness surrounding the use of science to improve sporting performance and this will 
become clear in the following chapters. 
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Chapter Six: Soviet Influences on British Sport 
British sporting performances had continually declined since the interwar period, but it was the emergence 
of the Soviet Union that now made these losses even more apparent. Previously, the results of British 
athletes could be attributed to the impact of the war and the continued strict adherence to amateurism, but 
the success of the Soviets meant that these excuses were no longer satisfactory. This chapter analyses the 
impact of the Soviet Union on British sport, and indicates how the success of the Soviets resulted in calls to 
adopt a more specialised sporting model. The meagre performances of British athletes at the 1952 
Olympics appear to have been much more influential in terms of encouraging change than the results 
experienced previously. Also, athlete unrest at both Helsinki and Melbourne suggests that discontent in 
British sport was now no longer just confined to professional coaches. This chapter considers some of 
those events and then explores why, despite increasing pressures to adopt Soviet techniques of coaching 
and training, British administrators remained reluctant to incorporate a more specialised approach to 
coaching. It then goes on to discuss how this resistance ultimately led to a number of coaching resignations 
in both swimming and athletics. The final section of the chapter suggests that, although National Governing 
Bodies (NGB) were unwilling to relinquish their master-servant relationship with professional coaches, the 
Soviet success and continued poor performances of British athletes encouraged external bodies to review 
the state of British sport. 
Helsinki and Melbourne from a British Perspective 
The rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States at both the Helsinki and Melbourne Games 
ensured that competition standards were particularly high. Despite the tentative steps taken after the 1948 
Olympics towards improving coaching in Britain, partly because the schemes were still very much devoted 
to the traditions of amateurism and volunteerism, British athletes were unable to keep pace, and this was 
clearly highlighted by the lack of achievement, particularly at Helsinki. Whereas previous British failures had 
been attributed to the aftermath of the war, by 1952 this could no longer be convincingly used to explain 
failure, and as a result the performances of the British team were widely touted as a ‘ghastly failure.’1 A 
gold medal tally of just one, coupled with the success of the Soviet Union and the United States, once 
again stimulated debate about the British sporting system. It was obvious that the alternative training and 
coaching methods now being utilised abroad far outstripped anything which existed in Britain. Helsinki 
indicated that the British sport system was ill-equipped to keep pace, for it was apparent that Britain was 
‘disastrously short of tracks; America has, perhaps, 100 tracks for every one that we possess; and they 
have indoor facilities as well.’2 The Times ran articles questioning how the traditionalist view on sport had 
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potentially hampered the development of British training methods and it was suggested that Britain has ‘too 
few coaches and their status still leaves something to be desired.’3 The issue of specialised training 
techniques was also raised, and although it was acknowledged that some British athletes were beginning 
to train in a ‘laboratory atmosphere of stop watches, statistics and records’, many critics continued to 
question this approach, suggesting that these methods were not suitable for British sport.4 This resistance 
to the incorporation of science into British sport was nothing new. In 1927, A. V. Hill, while completing a 
one-semester guest lectureship at Cornell University, observed that ‘in America...people are more inclined 
to treat the subject of athletics scientifically...there are I fear, many athletes and sportsmen in England who 
would be shocked by such an idea.’5 Despite Helsinki failures raising questions over science and sport, 
further progress was not forthcoming. In 1953, British football administrator Sir Stanley Rous commented 
that, ‘the British, compared with many other nations, usually go about their games in a surprisingly 
unserious way...who cares about the...chemical structure of a muscle.’6 It was clear that the debate 
regarding British sport and science would be on-going, and considering that it was yet another aspect 
influenced by amateurism, its integration could be a slow process.  
Despite widespread criticism, Harold Abrahams made attempts to defend the British athletes and 
suggested that their performances at the 1952 Games would have been sufficient to secure medals in both 
1936 and 1948. In response, The Times argued that it was exactly ‘this curious backward-looking and 
sideways thinking’ that was the ‘root of the problem’ in British sport.7 It was becoming increasingly apparent 
that amateurism was no longer an acceptable excuse for poor performances; where individuals had once 
expressed a fondness for the British amateur ethos, these feelings were gradually being replaced with 
resentment. The option was clear; if Britain wanted to achieve success in sport, then a shift towards a more 
specialised system was required. John Disley argued that the close relationship between British sport and 
amateurism had not only hindered the development of coaching and training, but had also ‘built up a 
psychological barrier to winning’ amongst developing athletes.8 The Picture Post also highlighted the 
differences between British and foreign interpretations of amateurism and suggested, ‘what’s the use in 
‘being British’ and saying “the game’s the thing - not the result”? No other country comes off so badly. 
Either we go flat out to win - or not enter.’9 It appears that the more professional Soviet system of sport was 
beginning to have an impact in Britain and it was being increasingly presented by some as a sporting 
                                                     
3 Philip Noel-Baker, ‘The Olympic Games: Britain’s Immense Progress’, The Times, August 9, 1952, 5. 
4 J L. Manning, ‘The Olympic Games’, The Times, August 13, 1952. 
5 Archibald Hill, Muscular Movement in Man: The Factors Governing Speed and Recovery from Fatigue (New York, McGraw-Hill, 
1921), 2; Park, ‘Cells or Soaring?’, 1710. 
6 Stanley Rous, foreword to Fitness and Injury in Sport: Care, Diagnosis and Treatment by Physical Means, by Sidney Simon 
Knight (New York: Van Nostrand, 1953), ix. 
7 ‘Olympic Games’, The Times, August 13, 1952, 5. 
8 Disley, ‘Reflections on Soviet Sport’, 71. 
9 Geoffrey Hoare, ‘Training by Candlelight?’, Picture Post, August 9, 1952, 12-3. 
 123 
Tegan Carpenter July 2012 
model that could potentially create opportunities for British athletes. It was suggested that if Britain ever 
wanted to achieve sporting success again they would need ‘to get rid of this absurd smugness about 
amateurism’ and ‘train every day, all year round’ under the supervision of professional coaches.10 In this 
respect, it was comments made by Kenneth Sandilands (‘Sandy’) Duncan, BOA secretary, which are 
perhaps the most illuminating. He suggested that  
 
Our Governing Bodies must decide whether they will, or can, make the all-out effort to train 
their Olympic teams. The day of dilettante in international competition is finished. To achieve 
supreme success, many months, or perhaps years of hard training must be carried out, and 
this requires wise direction, and great courage and self-control on the part of the 
competitor...we must realise precisely what we are up against, discard any surviving old-time 
methods, and start now planning ahead for the XVIth Olympiad, Melbourne, 1956.11  
 
Although British performances at Melbourne in 1956, where they managed to secure twenty-four medals 
including six gold, marked a significant improvement on previous Games, it was the emergence of other 
factors which indicated that British sport remained in a state of flux. There was growing discontent amongst 
the athletes, particularly over British officials and their definitions of amateurism. Although these 
disagreements had begun to surface following Helsinki, it was not until Melbourne that athlete 
dissatisfaction emerged in the public domain. The disputes which initially materialised in the press were 
associated with the request for ‘pocket money’ at the Games, something already granted in other countries. 
It was noted that Australian swimmers had ‘received 5s per day pocket money for expenses,’ but the 
appeal for funds by British athletes was denied by the BOA, with Sandy Duncan stating ‘definitely no 
pocket money. You knew that when you accepted the invitation to go to Melbourne.’12 This comment 
signifies that even though Duncan had previously acknowledged that British athletes required greater 
training and a more professional attitude, the BOA and other sporting organisation still remained guarded of 
their level of control and finances, which suggest that despite signalling an acceptance of specialisation, 
amateurism remained ever present. Despite initially linking disputes to the matter of money, it gradually 
became apparent that the issues went much deeper and the far-reaching restrictions which British amateur 
officials had placed on its athletes were beginning to create repercussions. Jack Crump, athletics team 
manager from the British Amateur Athletic Board (BAAB), referred to the majority of athletes as a 
‘miserable lot’ who had not approached the competition in the correct way.13 This resulted in a wave of 
criticism being aimed at the British athletes, with one press report suggesting there was ‘no point in sending 
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athletes who...clearly don’t care whether they win or lose.’14 Chris Brasher, who had won a gold medal in 
the 3000m steeplechase, came to the defence of the athletes, and declared that although there was a level 
of ‘cynicism’ in the team this was because of ‘the breakdown in confidence and respect between the 
officials and athletes.’15 He also argued that ‘sport is undemocratically controlled by a few amateur and 
professional dictators...old men have clung to the dreams of their childhood when a gentleman was an 
amateur and an artisan a professional.’16 British athletes suggested that because officials had failed to 
progress, they were ‘out of touch with the sport’, and particularly since the war that this had resulted in a 
‘wide gap’ between athletes and administrators.17 Athletes were not alone in their criticisms. When 
questioned why British athletics had ‘folded up’, the Australian team manager proposed that there was a 
lack of discipline in the team, administrators were too old and needed replacing by ‘younger people who 
had some conception of what modern athletics entailed’, and tellingly there was a lack of coaching.18 
Prompted by the events of Melbourne, many athletes called for a ‘complete re-organisation’ of the British 
sport system, something which the BOA were inclined to agree with.19  
 
It has become apparent that we need more professional coaches in this country and that in 
some sports the competitors from other countries train over longer distances and for longer 
hours. The amount of training that competitors felt that they required in 1956 was for some 
sports more than double that which was considered necessary in 1948.20  
 
In May 1959, a group of seventy athletes, which included John Disley and Chris Brasher, created the 
International Athletes Club (IAC), which it was hoped would encourage the development of facilities and 
coaching for British athletics.21 In order to tackle some of the issues in athletics they required financial 
backing, but since this would not be forthcoming from other sources, they set about raising their own funds. 
They produced a book entitled Road to Rome and the royalties were used to organise a pre-Olympic 
training weekend for forty-eight athletes and ten coaches.22 They also made plans to develop a permanent 
training centre in Hampshire but lack of finance and active support prevented it from becoming 
established.23 It was also hoped that ‘never again should a national coach have to dip into his own pocket 
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to enable one of our brightest hopes to travel to London for coaching.’24 Despite making considerable 
progress in a short period of time, when the IAC made attempts to be represented officially they were 
rebuffed by the BAAB. Although the BAAB did not object to the IAC’s existence, they were not willing to 
offer them a role which could potentially dilute the existing level of authority of amateur officials.25 
On paper it seems that attempts were indeed being made to raise the profile of British sport and 
change how professional coaching was being valued, but in reality, it was also apparent that sporting 
bodies still had firm ideas regarding the importance of professional coaching. It could be suggested that the 
way in which amateur administrators approached coaching and athletes was embedded within the culture 
of their sport because, historically, the connection between administrators and coaches or trainers had 
always been moulded around the master-servant relationship whereby ‘as long as coaches adopted their 
allotted roles as servants then suitable men might be acceptable as trainers.’26 It was extremely difficult to 
break down barriers and traditions which had existed in the sport for so long and it is unsurprising that this 
approach to coaching continued to have a residual impact. However, in the modern era, appointed coaches 
were no longer willing to accept the role of servant and they wanted greater autonomy and control over 
their working environment. From the administrators’ perspective these professional coaches were now 
encroaching on matters which did not come under their jurisdiction, and in an attempt to control the 
situation, they continued to rely on their traditional authoritarian approach. Tom McNab suggests that even 
as late as the 1960s when he was acting as national coach, there was still this assumption among 
administrators that 'you'll do as your told, we're the masters here.'27 
The following sections examine the development of the coaching schemes in both swimming and 
athletics after the 1952 Helsinki Games. The evidence suggests, that although changes were being 
implemented, the control of the sporting bodies, particularly the NGBs, remained with amateur officials who 
managed their sports according to their traditional beliefs. Although attempts were being made to raise the 
overall profile of professional coaching in British sport, amateur officials still viewed them with distrust and 
this was demonstrated by the lack of respect which they offered their national coaches.  
 
Post-Melbourne Coaching Scheme Development 
Swimming  
Although there had been discussions in the 1952 Amateur Swimming Association (ASA) Committee 
Minutes about re-opening negotiations with the Ministry of Education regarding grant-aid for coaches, it 
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was not until December 1957 that an official application was submitted.28 Contained within the application 
was a declaration that the ASA could extend the scope of work to which they were committed ‘if only we 
had a paid coach.’ Fern, who believed that because swimming was considered a life skill it was of greater 
value than any other sport, commented, ‘I notice that a grant had been made to the Amateur Fencing 
Association, no doubt very justifiably, but one can hardly rank fencing in the same category as swimming’ 
and he suggested that swimming ‘might well be ranked higher than any other sports for which coaching 
grants are already made.’29 This reflects the constant battle which occurred between sports to ensure they 
were receiving the support they felt they were entitled to. Many organisations believed that their sport was 
somehow superior to other sports and any hint that another association was receiving what they 
considered to be unwarranted support would immediately be questioned. It might be assumed that under 
modern conditions NGBs would be more willing to co-operate but, because the environment is now fuelled 
by the demand for results and greater financial opportunities, the rivalry between organisations has 
continued to develop and is actually now much more prevalent. Commenting on the situation Bill Furniss 
explained, 
 
There’s a lot of sports that are envious of other sports and think they’re not getting a fair crack 
of the whip and now it’s results driven so if you don’t produce the results you don’t get the 
money...it used to be that sports could get more, a bigger slice of the cake without producing 
results.30 
 
The Ministry’s response to the ASA’s request for money, perhaps because Fern questioned their 
administrative methods, was not particularly supportive. They asked the ASA to make an official 
application, as this was the correct procedure, and to outline the scheme they intended to implement if they 
were to be awarded any funds.31 Simply stating that they wished to apply for a grant was not considered 
enough by the Ministry, even if the ASA saw themselves as superior to other sports. The ASA did submit 
an application, albeit a very brief one, stating that they wished to appoint a ‘National Technical Officer’ 
(NTO) to organise and direct various courses throughout the country.32 Once again the response was less 
than favourable as the Ministry did not believe this was the ‘kind of scheme to which we can properly give 
grant aid’ because it was not within their jurisdiction to ‘aid the salaries of organisers.’33 There was a fear 
that if they were to award funding to the ASA on such grounds they ‘may have other applications following 
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in their footsteps.’34 The ASA were directed to review their application and submit it according to grant aid 
regulations. Fern responded by suggesting that the ASA were not required to amend their application 
because the Ministry had clearly misinterpreted what they had outlined. The ASA argued they had only 
used the term NTO to avoid confusion, because within the ASA, those individuals who had gained the 
coaching certificate were classified as ‘national coaches.’ The ASA assured the Ministry that they had 
every intention of appointing a ‘fully qualified coach’ and that ‘he would follow the procedure adopted by the 
AAA coaches.’35 Although the majority of the Ministry Committee were content that what the ASA were 
proposing was a ‘bona fide coaching scheme’, there were some who were clearly irritated by the ASA’s 
refusal to accept support some eleven years previous and so questioned their intentions. It was noted that 
‘for 10 years we have dangled this carrot for them to take, and a good deal of unobtrusive action has been 
taken behind the scenes in order to get them to eat it.’36 An objection was also raised on financial grounds 
which suggested that the ASA did ‘not have a very strong case’ to request grant aid because they currently 
had £16,000 in the bank and were showing a ‘regular surplus.’ The Ministry ‘should not just spend money 
because it happens to be available’ and if the ASA were not willing to undertake a coaching scheme 
without ‘an extra carrot from the Exchequer’ then for what plausible reason had the ASA accumulated such 
a large sum of money?37  
This appears to have been a common trait amongst voluntary amateur organisations of the time, 
whereby they generally had large sums of money available but were reluctant to use it constructively. Even 
though the ASA had previously commented they were unable to raise funds in a similar fashion to 
organisations such as the AAA, who had the opportunity to organise competitions and profit from the gate 
money, their financial position was at the time much healthier than many other organisations and yet they 
were not prepared to use the funds to further their sport. This was reinforced by a number of interviewees 
in this research who observed that amateur officials in both the AAA and ASA were much more inclined to 
use, although often begrudgingly, their own personal finance to cover their expenses rather than drawing 
on the association’s money. Both Tom McNab and Hamilton Smith described situations when, having just 
begun their national coaching role they required some form of transport to successfully fulfil their 
commitments. Arthur Kendal who was the Southern Counties AAA secretary had asked McNab if he was 
going to purchase a car so that he could undertake his role successfully. McNab, who had responded that 
he was unable to afford a car, described how 
 
He got his cheque book out, this was a guy who was a completely altruistic man, he signed it 
on the wall I remember and he gave me this cheque!...I always remember that £350 cheque; I 
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mean that was a lot of money in those days, that was a third of my year’s salary that he had 
given me. And that was his personal cheque; it wasn't from the governing body.38 
 
Hamilton Smith described a similar scenario during an encounter that he had with Alderman Fern, 
 
I asked if the association might be able to give me some money and I could buy a car and I 
could pay it back. He almost had smoke coming out of his ears, money! Money! He was 
trembling, so he changed the subject and we must have talked about something else for a bit 
and then suddenly his secretary, the famous Miss Righter by name came in, now how he 
communicated I don't know, but she came in with a book like this and he took the book and he 
opened it up and it was a cheque book, it was his cheque book and he wrote me a cheque, his 
personal cheque, to go and buy a car. He said pay that back when you can! It was £500 in 
1963, that's the equivalent of £10-15,000 now...But he wouldn't give me the association’s 
money he gave me his own money.39  
 
Smith commented that this ‘aristocratic’ and altruistic element was present amongst the majority of amateur 
officials. He suggested that it was akin to ‘what was portrayed in the Chariots of Fire’ in which there was an 
upper class element controlling amateur sport. He explained that ‘if you understood that relationship then 
everything was fine as long as you were positive and respectful.’ However, if you questioned either their 
authority or the way in which they managed the sport that is when ‘problems arose.’40 Although the context 
in which these organisations operated was ever-changing, the foundations remained essentially the same. 
They had been formed by upper-middle class individuals who wanted to have some form of control over 
amateur sport and this appeared to be a relative constant amongst the amateur associations.  
With respect to the issue of grant aid for the ASA, although there appeared to be support for not 
awarding them the money, there were still some who believed, that despite everything, they had a duty to 
provide financial help and it was ‘not a case of wanting to spend money just because it happens to be 
available, but of implementing a small part of an offer previously made.’ It was also noted, that considering 
British swimming had only achieved one gold medal in 1956, when it had been assumed that they would 
have done significantly better, it ‘would be a singularly inopportune moment to refuse an application for a 
grant which...might do much to improve national standards.’41 There was consistent evidence for both sides 
of the argument, but it was eventually decided that there would be no grant-aid awarded to the ASA 
although the Ministry hoped they would ‘be able to start a coaching scheme with its own funds.’42 While 
there appears to be a lack of information in both the ASA Committee Minutes and the Ministry of Education 
documents regarding the ASA’s reaction to the rejection, it is clear that, even though they had finances, the 
ASA did not heed the suggestion and initiate their own coaching scheme. 
                                                     
38 McNab, interview. 
39 Smith, interview. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ministry of Education, Minutes, July 24, 1958, File ED 169/70, MoE Collection: ASA, NA. 
42 E H B. Baker to A H E. Fern, August 7, 1958, File ED 169/70, MoE Collection: ASA, NA. 
 129 
Tegan Carpenter July 2012 
Despite the many objections raised by the Ministry, within a year they were re-considering their 
position on the matter after the ASA had submitted a revised application. When the coaching grants were 
initially established it had been agreed that they would be able to subsidise the work of twenty-five to thirty 
coaches at an annual cost of £20,000. However, in reality they were only spending £7,000 per year to fund 
ten full time coaches across four different sports, athletics, fencing, women’s hockey and lawn tennis. This, 
it was agreed, was a ‘very much smaller scheme than was originally contemplated.’43 It would appear that 
the amateur organisations were not the only ones who had been reluctant to spend available funds. It was 
eventually agreed to offer a grant to the ASA for 80 per cent of the salary of one professional coach, and 
the ASA immediately got ‘busy to find the right man for the job.’44 The position was advertised and the ASA 
received over twenty applications from individuals willing to fulfil the position at an annual salary of £1,000. 
However, one applicant, A. D. Kinnear, who was well known to the ASA because of his previous 
involvement with the Loughborough Summer School, was considered the most suitable and qualified 
candidate for the role, even if he wanted an annual salary of £1,500.45 The Ministry approved Kinnear’s 
appointment and considered the ASA ‘very lucky’ to have secured a coach of such ‘calibre.’ Since Kinnear 
had accepted a lower salary than he was currently receiving in order to take up the role, this confirmed to 
the Ministry of ‘his enthusiasm even at some personal loss.’46  
On 1 January 1960, Kinnear took up office, and as was standard protocol with all the coaching grants, 
he was contracted to submit annual reports to the Ministry outlining the work that he had completed. 
Amongst the many tours and lectures which Kinnear had organised and presented, it was noted that he 
had also visited a hydrodynamics laboratory on the Isle of Wight ‘in an attempt to solve the many problems 
associated with resistance and propulsion in the water.’47 Although initiatives like this could have potentially 
done much to improve the standard of British swimming, the Ministry were less than satisfied and they 
reminded the ASA that ‘our grant is given on the distinct understanding that his main duty will be the 
training of persons to fit them to become local coaches...I am sure that Mr Kinnear will be anxious to keep 
in mind the main object for which our grant is given.’48 The Ministry was obviously keen to remain in control, 
particularly regarding the function of the national coaches. The very principle on which the coaching grants 
were allocated, which was not to raise the profile of British sport internationally, but to train a contingent of 
honorary coaches, demonstrates that amateurism and all its associated principles remained a very 
powerful force in British sport. Although the coaching schemes often received praise from other countries, 
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particularly America, this was probably more to do with the fact that it was so very different to anything 
experienced abroad where the emphasis was not on developing voluntary coaches but on utilising their 
many professional coaches to improve their international standing in sport.49 
Unlike the athletics coaches, Kinnear and other sporting national coaches were not given the 
opportunity to coach individual athletes on a regular basis. In his first annual report, although it was noted 
he had spent two months intermittently coaching the entire Olympic Squad (which was distinctly different to 
the system in athletics), he appealed to the Ministry to allow him to coach athletes consistently because, ‘If 
I am to keep in touch with coaching I must be permitted to coach several pupils at varying levels of 
ability.’50 Tom McNab comments that a real strength of the athletics scheme was that that they were 
allowed to coach a small number of athletes. He claimed it was a ‘bad mistake’ that other national coaches 
were prevented from coaching because that meant that they ‘stopped experiencing’ and, as a result, 
stopped developing their expertise.51 There is no evidence to suggest that Kinnear was ever granted 
permission to coach a select group of swimmers on a regular basis and the first indication that NTO were 
going to be permitted to do this came in 1967 with the appointment of Hamilton Bland. Hamilton Smith 
recalls that in 1972-3 Bland persuaded the first director of swimming, Norman Sarsfield, to allow him to 
operate within a club environment for nine months. He became the head coach at Coventry and so became 
the first ever local authority professional coach. From this point onward, the programme continued to 
develop and was rolled out to other situations throughout the country, with local authorities funding 
professional swimming coaches to work within certain clubs.52 
By 1961, it was becoming increasingly apparent that Kinnear was unable to manage the workload and 
fulfil his duties effectively without some sort of assistance, especially when it was revealed that within a one 
year period he had ‘covered approximately 20,000 miles by road and rail…worked with 6,000 swimmers 
and non-swimmers and approximately 13,000 interested persons’ had attended his lectures and 
demonstrations.53 It is unsurprising, therefore, that his duties ‘fully occupy his time and leave him little 
margin even to visit his home to see his wife and family.’54 The Ministry approved the ASA’s application for 
a second NTO in June 1961 and they began interviewing for a suitable appointment although the 
interviewing process was ‘delayed owing to queries raised by Mr Kinnear in connection with his job as 
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National Coach.’55 As with the Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) national coaches, Kinnear felt he was 
not being utilised in the most productive way in order to further develop British swimming. But the ASA 
worked hard to persuade him to stay, partly by making changes in his terms of employment, following 
which he signed a contract for a further two years.56 This was the first real sign in any official documents 
that Kinnear was beginning to have issues with his job, and there is a sense he was now feeling 
undervalued.  
Although the ASA had successfully dealt with the issue on this occasion, this was a portent of things to 
come. Despite the delay, a decision was made in November 1961 to appoint Tony Holmyard at a salary of 
£950-980 per annum, and he was scheduled to begin his official duties on 1 January 1962.57 In Kinnear’s 
annual report in 1962, he recognised that the appointment of the second NTO had resolved some of his 
difficulties but he wanted the programme to expand further. He suggested that he would ‘like to see greater 
development in the organisation of coaching throughout the country with a closer liaison between coaches’ 
because this would create a system which allowed for the ‘regular exchange of ideas.’58 Kinnear could see 
real benefit in allowing coaches to share ideas, something which many of the coaches interviewed for this 
research suggested was one of the ways they gained a lot of their coaching knowledge, and this highlights 
just how advanced Kinnear’s coaching ability and awareness actually was.59 Kinnear also expressed a 
desire to develop a ‘universal system of bringing the better swimmers together for group and team training 
in areas’, which is very similar to Koskie’s proposals following the 1948 Olympics.60 The fact that over ten 
years later such a scheme had still not come to fruition demonstrates just how reluctant amateur sporting 
organisations were to initiate change. 
As with the AAA national coaches, it appears that the environment in which the NTO’s operated was 
difficult. Holmyard resigned after less than two years and he was replaced by Hamilton Smith who began 
his duties on 1 October 1963.61 Smith had emigrated to Canada and had been coaching there for about 
eighteen months when he received a telegram from Kinnear (who he had become acquainted with at 
Loughborough) explaining that the ASA were advertising for another national coach and he wanted him to 
apply. Smith was keen but he did not have the funds to pay for the airfare until he received another 
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telegram, this time from Alderman Fern, simply stating ‘come for an interview we will pay your fare.’ Within 
two days he was on a plane and being interviewed by ‘the whole of the ASA committee...half of them didn't 
know the shallow end from the deep end in any sort of coaching or technical context but Bert had wanted 
me to get the job, so I got the job.’62 The ASA appealed to the Ministry for a further grant to appoint a third 
NTO and Helen Elkington started in her role on 1 April 1964.63 Working in an environment where there was 
constant questioning from the amateur administration regarding the work of the NTOs eventually began to 
take its toll. In 1966 new terms of employment were handed to the three NTOs but there was disagreement 
over some issues and they refused to sign them.64 They were given until April 1967 to comply, and 
although Kinnear and Elkington were content (for the time being) to continue their work, Smith decided to 
resign.65 He explained that it was not one specific factor that caused him to leave, but a culmination of 
reasons, although ‘the straw that broke the camel’s back’ was when he was accused of cheating on his 
expenses. It transpired that there had been a complication with the paperwork and that Smith had been 
submitting it correctly but it was not being processed. By then, he had become so frustrated with the 
working environment and the amateur officials that he had already made the decision to leave and return to 
education.66  
Shortly after Smith’s resignation, the ASA were awarded another Ministry grant to appoint three further 
NTOs, Hamilton Bland, John Hogg and Charles Wilson. Unfortunately for British swimming, Kinnear was 
soon to follow Smith and resign. Kinnear had issues with Smith’s intended replacement, John Stace, who 
had been personally selected by Sarsfield. This was no real surprise since Kinnear and Sarsfield had 
always had a somewhat strained relationship because they failed to find common ground over the status of 
professional coaches.67 Stace did not hold the diploma of Physical Education, which Kinnear believed 
should have been a prerequisite in order for an individual to fulfil the role of NTO successfully. He 
commented, 
 
I have spent 7 and a half years building up a scheme which has earned the respect and 
support of the teaching and physical education professions, and the competitive swimming 
fraternity. The basis of its success had been the high qualifications in teaching physical 
education and swimming of its officers...and their exceptional ability. I am not prepared to 
lower these standards by accepting what I consider to be unqualified personnel.68 
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The ASA Committee was ‘not prepared to take the advice of Mr Kinnear on this particular occasion’ and 
therefore, on principle, he resigned as of October 1967.69 Once the basis of Kinnear’s resignation was 
made public, the ASA received a torrent of criticism from various bodies ‘deploring the resignation of Mr. A. 
D. Kinnear.’ In response, the ASA defended their actions suggesting that Kinnear had recognised that 
Stace was the best candidate for the job but his only objection was regarding the absence of the teaching 
qualification.70 Whether or not this was the case, their refusal to even consider Kinnear’s opinion, it was 
claimed, resulted in the ‘greatest loss’ to British swimming of an individual ‘who had done so much towards 
the improvement of coaching and towards the dissemination of information.’71 Kinnear never coached 
again. He withdrew his coaching services from the 1968 Olympics but he did agree to fulfil an arrangement 
he made with ITV to be a swimming commentator at the 1968 and 1972 Games. He had no further direct 
contact with swimmers and instead ran a restaurant with his wife before retiring to Spain in 1981. He 
passed away at the Aberdeen Acute Stroke Unit in January 2011. Reflecting on his time working with the 
ASA he referred to the ‘system as an example of a ruling oligarchy run by very few personalities.’72 
Although swimming may have progressed in terms of coaching provision and athlete development, it was 
clear that amateur administrators still controlled much of sport and they stuck by their traditional principles, 
even if this resulted in a significant loss to the sport. 
 
Athletics  
In athletics, the relationships between British coaches and administrators remained strained with the 
establishment refusing to accommodate the views of professional coaches. The emergence of the Soviet 
Union and the use of the Olympic Games as a means to demonstrate their superiority resulted in an 
increase in the acceptance of professional coaches abroad. Dyson and his colleagues could see these 
individuals were receiving a salary which was commensurate with their status and that they had the respect 
and support of their officials, something which coaches in Britain were unlikely to achieve while amateurism 
continued to dominate as a sporting philosophy. Amateur officials believed they understood the ‘simple’ 
mechanics of coaching and as such they continued to exert pressure over the direction of sport. Les 
Truelove, who took over from Jack Crump as British team manager, often referred to coaching as ‘90 per 
cent. Kidology’ and outwardly expressed that he did ‘not believe in coaching’, an opinion which reflected 
the views of the majority of administrators.73 This perspective on the value of the coaching role resulted in 
frequent disagreements between administrators and the national coaches, particularly Dyson. Many 
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officials felt that the work of the national coaches did not warrant any sort of status and they made no 
attempt to mediate an approach which would ultimately mark the beginning of the end of Dyson’s role as 
national coach.74  
In 1957, Dyson had accompanied the British athletics team on a tour of Poland and Germany when 
Crump, in attendance as team manager, failed to consult Dyson before making changes to the order of the 
relay team, which resulted in a poor performance. Dyson demanded to be allowed to return home and, 
although he was eventually persuaded to stay, the rift between Dyson and Crump was almost irreparable.75 
Once the press learnt of Crump’s actions, criticisms of the ‘pig-headed’ administrators and ‘out of touch’ 
system began to surface.76 It had become obvious that Dyson was being undervalued when it was revealed 
that his role in Warsaw consisted of ‘weighing a discus, a javelin and a hammer’, errands it was suggested 
‘which an office boy...might be required to do.’77 One reporter was ‘appalled’ because ‘surely the job of 
chief coach in this country’s athletics organisation entitles him to a more official position than implement 
checker on a foreign tour.’78 The options were clear, if Britain was to continue to improve in athletics then 
coaches were a necessity, and in order for the coaches to perform to their potential, they needed to be 
‘treated better than native bearers.’79 Dyson voiced his own opinion in July 1958, when he stated that he 
had ‘always approved of the British system where coaches serve under honorary team managers’ but he 
believed that the team manager should only overrule the coach’s decision regarding technical matters in 
the ‘most exceptional circumstances.’ Although no coach could be a ‘100 per cent expert’ in all track and 
field events, he believed that professional coaches who had been ‘at it for years’ and taught and coached 
athletics full-time were probably more qualified to make technical decisions than the ‘part-time 
administrative official.’80 Administrators actually saw no need for a coach at international competitions 
suggesting that it was ‘unnecessary’ because they believed that anyone had the ability to make successful 
last minute changes, thus there was no issue with someone like Crump making the changes that he did. 
Dyson’s response was simple. If after all the time of working with professional coaches, administrators still 
thought they could make technical alterations without harming performances, then it was clear that nothing 
had progressed and they still did ‘not understand the nature of coaching.’81 Commenting on the events of 
the 1957 Poland tour, Tom McNab observed that this act by Crump probably made Dyson reassess his 
position as chief coach because it was becoming increasingly apparent, that even after eleven years, the 
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sport had made very little progress in terms of embracing professional coaching. Overruling Dyson on 
coaching matters almost certainly encouraged him to move to a different environment which would place 
more value on his expertise as a coach.82 
Attempts to undermine Dyson were ongoing; Dennis Watts was selected to accompany the British 
team to the Commonwealth Games in 1958 and then later in the year at the European Championships in 
Stockholm when the AAA made their first appointment of a team coach, rather than as a mere observer, 
they selected John Le Masurier to travel with the team. While Dyson’s absence from the team coach role 
came as a surprise to many, Dyson had been expecting it and, although the appointment of a team coach 
could be viewed as a defining moment, for the AAA a more likely reason for the selection was the potential 
of such an action to aggravate Dyson.83 Considering the AAA now frequently referred to Dyson as the ‘Little 
Cesar’ it is unsurprising that when he offered his services to the 1959 Russia Tour, an act which the AAA 
believed was an attempt to bolster his own profile, they refused to accept, claiming that because of 
financial reasons only one coach could be sent with the team and that Lionel Pugh had already been 
appointed. However, when the IAC discovered that Dyson had been omitted on financial grounds they 
proposed to cover all his expenses. While the IAC were convinced the AAA would ‘somehow try to wiggle 
out of accepting this gesture to a man who has done much for and received little from British athletics’ they 
wanted to demonstrate the level of support Dyson had from the athletes.84 As the IAC had predicted, the 
AAA refused to accept their offer with Harold Abrahams claiming that the reasons for not taking two 
coaches with the team ran much deeper than mere finances, although he refused to elaborate further as to 
what the exact reasons were.85 In another public act of blatant disregard for Dyson’s value as a coach, the 
AAA tried to ensure that he would not be involved with the 1960 Olympic team. However, this attempt 
backfired when Truelove fell ill and was unable to manage the team, and as a result, Dyson had to be 
appointed as unofficial team manager.86  
Following the series of disputes between Dyson and the AAA, one press report commented that a 
simple way to avoid further disagreements would be to ‘just treat him as the chief coach!’87 Nevertheless, in 
a final move that would ensure Dyson’s resignation, the AAA commissioned a confidential enquiry in April 
1959 into the terms and conditions of the national coaching roles. Harold Abrahams’ nephew, Anthony 
Abrahams, was appointed to conduct the review and he presented his main conclusions to the AAA in 
September 1959 (a full written review was subsequently published in November 1959). Anthony Abrahams 
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praised the coaching scheme referring to it as ‘first class’ and suggesting that employing ‘professional 
servants’ to train amateur coaches was of great importance to the development of a sport like athletics. 
Echoing the sentiments of his uncle, he commented that its development had been ‘particularly British’ and 
suggested that the main successes of the scheme were the result of the AAA’s ability to resist ‘the 
temptation to concentrate the efforts of its professional coaches upon a few super-athletes in an attempt to 
win gold medals.’ In other countries, there had been active encouragement of this use of coaches and 
although in many cases this had resulted in greater international success, it had reduced the professional 
coach to a ‘ruthless demi-god’ who dispensed his ‘cracker-barrel philosophy’ to his charges. He believed 
that the AAA scheme had greater value than those abroad because it had ‘been built on a broader, more 
educational basis and...in a more wholesome way.’88 
It had been suggested to Anthony Abrahams that the appointment of a Director of Coaching would 
allow the scheme to expand and ensure that the national coaches were being utilised in the most beneficial 
way. As this is now a successful and integral part of both coaching and administration in many sports, it 
might be assumed that such an opportunity should have been actively encouraged. However, Anthony 
Abrahams rejected the suggestion arguing that employing a Director would be a waste of money since ‘the 
chief national coach is completely competent to deal with current technical problems.’89 Anthony Abrahams’ 
declaration that the chief coach was more than capable to deal with such an obligation emphasises what 
was being expected of national coaches. Although they were paid at college lecturer rates, their role 
involved not only an extensive range of demanding duties but also significant amounts of travel which often 
resulted in working a large amount of unsociable hours.90 When commenting on the work of John Le 
Masurier, it was noted that ‘during the year, he spends a total of forty Saturdays and Sundays away from 
home on AAA business.’91  
There appeared to be an assumption within the AAA that the national coaches were being offered 
extremely good terms of employment, and that if these coaches were to seek employment elsewhere 
would not receive comparable salaries. However, after reviewing the employment conditions, Anthony 
Abrahams was inclined to disagree, noting that if the coaches were to take up teaching and lecturing posts 
elsewhere they ‘could earn, quite easily, what the Association at present pays them.’ Not only could they 
earn more they would also ‘have less arduous jobs and a more settled home life.’92 This view was 
reinforced when Jim Alford resigned from his post in 1961 following his appointment as chief coach to 
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Northern Rhodesia where it was said he had been offered better terms of employment and a much higher 
salary.93 This example again accentuates the problems that most British sporting administrators had with 
professional coaching. While Britain had long been considered one of the world’s leading sporting nations, 
although perhaps not in terms of performance, they were unwilling to offer a more attractive contract than a 
much less affluent nation such as Northern Rhodesia in order to secure the services of a leading athletics 
coach. The AAA claimed that Alford’s resignation was primarily due to his securing a more lucrative 
contract abroad but it would appear that there were many underlying reasons, particularly associated with 
the legacy of amateurism, that had influenced him to leave his coaching post. The AAA’s determination to 
ensure the national coaches remained under their strict control and were never allowed to fully develop as 
professional coaches were clearly important factors behind the resignation of Alford, described by Dyson 
as ‘one as of the finest athletics coaches in the world.’94 Alford commented that he was ‘fed up with the 
attitude of AAA officials’95 because ‘they look down on us coaches because we are professionals; distrust 
our work and our motives; insult us by sending us to important international events as observers who are 
not allowed to help our own athletes.’96 
Anthony Abrahams had observed the national coaches in a working environment, seemingly 
experiencing first-hand quite how laborious and demanding the national coaching roles had become, and 
he described Dennis Watts as having been ‘steadily overworked for the past eleven years.’97 As a result he 
advised that the coaching salaries be increased from £1,200 to £1,370 per year (deemed the equivalent of 
a Senior Lecturer salary) and that the chief coach always be paid £350 above what the other national 
coaches received. He suggested that if this could not be met due to financial restraints then the national 
coaches should be told ‘as soon as possible as it may well be that several of them would then wish to seek 
other employment.’98  
The AAA had commissioned this review, at least partly, because they saw it as an opportunity to 
ensure that Dyson would not be willing to accept any new terms of employment and leave the role of chief 
coach. Their plan appeared to be a success when, in December 1960, Dyson submitted his resignation and 
although this was quickly retracted the AAA had no issues with leaking his supposedly confidential 
resignation to the press.99 However, far from turning public opinion against Dyson as it had been hoped, 
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the reaction to Dyson’s ‘resignation’ was one of disbelief and many athletes and sporting officials came 
forward to praise his efforts and demonstrate their support for him as a coach. Don Anthony, a finalist in the 
hammer at the 1956 Games stated, ‘It will put athletics back a dozen years, Dyson is almost irreplaceable. 
His appointment was one of the most progressive steps ever made in British athletics’ and Arthur Rowe 
suggested that ‘this is a very serious loss to British athletics. Geoff is one of the finest coaches in the 
world...an expert in all aspects of sport.’100 Regardless of the level of public support for Dyson, the AAA 
seemed determined to ensure that he left his coaching post, so, in an action which disregarded the 
recommendations of Abrahams’ report, a decision was initially made to remove the £350 differential in 
salary between the chief coach and the other national coaches, although this was subsequently 
reversed.101 Perhaps this had been done to annoy Dyson and to guarantee he would not accept the new 
terms of employment, but when he asked to discuss these initiatives, his opinions were simply disregarded. 
It was commented that, 
 
The Chief National Coach asked permission to make a statement regarding National 
Coaches. This statement dealt at length with feelings of insecurity of position and salary and 
with the relationship between National Coaches and the Association. A long discussion 
followed but no action was recommended.102  
 
This confrontational approach, coupled with years of struggle over amateurism and the role of a coach, 
resulted in Dyson’s decision to leave his post. Despite the coaching scheme owing ‘much of its shape and 
a good deal of its success to his personal efforts’, it was noted in the minutes, without thanks (which had 
been commonplace upon the resignation of previous coaches), that Dyson had resigned on 1 September 
1961 with six months’ pay.103 In answering questions about why the AAA had been willing to grant six 
months’ pay, a letter to the Ministry of Education revealed that Dyson had provided six months’ notice, 
effective from 1 September 1961 and therefore, according to his contract, he would remain in the national 
coach role until 28 February 1962. However, the AAA believed it would have been ‘extremely embarrassing 
to have to keep him employed until then, in view of his openly expressed criticism of their policy in respect 
of their coaching scheme’ and, therefore, they wished to ‘terminate his employment on 1st September by 
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paying him six months’ salary and then getting rid of him.’104 The AAA made a request to the Ministry that, 
in light of the situation, they be willing to continue to pay the grant intended for Dyson’s salary so that it 
could be used in a severance package. Although the Ministry sympathised, they were unwilling to pay for a 
coach who would no longer be carrying out their required duties and so they advised the AAA that if they 
were unwilling to keep Dyson in their employment, they should ‘cut its losses, pay Mr Dyson what his 
contract required them to pay, and get rid of him on the 1st September.’105 The AAA were so determined not 
to have Dyson working in the AAA that they were willing to pay his remaining six months’ salary from their 
own funds rather than letting him complete his work and having the benefit of financial support from the 
Ministry. 
Dyson was not the only national coach who resented the lack of cooperation he received from the 
AAA because, in November 1961, Lionel Pugh followed Dyson and left his post. According to the AAA this 
was the result of a disagreement regarding the appointment of a team coach for the Empire and 
Commonwealth Games in 1962.106 Prior to leaving, Pugh commented, quite openly to both the press and 
the AAA, that in ten years he had only been selected for one official English team and even after he 
volunteered his service to the British team when they travelled to Paris in September 1961 they decided not 
to take a coach at all.107 As in previous cases, the reasons behind Pugh’s resignation actually went much 
deeper. On leaving the AAA, he stated that he ‘agreed with the principles which Geoff Dyson fought for…let 
us be honest - most athletic officials do not want coaches with personality who are prepared to speak 
honestly.’108  
The quick succession of three resignations from national coach positions resulted in an open 
questioning of the AAA’s methods and values. Although they had repeatedly claimed the resignations had 
been entirely the coaches’ decisions, it was clear that the unwillingness of the AAA to allow professional 
coaches the freedom to do their job successfully had left them no other option. All three agreed that they 
had left because they were ‘frustrated by Victorian-minded administrators who resented their advice.’109 
Geoff Elliot, one of Britain’s leading pole-vaulters, agreed commenting that ‘while I would have been willing 
to admit that a clash of personalities would have led to one resignation. I cannot believe that it has led to 
three...unless the personality in the wrong is an official of the AAA.’ As a result, he explained that he was 
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‘dissociating’ himself from the AAA because the ‘distasteful events’ which had led to the three resignation 
were ‘unforgivable.’110 
While amateur administrators remained steadfast in their approach to professional coaching, it would 
seem that the continued poor results of British athletes was now encouraging other individuals to question 
the state of British sport. It had become apparent that if British sport was to improve then an in-depth 
review of the individual components of the sporting model was required. However, it was equally obvious 
that this review would not be forthcoming from the NGBs themselves and this prompted external bodies to 
take control. The following two sections analyse the 1956 report, Britain in the World of Sport, and the 1960 
Wolfenden Report and indicates how these signalled a new approach to sport in Britain. 
 
Britain in the World of Sport 
Although British athletes had fared considerably better at Melbourne than they had at Helsinki, the long 
series of high-profile defeats British teams suffered during the 1940s and 50s could not be ignored. This, 
coupled with the emergence of the Soviet Union, put pressure on the prevailing amateur hegemony and it 
was becoming increasingly apparent that that this approach was no longer sufficient to ensure success. If 
Britain wanted to perform well internationally, more sophisticated coaching and intense training was 
required. Prompted by these issues, a group of individuals at the University of Birmingham investigated the 
state of British sport in 1956 and subsequently published a pamphlet entitled Britain in the World of Sport. 
The report presented an array of recommendations which ranged from amateurism, to coaching and the 
finance of international competition. Comparisons were drawn with other countries and the report 
concluded that if Britain was to prevent future poor performances then the ‘traditional’ amateur regulations 
needed to be relaxed. In addition, the current levels of government intervention in sport, via the Ministry of 
Education, needed to be expanded because the opportunities for sporting organisations to secure financial 
support were limited and increasingly accompanied by unrealistic demands. Dyson praised the report 
stating that ‘at a time of much idle conjecture and muddled thinking over Britain’s sporting performances’ it 
is refreshing to read the ‘informed, carefully reasoned and well expressed views of a group of people who 
know what they are talking about.’111 Dyson argued that this report should not remain confined to the 
sporting world but ‘should be read by every politician and councillor’ in the country since it provided a useful 
and informative insight into the correct direction of British sport. With regards to amateurism in sport the 
report argued that, 
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When Britain takes part in international competitions the [amateur] regulations often prevent 
the selection of our best players. Practice abroad is often less in line with this precept. 
“Amateur” Soviet athletes and “amateur” American college athletes enjoy coaching 
opportunities, training facilities and freedom from financial sacrifice not regularly available to 
English athletes outside the armed forces.112  
 
It was also suggested that the amateur ethos was embedded within the notion of the ‘spirit of the game.’ 
Although this may have been satisfactory for those individuals who chose to play for fun, this idea of 
‘playing for game’s sake’ was no longer applicable to the high performance levels now being observed 
internationally.113 These ‘rising standards are paid for by training which is both more intensive and 
extensive. The single-minded attitude to sport, which makes such training possible, is not easily allied to 
the detachment necessary to regard the result as unimportant.’ The authors believed that ‘the government 
could be asked to allocate specific funds to sports’, and although this may have been considered 
somewhat unorthodox by traditionalists, it was becoming ever more apparent that it was now a necessity if 
Britain was to compete effectively.114 This suggestion rapidly gained support and a year later it was being 
argued in the press that, in athletics, 
 
Our national coaching scheme is financed by an annual grant of £3,000 from the Ministry of 
Education, plus a fluctuating sum, privately donated, of approximately £3,500. Now costs are 
rising – among other things, the salary of coaches. This means that, unless fresh help is 
given, the coaching scheme will be on its uppers in two-and-a-half years. Other amateur 
sports – swimming, gymnastics, cycling – are nearly always fighting undeserved financial 
crises...The Arts Council get £860,000 a year – with supervision and scrutiny, but without 
interference in control - from the Government.  A grant one-twentieth as big – without strings – 
would save amateur sport.115 
 
It is not clear whether the ‘without strings’ comment refers to the demands placed on sporting bodies as a 
prerequisite for grant aid from the Ministry. However it is clear, that although the reporter declares that 
government intervention would ‘save amateur sport’, what is actually being described here is, by traditional 
definitions, no longer amateur at all. The suggestion of financial intervention from the government in itself 
signifies a shift away from the true amateur tradition and the rising salaries of coaches to which the author 
refers suggests an increasing degree of professionalism within British sport.  
A final proposal within the 1956 publication centred on the idea that sporting bodies might develop an 
advisory council which would enable a greater level of coordination between organisations and encourage 
practical developments. Any changes or modifications to accepted practices in sport would require input 
from individuals who were ‘involved enough to appreciate the problems but detached enough’ to 
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recommend solutions. If British sport continued ‘neither taking a policy decision to withdraw from 
international sport, nor taking sufficiently energetic steps to see that representative teams really are 
representative...our declining performance will be resented at home and misinterpreted abroad.’ The 
responses of the British public had been, and would continue to be, fuelled by a press which generally 
described every defeat of British athletes as a ‘calamity.’ The authors commented that such a situation 
could be easily rectified by using an ‘advisory council’ to introduce improvements in training and coaching 
facilities, which it was argued would help reverse the defeats experienced in the late 1940s and early 
1950s.116 
It would appear from this document that some individuals were beginning to accept that the values of 
amateurism and fair play were no longer a suitable foundation on which to base international sport because 
success, more than ever before, now required significant resources, intense training, and most importantly, 
a focus on winning and not just taking part. Britain in the World of Sport was a revolutionary publication for 
its time because it questioned the much cherished amateur tradition in a constructive way. Far from 
suggesting a shift from amateurism without offering any direction, as many press reports did at the time, it 
offered practical ideas which could be incorporated into and potentially shape the future of British sport. 
Although the subsequent 1960 Wolfenden Report has long been considered the ‘blue-print’ for the future 
development of British sport, it is difficult to argue with those who view Britain in the World of Sport, with its 
many innovative recommendations, as the primary catalyst for future progress.117 
 
The Wolfenden Report 
Barrie Houlihan and Anita White argue that the motivation of the Wilson Government to establish a Sports 
Council in 1965 was ‘less a reflection of its particular interest in sport and recreation than of its general 
willingness to expand the boundaries of the welfare state.’118 Whether this is true or not, crucial to this 
increased willingness of the government to become involved in sport, was the publication of the Wolfenden 
Report, Sport in the Community (1960). Although the establishment of the Wolfenden Committee in 1957 
was primarily the result of much lobbying by the Central Council of Physical Recreation (CCPR), the 
significance of the Birmingham University Department 1956 publication should also not be overlooked. 
Prompted by a number of factors, such as the success and development of sport in other countries, 
particularly the Soviet Union and the United States, and a growing realisation that international sport was 
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now inextricably linked with prestige, the CCPR had commissioned the Wolfenden Report in an attempt to 
resolve issues and improve the structure and organisation of British sport.119  
The history and the development of the CCPR are covered in great depth in the seminal work of Justin 
Evans (secretary of both the CCPR and Wolfenden Committee) and although it would be inappropriate to 
deal with the organisation in detail here, a brief overview is necessary. The Central Council of Recreative 
Physical Training (CCPRT), as it was then known, was established in 1935 as a direct result of the 
influence of Philys C. Colson, who consequently played a dominant role in the ‘creation, growth and 
functioning of the CCPR.’120 Colson could see the benefit of enlisting the help of powerful and influential 
individuals from the sporting world so she appealed to Sir Stanley Rous and Lord Aberdare, amongst 
others, to be founding members of the CCPRT. Rous, an amateur football player in his youth, secretary of 
the FA and eventually president of FIFA, had clear ideas about the position of amateurism in sport. 
Similarly, Aberdare, who was a member of the IOC and went on to become chairman of the NFC and a 
member of the 1948 London Games Organising Committee, did his utmost to ensure that the amateur 
principles of sport remained a consistent factor in British sport. As many of the members who initially 
agreed to serve had come from amateur sporting backgrounds, it was inevitable that their cultural values 
and beliefs influenced both the direction and development of the Council. The Council had been created in 
response to various issues of the time, including high unemployment rates, a state of poor national health 
and a ‘realisation by the governing bodies of sport that some form of collective cooperation could assist 
hugely with both separate and corporate aspirations.’121 The CCPRT was initially involved with the 
development of the NFC, increasing the provision of recreational facilities in an attempt to raise fitness 
levels amongst communities, and affording school leavers the opportunity to participate in sport.122 In 1944, 
the CCPRT became the CCPR, by which point it had already developed into an influential and proactive 
body within British sport. The CCPR had established itself as an umbrella organisation for a wide range of 
sporting bodies and become heavily involved in a number of activities including the training of coaches and 
physical education teachers.123 It has been suggested that ‘the CCPR transformed the concept of 
recreation in Britain. Long before the purposeful use of leisure became a general topic of discussion...the 
Council set about creating recreation centres, training leaders and coaches, encouraging participation and 
developing new recreational centres.’124 It was against this successful background that the CCPR 
commissioned the creation of the Wolfenden Report. 
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The Wolfenden Report of 1960 appeared to heed the calls of those who had demanded a new 
approach to sport in Britain. It subsequently emerged as a publication of both significance and influence 
because not only did it raise the profile of sport from a government perspective, it also indirectly led to other 
key developments such as the appointment of the first British Minister for Sport in 1962 and the creation of 
the Sports Council in 1965.125 However, despite this eventual success, the initial establishment of the 
Wolfenden Committee in 1957 ‘aroused no particular concern other than general broad interest’ even 
though the recommendations of the report would ‘alter the face of British Sport within a decade.’126 For the 
first time in British history, there was to be a formal recognition that the government had a responsibility not 
only to provide opportunities for the public at large but also to support elite athletes at a national level.  
The committee, which was composed of twelve individuals and chaired by Sir John Wolfenden, was 
appointed to conduct an impartial study on the factors which were affecting the ‘development of games, 
sport and outdoor activities in the UK and to make recommendations...as to any practical measures which 
should be taken...in order that these activities may play their full part in promoting the general welfare of the 
community.’127 The first meeting was in January 1958 and for the following two years the committee 
proceeded to collect oral and written evidence from a variety of sporting bodies, government departments 
and other interested parties, which included Geoff Dyson and other national coaches. In 1960, the 
Wolfenden Report made fifty-seven recommendations which covered several areas in depth including 
coaching, amateurism and facilities and these were all shaped around the notion of the ‘gap’, defined as 
the break between school sports and adult participation.128 Developing recommendations around the 
Wolfenden ‘gap’, as well as making suggestions to improvements in international sport, allowed the 
identification of a concept which could be ‘interpreted positively by those with a concern for the social 
development of young people and those with a narrower concern for the production of the next generation 
of elite athletes, thus uniting two significant elements within the sports lobby.’129 This demonstrates the 
report’s versatility in being able to appeal to a wide variety of administrative bodies thereby ensuring that 
each organisation would benefit. As Fred Coalter and others indicate ‘the concern of Wolfenden was to 
achieve reforms which would not introduce major structural change, but would assist existing organisations 
to perform more efficiently.’130 Houlihan and White suggest that this diplomacy and the simplicity of the 
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recommendations within the report guaranteed that it had a substantial and long-term impact on the 
development of British sport. 131 
The running theme throughout the report was an ongoing defence of the voluntary infrastructure within 
British sport; often accrediting it as the foundation or cornerstone of sports development and organisation. 
It was noted, 
 
The whole fabric of British sport is held together by the labours of unpaid and devoted 
enthusiasts, who at all levels give of their time and energy in order that other people may 
enjoy themselves. In countless ways these volunteers, unsung and often unhonoured, make 
the wheels go round; without them the incredible variety of activities we have examined simply 
could not exist.132 
 
Although they suggested, albeit tentatively, that there were some disadvantages to the voluntary tradition, it 
was argued that ‘where there are weaknesses and shortcomings the reason is not so much lack of interest 
as lack of money.’ Since volunteerism had always been a strong component of amateurism it is clear to see 
why they approached the subject with caution. In order for the Wolfenden Report to act as a catalyst for 
change in British sport, it required widespread support, and alienating the traditionalists in British sport who 
valued amateurism could result in the report being marginalised. However, the report was explicit about 
government intervention, which needed to be forthcoming if British sport was to improve in terms of 
coaching and facilities. The committee were therefore placed in a predicament, and this came across 
strongly throughout the report. It was clear that a professional system of organisation, coupled with some 
form of government involvement, would improve the overall standard of British sport but they were keen to 
preserve both volunteerism and the autonomy of the NGBs, referred to as a ‘sacred principle.’133 In the end 
it was concluded, that although 
 
We believe that public opinion in this country would want our national participation in 
international sport to continue to depend in the main upon voluntary effort but...we have come 
to the conclusion that some measure of statutory financial assistance should be forthcoming to 
support the administrative and other work of the B.O.A.134 
 
Contained within the report was also recognition that some NGBs still had reservations about engaging 
professional coaches since ‘some Governing Bodies have taken an active interest in coaching, while others 
have been content...to let the game develop without coaching.’ Far from trying to encourage NGBs to adopt 
a more positive approach with regards to professional coaching, it was clear that the committee did not 
want to be viewed as encroaching on their autonomy when it was recognised that, with regards to 
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recommending an increased coaching presence in sport, ‘some governing bodies...do not share that view, 
and we entirely recognise their right to their opinion and their policy.’ Attempts were also made to establish 
why coaching had ‘tended to play a technically less effective role in sport in Britain than elsewhere.’ The 
committee concluded that this was primarily historical and ‘connected with the essentially haphazard and 
amateur way in which the sports themselves have grown up.’ The ‘carefree participation and a tolerance of 
low standards’ present in British sport may not have been ‘antagonistic’ to the development of coaching but 
it certainly did not ‘energetically encourage it.’135 However, the committee praised the work of the Ministry 
of Education coaching schemes, noting that despite the somewhat hostile environment towards 
professional coaching in British sport, they had managed to support initiatives in a handful of sports. 
Despite this acknowledgement, it was apparent that the expertise of professional coaches remained 
undervalued in the majority of sports. The committee suggested that the coaching schemes would only 
‘prosper’ if each of the NGBs involved ‘whole heartedly believes in it’ and, in order to achieve this, they 
would need to be willing to regard the appointment of national coaches as fundamental to ensuring its 
success. Although the committee could see the benefits of using the national coaches to develop a 
contingent of honorary coaches, there was a fear that it would present a situation whereby there would be 
an ‘over-supply of coaches.’ Such a suggestion could indicate that some members of the committee still 
possessed a suspicion of coaching, because although there was some flexibility regarding the inclusion of 
coaches in sport, they did not want a situation to arise whereby there was an abundance of professional 
coaches as they could then potentially be in a position to control British sport. It was declared that this 
situation could be avoided by not only implementing a system of re-examination of the honorary coaches 
but also by diverting more of the national coaches’ time to a focus on elite athletes because they believed it 
seemed ‘logical that...any national or official representative team should have the services of the 
professional national coaches.’ Despite recommending more coaching opportunities and ‘more and better 
organised coaching’ there was a reticence within the committee to endorse a shift in coaching direction 
towards an American or Soviet system. Even though American athletes often experienced greater success 
due to a sophisticated coaching structure, it was ‘not obvious that the...American systems are preferable to 
our own’ because the British system of sport ‘has considerable merits.’136 
The string of defeats suffered by British competitors and the overall gradually diminishing 
competitiveness of British sport, which in part had acted as a catalyst for both Britain in the World of Sport 
and the Wolfenden Report, was addressed in great depth. It was obvious that British sporting techniques 
and training were no longer adequate to ensure success and, although they did not have definitive 
evidence, the committee were inclined to believe that sports abroad were ‘prepared to devote much more 
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time and much more money to [training and practising] than we are in Britain.’ It was recognised that if 
British sport was to compete effectively abroad then not only was some form of investment required but 
there had to be an acceptance that sports, which included competition at the Olympic Games, were being 
subjected to rising standards of performance, and there was a need for more intensive and wide-spread 
training.137 There was an agreement amongst committee members that ‘for those players who display a 
degree of skill and promise which justifies the expectation that they will develop into “top-class” 
performers...the player will need equipment and training and match-play on a high competitive level at 
home and abroad.’138 Despite urging the NGBs to adopt a more vigorous approach to the training and 
conditioning of athletes, the report never appeared to shift too far from the accepted system of amateur 
British sport and it argued that both winning and losing needed to be kept in perspective. It was insisted 
that 
 
It is not the end of the world if British teams are defeated, still less is it a symptom or proof of 
national decadence. To talk, as some do, as if sport could properly be used as a major 
instrument in international diplomacy, or as if a nation’s authority and influence in world affairs 
at large are to be measured by its successes or failures in the Olympic Games, seems to us to 
reveal a serious lack of sense of proportion.139  
 
The traditional attitudes within British sport once again emerged in suggestions that the British public had 
come to expect success purely because ‘so many sports and games originated in this country and were 
later adopted abroad.’ Tied in with this reverence towards the supposed ‘golden days’ of sport was an 
assumption that the reason British competitors were no longer successful was not because British 
standards had dropped but because others nations had progressed. It was pointed out that, ‘with the great 
development of international sport and the increase in the number of participating nations, success is likely 
to become increasingly rare and hard to achieve’ and so an adjustment of attitude was required, one which 
would fully appreciate the standards now seen abroad. Even though it was acknowledged that the notion of 
‘being a good loser’ could result in a defeatist attitude, the committee believed that it was ‘better to lose 
gracefully and good-humouredly than to win by sharp practice or unsportsmanlike conduct.’140  
The majority of comments and recommendations contained within the report were in some way related 
to amateurism. There was an underlying respect for its principles and a reluctance to shift too far from its 
ethos. While this report was attempting to instil change in British sport, which would inevitably require the 
adaptation of some amateur principles, there was still a latent apprehension about dealing with the topic 
even though it was acknowledged that the foundations and environment in which the amateur principles 
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had been founded were radically different. In fact, it was proposed that the retention of traditional amateur 
principles was essential to ‘preserve standards of behaviour and sportsmanship, to ensure fair grouping for 
competition, and to reflect in sport the social dimensions which were then current in society as a whole.’ 
The differing interpretations of ‘amateur’ by various NGBs had resulted in a situation whereby the amateur 
principles were not always comprehensible and appropriate for sport.141 There was unanimous 
‘dissatisfaction with the present position’ regarding the role of amateurism but, in line with the beliefs of 
many of its members, the committee were ‘not agreed as to the ultimate solution for the present 
difficulties.’142 There were some, particularly Albert Davis Munrow, who believed ‘that the right solution is to 
abolish, quite simply and straightforwardly, the formal distinction between amateur and professional’ but the 
majority were unable to ‘accept this radical solution’ and Arthur Porritt, for one, emphasised that he would 
refuse to sign off on the report if such a clause was included. The outcome of this debate appeared to be 
influenced by the on-going loyalty which the committee had to the NGBs and their autonomy, since it was 
generally agreed, that ‘for so long as the Governing Body is recognised as the controlling authority in its 
particular sport it must, we feel, have the authority to decide who may participate in that sport, and on what 
terms.’ Removing this power from the NGBs, it was believed would be an infringement of autonomy so 
serious as to ‘deprive its title of meaning.’ Ultimately, the committee urged ‘Governing Bodies not to 
confuse autonomy with separatism or non-co-operation’ as it had become apparent that amateur 
organisations were becoming increasingly discrete from each other, and that if British sport was to progress 
then it would require a combined coordinated effort.143 
There was one significant proposal that could be considered somewhat at odds with the overall 
reoccurring theme of amateurism within the report, the creation of a Sports Development Council (SDC). 
The recommendations of the committee seemingly mirrored those suggested in Britain in the World of 
Sport, in that the SDC would consist of a ‘small body of six to ten persons of varied experience who have a 
general knowledge of the field and such personal standing as will give them accepted authority and 
influence.’144 It was proposed that a sum of £5,000,000 be made available for use by the SDC, for which it 
would be only loosely accountable to parliament. The NGBs would also have some form of authority and 
discretion as to how the money was allocated. These suggestions allowed for greater public investment in 
sport but also protected the voluntary foundation of the NGBs and allowed them to retain some level of 
autonomy. Considering the persistent defence of the voluntary and amateur traditions in British sport 
perhaps the most radical proposal by the committee was that the SDC should become involved in the bio-
medical aspects of sport. Apart from isolated instances of unofficial engagement with the sciences, there 
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had been little engagement with these kinds of support services but this was now being proposed as a 
means of improving British performance. It was suggested that 
 
With the very limited resources available to them several medical and scientific groups...have 
carried out constructive and instructive work. But much of this has hitherto been un-co-
ordinated, and we see a real opportunity for the Sports Development Council to encourage 
and stimulate an increased and more widespread interest in medical and scientific matters 
related to sport. Not the least significant of these are advances in methods of training and 
technique.145  
 
Initial reactions to the Wolfenden Report although varied, were for the most part favourable. Perhaps the 
most important group, the NGBs, saw potential in the report and its proposals.146 The press also offered 
support; particularly The Times, the Daily Express and The Economist, which was somewhat surprising 
given that the report contained criticisms about the press at large.147 The committee had described the 
press as being more concerned ‘with sensationalism than accuracy, with circulation than truth’ and claimed 
that reporters lacked the ‘knowledge or experience to comment adequately or constructively on the sport 
about which they write and that this ignorance shows itself inevitably in ill-balanced judgements and a 
failure to understand or to represent correctly what they have seen.’148 The press response to Wolfenden 
suggests that there was real potential in the report because, despite its criticisms, the majority of 
newspapers supported the proposals. Nevertheless, the press were realistic and well aware that it would be 
difficult to instigate any real changes, particularly with regard to amateurism and the NGBs. The Economist 
commented, 
 
They [the NGBs] are mostly not particularly democratic bodies, members who play club 
subscriptions have little direct opportunity to vote them out of office and spectators who pay 
entrance fees have even less. They are generally composed of people who have given a 
lifetime of service (and sometimes spent a deal of their own money) for their sport. But once in 
office their different methods of running their organisations, though extraordinarily haphazard, 
are often characterised by a determined restrictionism and a most dubious autocracy.149 
 
Although there was support for the development of a Sports Council from a number of sporting 
organisations, the Executive Committee of the CCPR and the Ministry of Education were much less 
positive. Even from the outset of the report when the committee were attempting to gather evidence, the 
Ministry were not particularly accommodating. Evans commented that ‘no-one could be found to speak to 
the committee with any real authority about the Ministry’s policy.’ When a meeting was eventually arranged 
it was with three civil servants who possessed little authority in the grants procedure but, even so, they 
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were unable to ‘conceal the fact that...the development of sport was not high among the Ministry’s 
priorities.’150 Once it emerged that it was the intention of the committee to recommend ‘that grant aid for 
sport should no longer be administered through the Ministry of Education’, the Ministry voiced their 
objections.151 Although the Ministry were quite comfortable with having some of their financial burden 
removed, when they recognised that this would also require them to relinquish a degree of power, they 
opposed the transfer of responsibility to another organisation on the grounds that ‘public opinion was not 
yet ready for the State to take a greater part in grant-aiding adult sport, in view of the tradition of voluntary 
participation.’152 By linking themselves to the values of amateurism, they were able to present themselves 
as an organisation that would act in the best interests of British sport, particularly from a traditionalist’s 
perspective, because they would ensure that sport would only be subjected to limited government control. 
The Ministry also claimed that if the government was to assign greater funds to sport then they were the 
most obvious choice as a means of distribution because they had ‘greater experience in this field than any 
other’ and they would ensure that support was provided to worthy organisations.153 Colson of the CCPR 
also raised objections to the suggestion of an advisory council and, considering the CCPR were in receipt 
of the largest Ministry of Education grant, her opposition appeared to be well-founded. If the power of grant-
aid was removed from the Ministry and bestowed upon another body there would be no guarantee of the 
same level of financial support for the CCPR, and since this was their primary source of income, Colson 
was obviously keen for this to continue.154  
After the report had been published and it was clear that the SDC was indeed a fundamental 
recommendation, it was not welcomed, or supported, by either the CCPR or the Ministry of Education, 
hardly surprising considering their reactions during the development phases of the report. The Ministry 
strongly defended their actions and stated that ‘if local authorities and government departments have not 
done more in the past it was not because the machinery was inadequate but because the government 
chose other priorities.’155 The CCPR Executive Committee was split over the possible creation of a SDC, 
with some in favour and others strongly opposed. However, to avoid their disagreements being made 
public the decision was taken to not press the matter to a vote and members were discouraged from 
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expressing any personal views about the SDC.156 The Ministry, on the other hand, were not so diplomatic; 
they very publicly rejected outright the proposal for a SDC and appealed to others to do the same.157 
Considering the Wolfenden Report was a private initiative and not a government endorsed report, the 
levels of attention it received from official channels was unprecedented.158 In February and April 1961, the 
report was debated in the House of Lords and House of Commons, respectively, and although the 
discussions were supportive, the government showed little commitment to accepting the report’s 
recommendations.159 In the February debate, it was noted that ‘the government had not taken a final 
decision about the SDC, but were doubtful whether such a radical intervention was needed.’160 Much to the 
satisfaction of both the CCPR and Ministry of Education, the notion of developing a SDC would lie dormant 
for another four years before any concrete developments took place. As a result of this delay, Kevin 
Jeffreys has argued that, despite the belief that the Wolfenden Report had been the catalyst for change in 
British sport, the actual ‘short term and medium term impact’ were minimal. However, even though the 
proposal may not have been addressed straight away it did prompt other smaller changes which had more 
immediate impact. It was agreed that more capital investment was required in sporting facilities, including 
the creation of new swimming baths, and so the ceiling of the Ministry of Education’s grant aid for such 
initiatives was increased from £3,300 to £6,600 for each sport. There was also a realisation that 
professional coaches were being undervalued, and in an attempt to improve their status, an agreement 
was made to increase the Ministry’s grant for coaches’ salaries from £1,000 to £1,200. Alterations were 
also made to enable sports to apply for administrative grants towards their coaching schemes. Although it 
was never in the Ministry’s policy to refuse such grants there had been a reluctance to award financial 
support on these grounds alone.161 Jeffreys suggests that these developments would have come about 
regardless of the report and argues that ‘the most generous interpretation of what happened was that 
Wolfenden pushed the government to consider going a bit further and faster than it might otherwise have 
done.’ However, there is no available evidence to suggest that the government was intending to make 
these improvements until the emergence of the report.162 
Wolfenden clearly made an impact, but perhaps in a slightly different way to that envisaged by the 
CCPR when they commissioned the report. Despite the ever increasing body of support for its proposals 
and a growing awareness that other countries were now exploiting sport for international recognition, 
something which Britain was still ill-equipped to compete with, the Conservative Government at the time of 
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the publication remained somewhat cautious regarding the role of the state in sport in Britain. However, 
although it would be another four years before the creation of a SDC, there was an indication that the battle 
for greater government investment in sport was being won when in 1962, Lord Hailsham, Lord President of 
the Council and Minister for Science, was appointed as ‘Minister with special responsibility for sport.’163 
Considering this idea had been rejected by the Prime Minister in 1961, claiming that sport did not require 
such a ‘spectacular’ means of support, it seems that the government were now less averse to assisting 
sport and were gradually becoming more accommodating. Those parties who envisaged progress solely in 
terms of the development of a SDC were somewhat disappointed, particularly when it emerged that while 
he agreed with the majority of material contained within the Wolfenden Report, Hailsham did not agree with 
the establishment of a SDC.164 His steadfast opposition to the development of a SDC was not popular, and 
during a House of Commons debate in 1964 the question was asked ‘Does the Prime Minister realise that 
the Lord President of the council is either too busy to be interested in sport or is just not interested in 
sport?’165 Nevertheless, although Hailsham fought until the end of his term in office against the 
development of a SDC, his appointment did bring about greater government investment both in coaching 
and in international sport.166 For example, in June 1963, for the first time in British sporting history, the 
government announced that financial assistance would be available ‘in suitable cases’ to support British 
amateur sporting teams competing in international events, a welcome development to many NGBs 
considering that the Tokyo 1964 Olympic Games was on the horizon.167  
The Soviet sporting model, with its almost guaranteed success, appears to have offered an alternative 
to the struggling British methods. However, while the British press and some of the sporting world called for 
an adoption of this more specialised approach, amateur administrators continued to shy away from these 
issues, particularly those associated with coaching. This continued reluctance of the NGBs to allow 
professional coaches a greater level of freedom, particularly with regards to their coaching role, eventually 
resulted in the loss of influential coaches in both athletics and swimming. Both Dyson and Kinnear were 
key individuals in the international coaching world but, because administrators were unwilling to relinquish 
amateur control, British sport experienced significant losses and this undoubtedly slowed the progress of 
British athletes. However, although amateur administrators continued to control their sports along 
traditional lines, developments such as Britain in the World of Sport and the Wolfenden Report were now 
encouraging greater government intervention, and considering the British government had always 
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remained distant from the issues of sport, this could be considered somewhat of a breakthrough. The 
following chapter analyses this increased government intervention, and suggests that although changes 
were increasingly being implemented following pressures external to specific sports, amateur 
administrators within the NGBs continued to resist change. 
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Chapter Seven: Government Intervention and the National Governing Bodies’ Battle for Autonomy 
Encouraged by previous publications such as the Wolfenden Report and a realisation that success at the 
Olympics now had political as well as sporting significance, the British government began to take a much 
more active role in British sport, particularly after the 1960s. However, increased government involvement 
in British sport would inevitably demand greater specialisation because financial support became indirectly 
linked to sporting success and medal attainment. Despite this need for greater professionalisation, the 
National Governing Bodies (NGB) fought to retain their autonomy and to control their sports in the way that 
they deemed appropriate. By offering evidence from both perspectives, from that of official channels which 
demonstrates where and when new developments were being implemented and also from that of the NGBs 
and coaches, this chapter will demonstrate that although British sport was gradually becoming 
professionalised, the amateur NGBs with their amateur perspectives on both sport and coaching, still to 
some extent, continued to regulate British sport. In order to achieve this, the chapter first analyses how a 
perceived threat to their autonomy and control made organisations fearful of change and government 
involvement. Subsequent sections highlight how an increase in centralised funding and support improved 
the overall profile and perceived value of British coaching, and why, even though the emergence of elite 
sport as a discrete domain for government intervention ensured that amateurism was no longer a guiding 
principle, its legacy and influence remained. 
 
1965 Advisory Sports Council 
 
It has been claimed that there should be no relation between sport and politics- that sport and 
politics do not mix. I myself would oppose this contention…sport and politics are becoming 
increasingly and irrevocably intertwined…as day follows night there is an involvement of 
politics with sport. But of course from a sporting perception the essential word is involvement - 
not interference.1 
 
The Labour Government under Harold Wilson entered office in October 1964, and remaining true to their 
manifesto with regards to sport, Denis Howell Joint Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science, 
was appointed as Minister with responsibility for sport. An Advisory Sports Council (ASC) was soon 
established in February 1965 to advise the government ‘on matters relating to the development of amateur 
sport and physical recreation services and to foster cooperation among the statutory authorities and 
voluntary organisations.’2 The ASC was purely an advisory body and not the executive Sports Council 
recommended in the Wolfenden Report , so the control of sport was to be handled through a department of 
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state and not through a body of men and women well versed in sport. Although the government had now 
agreed to implement one of the main recommendations of the Wolfenden Report, John Coghlan argues 
that the advisory nature of this new body prevented it from ‘having teeth and a cutting edge’ in the 
organisation and control of sport in Britain.3 Nevertheless, support for sport now increased, which for the 
most part, was due to the work of Denis Howell, who had been appointed deputy chairman of the Sports 
Council. Considered by some as the best Sports Minister Britain has ever seen, Howell was described as ‘a 
credit to British sport, a trail blazer’ and his commitment to sport would ensure that significant progress was 
made regarding sports provision.4 Regardless of the uncertainties and disagreements about the direction 
that sport should take, financial support from the government was now forthcoming. Four years on from 
Wolfenden, the government, for the first time in British history, was now inextricably and formally linked with 
sport.5 
One of the first tasks of the ASC was to assist elite sport and four committees, each with their own 
specific focus, were developed in order broaden the scope of work that could be attempted; the 
International Committee, the Research and Statistics Committee, the Sports Development and Coaching 
Committee and the Facilities Planning Committee.6 The International Committee had been established to 
deal with the issues of British elite sport both at home and aboard and to develop a programme to finance 
the training and preparation of national teams which would complement the Olympic four year cycle. They 
presented this to the government, which then agreed to donate £30,000 directly to the Olympic Appeal for 
the 1964 Games.7 The ‘Appeal’, which had traditionally been raised through public donations, was now 
being supported officially and this provided the British Olympic Association (BOA) with a ‘safety net’ if they 
were ever unable to achieve their targets through other contributions.8  
The Sports Development and Coaching Committee was created to provide advice to the government 
regarding those areas of British coaching which required financial support. It was agreed that more national 
coaches were necessary and that more full-time professional members of staff were required within the 
NGBs, so the funds allocated for coaching and administration increased from £565,000 in 1965-6 to 
£876,608 by 1970.9 This growing recognition for coaching was also reflected in the development of the 
British Association of National Coaches (BANC) in 1965. Formed by two national coaches, Geoff Gleeson 
of Judo and Bob Anderson of Fencing, they had noted the growing need to bring ‘together contemporary 
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thinking about training and coaching in Britain.’10 They organised annual conferences, which were to 
become ‘the bedrock of their existence’ because they encouraged the coming together of likeminded 
individuals and the dissemination of information from ‘high calibre speakers.’11 From his own experience, 
Tom McNab suggests that national coaches were not given any training on the job by their particular 
NGBs, and the BANC provided the opportunity to gain knowledge from other coaches who were often in a 
similar situation, and it also re-affirmed their professional identity as a coach.12 However, its creation 
caused a degree of consternation within NGBs and the Sports Council because the organisation would not 
be directly under their authority, and therefore they had no way of controlling what the BANC was doing.13 
The Sports Council were particularly cautious about its activities and appointed a liaison officer, Harry 
Littlewood, who although he was a ‘nice guy...he was under a watching brief to make sure these men did 
not stray into forbidden territory, he had to report back about these chaps like they were some kind of mafia 
that had suddenly arisen.’14 McNab suggests that the Sports Council had a tendency to align themselves 
with the NGBs rather than the coaches because ‘they were people they could get on with’ and they had 
established that the administrators were generally in control. Because the Sports Council would ‘gravitate 
to where the power was’ they tried to appease the NGBs by monitoring BANC activities. The NGBs had 
always assumed that they were the ‘voice of coaches’ because they came directly under their jurisdiction, 
so they remained concerned about the activities of the BANC as there was a fear they were actually 
beginning to ‘speak on behalf of the coaches.’15 
 
How Coaching Was Valued 
 
The whole attitude towards coaching was very, very poor, right throughout sport, not just in my 
sport but all throughout sport. They distrusted the whole idea of actual preparation and really 
taking it seriously. We were still permeated with the public school ideas of 'good show old 
chap', that kind of approach.16 
 
British sport was now experiencing improved organisation and increased government investment. There 
was also a growing acknowledgement of the value of coaching and attempts were being made, to not only 
improve the provision of coaching, but also raise its profile. However, the following section, presented 
predominately through the use of interview material gathered from Geoff Dyson by Tom McNab in 1970, 
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traces the development of British coaching in this period and demonstrates that, although changes were 
being implemented along official lines, the control of the NGBs and coaches remained firmly with amateur 
officials who continued to manage their sports (and coaches) according to their long-established beliefs. 
Consequently, despite attempts to raise the overall profile of coaching, because amateur officials still 
viewed professional coaches with a degree of uncertainty, reflected in their unwillingness to accommodate 
them more fully within their sports, coaching still struggled to find acceptance within British sport. 
 
Amateur Attitude towards Professional Coaches within the NGBs  
When Dyson was appointed national coach in 1947, the athletic administrators were still suspicious of the 
act of coaching and of the coaches themselves. This suspicion, and the amateur attitudes taken towards 
coaching, remained in the sport for many years. This was potentially because so many of these 
administrators had a long association with their sports and they were able to influence the perspectives 
taken by any new officials. Tom McNab suggests that when national coaches were introduced into 
athletics, the administrators felt threatened by their presence and this further fuelled the level of resistance 
which the administrators had towards coaches. Prior to the appointment of the national coaches, the 
administrators were the ‘top dogs’, the people whom everybody approached if they had issue, but when 
national coaches appeared ‘they challenged them.’ Harold Abrahams in particular was never satisfied with 
this scenario and displayed considerable ‘malice’ towards the coaches, especially Dyson, who ‘was a 
particular manifestation that he didn’t like.’17  
 
Amateur Officials Unwilling to Take Direction 
The question arises then that if the administrators felt so threatened by the introduction of coaches why 
they were willing to go down this route. During discussion on this issue, Hamilton Smith suggests that 
amateur officials, who were generally from an upper-class background, ‘recognised that they didn’t know 
an awful lot’ about the technical matters of their sport so they felt it necessary to appoint coaches to 
manage this.18 However, despite accepting input from coaches on technical matters, administrators still 
viewed them with a degree of superiority because they saw themselves as the ‘masters’ and the national 
coaches ‘as a serf, a sort of creature.’19 It was unsurprising therefore, that they were not willing to take 
direction from the coaches.20 When Dyson suggested to Rowland Harper, a member of Coaching 
Committee, that he should be referred to as the ‘Director of Coaching’, because that was essentially the job 
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he was doing, Harper replied ‘Oh, the Coaching Committee would never agree to that, for we cannot be 
directed by anyone.’21  
Coupled with this refusal to take direction, amateur administrators viewed the coaches as inferior, 
because they had very little respect for them. Dyson noted that ‘Harold Abrahams didn’t make any 
differentiation between a coach who held a stopwatch and a coach who had to do a big national 
administrative job. He couldn’t care less about it.’22 McNab suggests that because the people involved in 
the administration of the Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) ‘were very conservative people by nature’, 
they had a tendency to disregard the value of the coaches. He explained that they never supported the 
national coaches in any of their activities and they never connected with them on a personal level. The 
relationship was purely professional, and they ‘never asked about whether you had a family or a wife or 
what you were doing.’23 If the national coaches ever demonstrated any sort of initiative, as Dyson and 
Kinnear frequently did, then administrators viewed them ‘with suspicion’, but if coaches followed directions 
and ‘didn’t cause any ripples of any sort’, they would be tolerated.24 From the administrator’s perspective, 
since they were not only controlling and managing the coaching scheme but also ensuring its success, they 
were the ones that should receive recognition, not the coaches. Dyson believed, that ‘as long as the official 
gets the OBE because of the overall success of the coaching scheme and as long as the athlete doesn’t 
mention his coach’s name too many times on television, all is well.’ He went further to suggest that if this 
was not the case then on ‘the rare occasions when they are any sort of awards to be gained, why is it the 
officials always get them?’25 
Dyson recalled a period where the AAA were encountering ‘money trouble’, and at this point it was 
suggested that they could only afford to keep the national coaches on for a maximum of five years 
(because their salary would increase annually). As many of these individuals came from a physical 
education background, it was suggested that they would then be able to return to teaching and continue to 
pass on their knowledge. Dyson argued that this would be a complete waste of both resources and money 
because the national coaches would just reach the point ‘when they’ve become national coaches, and then 
you would get rid of them.’26 Lack of finances is one obvious reason why administrators were keen to 
replace the national coaches, but it could also be suggested that there was a desire to remove the coaches 
before they had the opportunity to build their reputations to a point where they would be willing to challenge 
the authority and decision of the administrators. Officials could justify replacing national coaches, because 
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not only would this would reduce financial expenditure, but it would also ensure that any new coaches 
which they employed would be fairly willing, initially at least, to accept direction without much disagreement.  
While both the Amateur Swimming Association (ASA) and AAA appointed ‘foreign’ coaches to work at 
Loughborough Summer School over the years, the majority of sporting organisations remained very 
reserved about accepting advice from foreigners because there was a desire to control the methods that 
were to be introduced into British sport. This was even reflected within the boundaries of the coaches’ own 
organisation. Dyson recalled an incident at the BANC Committee meeting during a discussion about 
potential speakers for an upcoming conference, when all the names being mentioned were British, he 
argued,  
 
For twenty years you British have been talking to yourselves, I know theoretically you go to the 
Olympic Games I know in theory you’re in the Olympic Village and you rub shoulders with the 
other coaches and you learn - but that’s not the way. I’ve been to too many Olympic Games to 
know...that’s not the way you learn, and [in reality] you and your athletes come back from your 
international trips with very, very little opportunity of technical exchange with other people. By 
and large you British have been talking to yourselves and now you’re thinking up a British 
Association of National Coaches conference and out comes one of the familiar names to talk 
on the familiar subject. Why on earth don’t you spend a few hundred dollars and get someone 
to come over from across the seas and say something quite outrageous, something which 
maybe wrong but something which will set you thinking.27 
 
Public Perception of Coaching 
Sporting administrators were not the only ones that had difficulty accepting coaching since it was noted that 
the British public also failed to acknowledge its value. This could have been due to a lack of education on 
the subject, because at this time, the British public were rarely exposed to coaching and there was a 
degree of uncertainty regarding what the job entailed. Dyson believed, that ‘when they see that little man 
run out on the Wembley football ground with his bottle of water and his sponge, I personally think that is 
what they think it is.’ The ‘average British person wouldn’t be able to explain the difference between a 
trainer and a coach’ and that while he was national coach, his neighbours and other individuals, who were 
fully aware of his role, would complain to him about their ailments, to which he would respond ‘well go and 
see someone’, because this was their concept of what a coach was.28 Individuals who did understand the 
role of the coach felt that it was ‘unimportant’ and did not see the benefit because they still had ‘this 
suspicion’ that the coach was ‘a sort of hanger-on in many sports.’29  
Dyson suggested that the way in which sport developed in Britain may have influenced how people 
perceived coaching. The act of coaching ultimately undermined amateurism and what sport stood for, 
                                                     
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
 160 
Tegan Carpenter July 2012 
 
consequently, a culture developed whereby coaching was never fully embraced within British sport. 
Because amateurism was cherished for so long in British sport, it became increasingly difficult to change 
this culture, something, which by the late 1960s, Dyson suggested ‘we’re only just very slowly in Britain 
beginning to get rid of.’30 If this really was the situation, then it is unsurprising that for sporting 
administrators and a proportion of the British public, coaching was accompanied by negative connotations. 
As sport had developed somewhat differently in other countries, particularly in America and the Soviet 
Union, coaching was seen differently and generally welcomed. Coaching had a much greater presence, 
especially within American schooling when the majority of the American public would have been exposed 
to and experienced the coaching process. McNab highlights that ‘the coach was a god to them, that whole 
idea of the coaches being a leader was fundamental to American society, here it never was...it’s been built 
into their psyche from the beginning.’31 
Although not universally accepted, there was a slow and gradual recognition by some within sport, that 
if Britain was to improve and challenge other nations then some form of intervention was required. As a 
result, the amount of coaching within British sport began to increase, particularly after the 1950s. As 
resources increased to support coaching provision, so too did the expectations from the British public as to 
what coaching could achieve. A general consensus developed around the notion that since athletes now 
had the opportunity to experience regular coaching, this would immediately act to remedy the poor 
standard of British performances. When coaching did not have an instant impact it was then viewed as not 
being particularly successful and so the British public and press began to ‘bemoan their lot, the fact that 
they aren’t getting out of coaching what they think, or they ought to be getting.’ Even though there was an 
increased awareness, there continued to be an underlying disregard for coaching, particularly when it did 
not deliver to expectations. It therefore became increasingly difficult to alter existing perceptions, and 
although it might indeed be the key to ensuring British success, the British public continued to harbour ‘a 
rather uneasy feeling about coaching.’32   
By the late 1960s Dyson suggested that ‘there’s no reason now in this day and age, why coaching and 
officiating should be divorced.’33 However, it would appear that the traditions which had directed British 
sport for so long, continued in some way to control aspects of sport, and although Dyson and colleagues 
had made efforts to break down these barriers, during his time as national coach, even he had to ‘wonder’ 
if they had made any impact.34 There was an ongoing assumption amongst British administrators that they 
could continue to offer mediocre salaries and contracts and still entice individuals who had the ability and 
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knowledge to implement change. In 1968, it emerged that AAA administrators were willing to offer only 
£3000 a year for an individual to undertake an expansion of the role that Dyson had once occupied. Dyson 
viewed the low salary offer as an insult to any applicant, and he asked,  
 
Have the powers-that-be stopped to think of the enormity of the task, the committees they now 
have to attend; the travelling; the man-management that’ll be involved; the smattering of 
technical knowledge; and many different facets of the game to pay such a man £3000 a 
year?35 
 
Despite this reluctance to embrace coaching, British athletes were beginning to experience increasing 
international success, particularly after the 1960s, although the evidence presented here would seem to 
suggest that these results were being achieved in spite of the system rather than because of it. At 
Wimbledon, Angela Mortimer and Ann Jones, in 1961 and 1969 respectively, provided Britain with its first 
ladies singles titles since 1937 and England won the football World Cup in 1966, a success in sporting 
endeavours that appeared to provide a boost to public morale; the football victory in particular created an 
‘immense feeling of national pride and the atmosphere in Trafalgar Square was something akin to VE 
day.’36 Perhaps prompted by these events, and awareness that British sporting organisation still required 
development, the Sports Council underwent a series of alterations and improvements. 
 
The 1972 Executive Sports Council and Modern Developments 
In 1972, the newly appointed Conservative Government created an Executive Sports Council (ESC) by 
Royal Charter. Whether this creation was the result of international sporting victories or the realisation that 
sport now had a much larger role within society is unclear, but it seems obvious that the Conservative 
government were seeking to change the organisation of the current body even before they got into office. It 
was felt that the current ASC was too closely linked to government and a more ‘arm’s length’ approach 
would be suitable. A newly formed ESC would retain all the advisory functions of the ASC but it would have 
the additional responsibility for carrying out grant-aiding to voluntary organisations. The ‘new’ Sports 
Council fulfilled the wishes of The Wolfenden Report since the organisation would receive funding from the 
government but it would be free from state control. This also seemingly satisfied those who valued the 
existing voluntary infrastructure, because in some ways, it allowed sport in Britain to continue in the same 
vein as before. The organisational structure would remain firmly based within the voluntary sector and, 
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despite an increased government involvement, via enhanced levels of funding, the government would not 
attempt to interfere in terms of organisation.37 
Despite the creation of the ESC receiving widespread approval from many sports, the Central Council 
of Physical Recreation (CCPR) viewed the situation as anything but beneficial and this move posed a 
serious threat to the relationship between the CCPR and the Sports Council. The existing connections 
between the original ASC and the CCPR had been so close, that some suggested that ‘during this period 
[1965-71] it became increasingly difficult to detach the work of the CCPR from that of the [Advisory] Sports 
Council.’38 When discussions about the creation of the potential ESC began, it was generally concluded 
that if the Sports Council developed into an executive body, the CCPR, which had been so closely involved 
with its activities, ‘must accept some form of merger or absorption with the Sports Council.’39 As the CCPR 
were well aware that any alteration in the organisational situation would compromise their level of control 
over British sport, they continually resisted the creation of the ESC. However, their efforts proved futile, and 
in 1972 when the ESC was created, the two bodies were merged and the CCPR went into voluntary 
liquidation, transferring all of its assets and staff to the ESC.40 By agreeing to abide by these terms, the 
CCPR remained in existence to act as a representative body of the NGBs, and as a purely consultative 
body for the new ESC. 
The main objective of the ESC was to ‘develop and improve the knowledge and practice of sport and 
physical recreation in the interests of social welfare and the enjoyment of leisure among the public at large 
and to encourage the attainment of high standards.’41 Although the Council’s primary concerns were with 
mass participation, they also had a focus on elite and international sport. The aim was to ‘raise the 
standards of performance in sport and physical recreation’, but because there was a general consensus 
that increasing facilities was ‘the first priority’, it was agreed that mass sport would be the initial focus and 
this resulted in the emergence of the scheme known as ‘Sport for All.’42 It has been subsequently argued 
that the ‘Sport for All’ policy was never more than a slogan and that the continual demand by the 
government to direct resources to specific groups, resulted in ‘Sport for All’ becoming known as ‘sport for 
the disadvantaged’ and ‘sport for the inner city youth.’43  
An increasing awareness by the government that ‘success in international competition had an 
important part to play in national morale’, resulted in more funding being funnelled towards the ESC for the 
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purposes of elite and international sport.44 In 1975, the first White Paper on sport, Sport and Recreation, 
expressed the desire of the government to direct resources to those who were considered ‘gifted’ in sport 
with a suggestion that this was to be done through the development of ‘centres of excellence’ based in 
colleges and universities.45 As Ken Hardman and Roland Naul suggest, this document acted as ‘a 
precursor to a change in philosophy, a call for a better coordinated system of performance sport to enable 
young people to develop their full potential.’46 Despite initial resistance from some NGBs, because such a 
move signalled a loss of some of their autonomy, the ESC could see the benefit of such a scheme and 
gave its support. In 1977, the first centre of excellence opened in Leeds, which was soon followed by 
centres in both Manchester and Birmingham. The creation of centres of excellence marked an important 
landmark for coaching in Britain because it provided a focus for the development of top-level elite coaching 
for both Olympic and non-Olympic sports.47 This increased concentration on elite level coaching 
encouraged debates and disagreements between the NGBs and the ESC regarding the development of a 
coaching framework in British sport.48 A lack of consensus regarding the direction of elite British coaching 
emerged because 
 
There has always been...a somewhat schizophrenic attitude to coaching and coaches and 
nothing rouses the sporting passions more quickly than the topic of coaching. Perhaps it is a 
throw-back in the psyche to those halcyon days when athletes just took of their coats and 
ran.49  
 
There was a growing realisation that in order to deal with issues of coaching there needed to be some sort 
of centralised body that could work in association with both the NGBs and other sporting organisations to 
guarantee a degree of cooperation with regards to coaching policies. In 1983, encouraged by the years of 
lobbying by the BANC, the Sports Council established a ‘coaching arm’, known as the National Coaching 
Foundation (NCF). Influenced by the sporting systems which had developed in the East, it was believed 
that a network system of coaching units set up within universities and colleges would ensure greater 
collaboration throughout the country.50 By 1987, Leeds Polytechnic was acting as the NCF headquarters 
and there was a network of fourteen national coaching centres housed within other higher education 
institutes.51 The NCF initially associated itself with producing study packs and organising short courses in 
an attempt to create a national standard for coaching. By 1990, it had developed a sports coaching diploma 
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on a distance learning basis, which soon became the ‘gold standard’ amongst high-level experienced 
coaches.52 However, whilst interest in the diploma course was initially high, Les Burwitz, who had 
involvement with the programme while working at Manchester Metropolitan University, suggests that the 
distance learning format was ‘one of the critical limitations.’53 The diploma was directed towards active 
coaches, who by their very nature were very committed to their coaching role and, therefore, getting them 
to complete even a part-time academic role was difficult. Burwitz believes that ‘it took a lot of nurturing’ to 
get people from start to finish and that was only if they were willing to remain on the course for the duration. 
Nevertheless, one significant positive of the NCF programme was that it raised awareness amongst the 
NGBs regarding the potential benefits of coaching, and those NGBs which saw the coaching qualification 
as a positive initiative encouraged, and in some cases even funded their coaches to participate in the 
programme. The work of the NCF continued to expand during the 1990s, but as academic institutions 
became aware that they could run similar undergraduate coaching programmes and therefore gain 
financially, the emphasis was shifted away from the NCF. Burwitz indicates that when institutions began to 
encroach on what had been considered NCF territory, this ‘was the kiss of death’ and it marked the end of 
the NCF.54 As the programmes became obsolete, the NCF gradually began to reduce its scope and a 
series of redevelopments led to it being rebranded as Sports Coach UK in 2001. 
The election of John Major in 1990 saw another shift in the government’s approach to sport and 
witnessed the introduction of new structural changes. Mick Green suggests that the 1996 policy statement 
Sport: Raising the Game signalled that sport was now considered ‘a discrete domain for government 
intervention’ as the ‘organisational, administrative and funding framework for elite-level support’ was further 
developed.55 Raising the Game focused on plans to develop elite institutes of sport and considered how 
universities, in particular, could assist in the development of elite athletes. Essential to the new structure of 
British sport was the introduction of the National Lottery in 1994, something which Hamilton Smith referred 
to as ‘the greatest thing of all.’56 The impact of the lottery was a recurring theme in all of the interviews 
conducted for this research.57 Everyone involved suggested that the availability of funding from the Lottery 
was a pivotal moment because it caused a shift in the direction of British sport. For the first time, significant 
sums of money were being allocated to elite sport and this allowed for the introduction of improved 
methods of coaching and training. Terry Denison commented ‘I remember we had a budget of £100,000 a 
year for British swimming, international swimming, once we got into Lottery funding that went up into the £2 
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million bracket so suddenly there was a whole different game.’58 Les Burwitz suggests that the Lottery 
funding introduced the idea of payment by results and this encouraged more exploration of ways of 
‘enhancing and improving their particular sport’s performance.’59 This sentiment was echoed by Sarah 
Rowell who considers the Lottery as the ‘catalyst’ for introducing people into sport whose main focus was 
just on performance.60 The eventual reconstruction of the Sports Council in 1996 into the UK Sports 
Council (now UK Sport) and the English Sports Council (now Sport England) was a final decisive move by 
the Conservative Government to increase provision for sport and it also reflected the widespread view that 
separate organisations were needed. The UK Sports Council was to be responsible for developing 
excellence in sport and controlling drug-related issues, whereas the English Sports Council would be more 
focused on grass-roots level sport and its development towards excellence. This division was yet another 
reflection of the government’s desire to improve elite sporting success at international level.61  
More recently, and perhaps encouraged by the success of Soviet sporting policies in such areas, there 
has been an increased emphasis placed on all NGBs to have talent identification strategies which involve 
the development of ‘performance pathways’ for individuals who wish to progress to higher levels of 
competition.62 This became more firmly established through the Game Plan publication in 2002, which 
stipulated that each NGB had to develop a sport-specific Long Term Athletic Development (LTAD) plan in 
order to secure government funding.63 The LTAD model was developed by Istvan Balyi and proposed that 
a ‘specific and well-planned training, competition and recovery regime would ensure optimum development 
throughout an athlete’s career.’64 Ultimately, how successful an athlete is and whether they are able to 
achieve elite levels is predominately determined by training well over a long period time. Balyi concluded 
that it takes eight to twelve years or 10,000 hours of training for a talented athlete to reach elite levels and 
this has become a central notion of LTAD.65 
Sporting Future for All, which was published in 2000, signalled a further change in the way that British 
sport was being funded, particularly at the elite level.66 In acknowledging that international success had its 
advantages, the government now wanted some guarantee of outcome from their investment. The report 
stated that each sport would be required to develop realistic medal targets and ‘the success or failure in 
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achieving milestone targets in performance...will be an important factor in deciding future levels of 
funding.’67 Examples of this can be seen in both British swimming and cycling. Elite swimming in Great 
Britain has experienced variable success at the Olympic Games; at the Sydney Games in 2000 they 
achieved no medals and four years later in Athens they only achieved two bronze medals. Poor 
performances at Sydney would have resulted in a drop in funding, and the possibility of performing well at 
the following Games would have been difficult to achieve. However, those two bronze medals in Athens 
created a slight increase in funding which clearly paid dividends when Rebecca Adlington secured two gold 
medals at the Beijing Games in 2008. Although a total of six medals were achieved in British swimming, it 
was primarily these two gold medals that generated a 24 per cent increase in funding from £20.66 to 
£25.61 million for the 2012 London Games. Similarly, cycling achieved fourteen medals in total at Beijing, 
eight more than the expected target, which resulted in a 21.5 per cent increase in funding for the 2012 
Games.68 But such financial investment by the government is entirely dependent on results and if a sport 
fails to achieve its medal targets then the funding is reduced or withdrawn, which has recently been the 
case with British shooting. For the 2008 Games, their funding was £5.06 million and they were required to 
achieve two medals but when British shooters did not secure any medals, their funding for the following 
Games suffered a 75.8 per cent decrease to £1.225 million.69 Mick Green argues that the unfavourable 
consequence of such a scheme is that without funding, Olympic athletes struggle to achieve the medal 
performances demanded by the government targets, and the resource-dependent relationship which all 
Olympic sports now have with government is one that will only endure if the sport delivers its Olympic 
targets.70  
As a result of increased government involvement and greater funding availability, predominately 
through the creation of the lottery, there have been calls for a more specialised approach to British sport 
preparation. Particularly in the last thirty years, it has gradually been accepted within the majority of NGBs, 
that if British athletes were/are to pose a serious threat for medals at World Championships and the 
Olympics then a structured and carefully directed coaching and training programme was required. Greater 
specialisation and the abolishment of the amateur ruling at the Olympic Games in 1986 marked a gradual 
breakdown of some amateur barriers in British sport. However, despite this shift towards greater 
specialisation and because amateurism controlled and directed British sport for so long, it is inevitable that 
some remnants of its ethos will remain. An example of this underlying presence of amateurism can be seen 
in the recent debate surrounding Dwain Chambers and his eligibility for the 2012 Olympic Games. 
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Chambers was found guilty of doping and served a two years suspension in 2003 but under a British 
Olympic Association (BOA) by-law he was also served a life ban from Olympic competition. The argument 
which surrounded the debate was associated with the fact that if Chambers was a citizen of any other 
country the life-ban would not stand, and consequently it was being contested on the grounds that the BOA 
were not following the accepted global standards. From a British perspective, Chambers had violated the 
basic ethics of fair play and deserved to be punished, but the World Anti-Doping Agency ruled that the BOA 
by-law was not compliant with their policy, resulting in the BOA appealing against the decision at the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport. A ‘very disappointed’ BOA lost its appeal, yet this incident does demonstrate the 
ongoing presence of amateurism within British sport and how the remnants of its ethos continues to impact 
on everyday events at all levels of sport.71 The long held assumption that the traditions and rules of British 
sport are in some way superior to those in the rest of the world seems to still be held as a self-evident truth 
and an international ruling which is good enough for every other athlete in the world does not meet the high 
expectations of British sport.  
Although this is just one example of the continuing amateur legacy a number of the interviewees in 
this study offered further examples. Terry Denison explained that ‘I think we've moved on, but there is still 
something of the old amateur tradition and there is still something of it’s not quite right, it's professional, it's 
not quite acceptable.’72 Bill Furniss suggests, that as was the case previously, ‘even now...I still think 
coaches are undervalued.’73 Although some elite level coaches were now on ‘pretty good salaries’ he 
believes that this is not really comparable to other positions in the sports world, given the environment in 
which they have to work in, and the pressures which they have to face. He argues that there is ‘no 
comparison’ between a coach working with an athlete, and sports support services, and ‘yet a lot of sport 
service people are paid more than the coaches they support! Which is somewhat of an anomaly!’74  
When questioned if amateurism still influences British sport, Dave Collins responded ‘staggeringly, 
completely and utterly.’ He suggested that ‘people who loved athletics tried to run athletics, for athletics’ 
and, as a result, the performance of British athletes had continued to diminish. The results at the 2004 
Athens Games, as in the 1908 Games, covered up significant failures in the British sporting system. Kelly 
Holmes had managed to achieve two gold medals, and while Collins accepts she prepared and worked 
hard for that result, that British athletics had been ‘saved by the Americans having a bad day at the office 
and Kelly having two good days at the office...it covered up loads of other things, they couldn’t carry on 
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going like that.’75 Unlike 1908, attempts were made to try and remedy the situation, but Collins suggests 
that because of the hold that amateurism still had over British athletics, the sport failed to progress. He 
explained that, 
 
Soon after I got the performance director job someone asked me if I had seen the Southern 
League results and I said ‘No’ and they said ‘well you aren’t really interested in athletics are 
you?’ No, I’m interested in winning, I am interested in performance. I’m a performance director 
not an athletics director and that for me, that was the difference. The traditions of athletics and 
its failure to embrace quick enough the new world has limited it and in my perception 
continues to limit and that ethos is still there.76 
 
Tom McNab suggests, that although its principles may not be as influential as they once were, because 
amateurism was such a persistent feature of British sport for such a long period of time, the amateur legacy 
has left a ‘vacuum’ which will subsequently impact on any future developments. He commented,  
 
I had this naive belief when I was young that once we got professional coaches in charge, 
professional administrators that we would suddenly, we would fly off. I thought that's the way, 
indoor facilities here we go. Totally wrong. It left a vacuum, the amateur setup, it left no one 
behind that had any professional attitudes to develop athletics in coaching or any other way.77 
 
For McNab, while athletics has not suffered from a lack of investment particularly in the last ten years, 
these resources have not been utilised in the correct way so they have offered no benefit to the sport; ‘the 
advantage we’ve had is building facilities, which are excellent, but the men, not the walls make the city and 
there’s this belief that if you have all these facilities and systems in place that you can produce 
performance.’78 This sort of mind-set appears to be a throwback to a time when amateurism was the main 
guiding principle of British sport because there have been examples elsewhere in this thesis that suggest 
that amateur administrators always placed the value of facilities above coaches. There was an assumption, 
that if the equipment and facilities were provided, then that in turn would produce results, and this attitude 
still appears to be present, particularly in athletics. If sports are not supplied with individuals who have the 
correct technical ability they will never have the opportunity to improve. However, McNab suggests that 
thanks to the far-reaching impact of amateurism, which has left such a big void in many sports, ‘we don’t 
have the right people in place and I’m not sure we ever will have.’79 
Although the continuation of the amateur influence has been considered primarily from a limiting 
perspective, some interviewees suggest that its influence has in some ways been beneficial for British sport 
and that it should be encouraged to continue. Frank Dick is grateful that the amateur tradition remains 
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because ‘we had and we still have people who are amateur who are producing world class performances 
from their athletes.’ He often had this argument with Harry Wilson, in which he asked ‘If I give you a million 
is Steve [Ovett] going to run much faster?’ Wilson suggested that was not the point but Dick argued,  
 
Yes it is, it’s an attitude...it’s not economics. I’d love to support if we could do it, give proper 
rewards to those persons who produce genius as amateurs but that’s not possible, but that the 
fact is, getting paid doesn’t make you a good coach.80  
 
Hamilton Smith suggests that the amateur tradition has actively encouraged individuals to donate their time 
to sport and this has made British sport available to everyone. The option for anyone to volunteer ensured 
that it has not become an exclusive past-time only for elite athletes, as was frequently seen in other 
countries such as the Soviet Union. Like Dick, Smith recognises that money does not make someone an 
expert coach. The unique aspect of the British sporting system is that ‘giants’ in coaching can emerge 
simply because they had been willing to volunteer. These individuals are not initially motivated by the 
prospect of money or success, but simply because they want to help progress their chosen sport.81 
Similarly, Les Burwitz indicates that he would ‘fight’ for the ‘old school ethos of the amateur coach’ because 
this forms the back-bone of what British sport represents. He suggests that, ‘yes we need mechanisms to 
be able to compete at the highest level but let’s not throw the baby out with the bath water all the time.’ He 
argues the grassroots American coaches are often ‘mirror images of professional coaches’, and as such, 
they treat the athletes (often children) in a way that is inappropriate and not conducive to their 
development. This is something that Burwitz would not like to see transposed to British sport because ‘it’s 
much better that we are amateurs in our approach, providing we know when to cut off and when to shift 
from play to a professional mode so they've got a half decent chance of achieving medals.’82 This 
recognition that there is a significant difference in terms of the required support for grassroots and elite 
level sport has now become ever more widespread.  
As the NGBs became ever more reliant on government for financial support, which is now dependent 
on achieving targets, it was inevitable that they would lose some of their autonomy. Perhaps this is one of 
the factors that diluted the influence of amateurism within the NGBs because they were now no longer able 
to control their sport, and their professional coaches as they once had. As British sport continued to 
develop it became apparent that a different approach was required for grassroots and elite sport, and that 
amateurism did not have a place in an elite sporting model. If Britain wanted to achieve similar success to 
that seen in the Soviet Union, it would require greater specialisation and a focus on winning. However, 
although it gradually became accepted that amateurism was no longer considered the guiding principle in 
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British sport, it is clear from the interviews conducted here that some of its legacy and ethos are still 
present, even in elite sport. The following chapters address another specific area of specialisation, sports 
science, and suggest that although Soviet successes encouraged an increased amount of government 
involvement in British sport, there was a much slower uptake of sports science. Having said that, there 
appears to have been a greater acceptance of medical support, as demonstrated by the 1965 Altitude 
Research project, which provides an interesting case study of how advanced the relationship between 
sport and science could become, even in the amateur era.  
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Chapter Eight- Emergence of Sports Science and Medicine in British Sport 
Despite the successes enjoyed by Soviet athletes in the 1950s, there was a significant lag between the 
emergence of Soviet sports science techniques and its uptake in British sport, although medical 
involvement was always more readily accommodated. While an adherence to amateurism may have been 
behind the reluctance to engage with scientists, a different approach was taken to individuals associated 
with the medical world. Because doctors were perceived to be of the correct social standing, amateur 
administrators were happy to incorporate them, especially if they were prepared to assist in a voluntary and 
honorary capacity. This chapter explores that relationship and suggests that even though medicine and 
medical men were accepted within amateur sport, the manner in which the medical world engaged with 
sport remained under the control of amateur administrators and this was reflected in the ad-hoc and 
informal way in which it functioned. In order to explain that relationship, this chapter traces the early 
development of sports science and medicine, when the emphasis was on discovery rather than 
improvement, and suggests how this appears to have shaped future development. This is followed by a 
consideration of how the way in which British sports medicine developed and functioned, which was 
characterised by a lack of qualified personnel and focus, reinforced the very amateur nature of its 
organisation. Finally, this chapter considers a short case study which suggests, that even though sports 
medicine was becoming more formalised and established within British sport, there was still much 
uncertainty surrounding its integration among the amateurs who controlled sport. 
 
Early Forms of Sports Science 
 
Matters of very great significant interest can be found in the performances of that 
extraordinary machine, the human athlete.1 
 
In order to comprehend the widespread and rapid changes that took place in the post-war period, it is 
beneficial to understand and appreciate the evolution of science and sport during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. The early research studies that were carried out during this period were 
essentially designed to monitor the human physiological response to exercise, rather than to systematically 
study athletic performance. The capacity in which modern sports science and medicine is recognised, 
whereby science is applied to training, could therefore be considered a fairly recent development.2 As the 
relationship between science and sport had not yet been clearly defined, most of the early research into the 
physiology of elite sportsman was aimed at identifying the peculiar characteristics of these ‘curiosities or 
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freaks of nature’ rather than improving their performance.3 The scientific marginality of sport during this 
period may have caused this lack of clarity in the relationship. Although sport provided the researcher with 
a source of physiological data, this constituted only a small part of a much larger area of interest in physical 
performances that included manual labour and military service, which at the time were considered much 
more important than sport.4 For example, in 1899 Oskar Zoth focused on the pedalling action of cyclists 
and concluded that muscle physiology played a specific role in the execution of such an activity but he did 
not suggest that his results could be applied to improving physical performance.5 Similarly, in 1903 Thomas 
Storrey identified that the condition and irritability of voluntary muscles following a sprinter’s warm-up could 
be useful in formulating a scientific rationale for warming-up but this was never discussed in relation to 
runners using such a technique to improve overall sprinting time.6 It could also be suggested that the 
majority of researchers at the time did not express an interest in applying science to improving athletic 
performance because of the widespread belief that over overtraining and overexertion could cause damage 
to the vital organs of the body, particularly the heart.7 
 
Relationship between Early Sports Science and Coaches 
Although scientific research into particular areas of sport was beginning to gain momentum, the 
communication between scientists and the athletic community was fairly limited.8 Because research 
remained largely confined to scientific journals, which were not readily accessible, coaches continued to 
rely on their ‘accumulated experience’ and knowledge.9 However, it does also need to be considered that 
even if communication between the researchers and coaches would have been conducive to the transfer of 
knowledge and ideas, coaches would have remained reluctant to incorporate ‘experimental science.’10 
Victorian and Edwardian coaches or ‘trainers’, as they were commonly known, relied heavily on a ‘craft 
knowledge’ which would have been acquired through a process of experience and the oral and visual 
transfer of coaching knowledge.11 During this time, coaching craft was generally transmitted through 
personal contacts and coach-athlete relationships. The successful coaching philosophies which Alfred 
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Shrubb had experienced while training under Harry Andrews were then passed on to other athletes when 
Shrubb became athletics coach at Oxford University. Consequently, coaching was ‘considered an art as 
much as a science’, something which had been forged and developed through accumulated wisdom.12 
Although the phrase ‘scientific’ became increasingly associated with most Victorian training methods, this 
was not used to indicate the incorporation of scientific principles but rather to demonstrate a systematic 
process of training that would produce skill and physical fitness.13 
The suggestion that the experience of trainers was worth more than the, as yet, underdeveloped 
knowledge of the medical world was clearly outlined in the British Medical Journal in 1873:  
 
The absence of any scientific work on exercise and training for the guidance of athletes is to 
us no matter of surprise. Experience has built up a system of training which, although in some 
respects...open to improvement by the application of scientific knowledge, is on the whole 
probably much more correct than would be the programme recommended by the whole body 
of our savants in the Council...When we come to the effects of training and exercise on the 
health of the body, we are at a loss.14 
 
Consequently, coaches developed their own strategy of effective training long before the incorporation of 
science proved or disproved its effectiveness. However, even in contemporary sport, which has seen the 
institutionalisation of sports science, there are some coaches who continue to rely on traditional knowledge 
and personal methods. Since the credibility of a coach has always been associated with competition 
outcomes, it is unsurprising that there has been some reluctance to shift away from methods which have 
proved to be successful. As Dave Day highlights, ‘many prominent coaches have achieved consistent 
results without the use of a scientific approach and, because their methods are successful, they feel no 
obligation to provide theoretical justification.’15 This seems to be reflected in comments by Arthur Lydiard 
who is noted to have said, ‘Coaches already know what works, and the scientist's job is to tell them why it 
works!16 Similarly, athletics coach Steve Jones suggests his coaching is ‘simple...there’s no science in it, 
no heart-rate monitors, nothing...it’s just about running instinctively…none of it comes out of a book. It all 
comes out of my own experience.’17 Aspects of this ongoing reluctance of coaches to fully incorporate 
science will be explored in chapter nine. 
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Interwar Developments 
Despite this continued disconnection between science and sport, developments had begun to emerge in 
Europe during the first half of the century, which indicate that attempts were being made to bridge the gap 
between science and sport and encourage greater formalisation. During the interwar period, European 
researchers had begun to develop a ‘scientific body of knowledge’ concerning human anatomy and 
physiology, and this is why this era is commonly considered as the formative years of what is now 
recognised as sports science.18 However even prior to this, German researchers had been particularly 
influential because of the many advances and developments that were emerging from their work. Roberta 
Park suggests that the 1911 Dresden International Hygiene Exhibition provides significant evidence that 
attempts were being made to launch a more formalised programme of sports science.19 The exhibition was 
comprised of different sections, including those related to sport, and upon completion of the exhibition, 
Henry Beyer a German-born United States Naval Officer, praised its success.20 He commended the last 
minute efforts made by England as having added to the ‘completeness of the results of the undertaking’ but 
he regretted the absence of America, and concluded that the achievements which Germany had made in 
terms of scientific study in this field were far advanced to those seen anywhere in America.21 In an attempt 
to continue the success achieved at Dresden, a decision was made to establish a research laboratory in 
the Charlottenburg district in Berlin, and as part of the preparation for the planned 1916 Games in Berlin 
there was a nationwide drive in Germany to advance the study of sport and focus research on the limiting 
factors of improving athletic performance.22 However, as Park notes, it would be another three decades 
before similar initiatives were seen in America.23 
Progress was being made in the 1920s, particularly in the field of exercise physiology, by David Bruce 
Dill at the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory and A. V. Hill who won the Nobel Prize for ‘physiology or medicine’ in 
1922 for discoveries relating to heat production in the muscle. British physiologist Hill, described as ‘a giant 
in the field of physiology’, had a major impact and Ernst Jokl later suggested that Hill’s writings and lectures 
had provided an impetus to the emerging field.24 In 1923, he became the professor of physiology at the 
University College London, although his best known work was in 1910 which focussed on heat production 
in the muscle of a frog. Hill had a personal interest in the study of athletic performance, so in 1922 he 
undertook research in the area of muscular contraction, lactic acid production and oxygen debt within the 
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human body.25 These experiments were physically demanding and therefore it was considered appropriate 
to work with athletes in training because they were willing to work to their maximum capacity.26 As Hill 
explained in 1927, this factor played a significant role in his research with athletes,  
 
The processes of athletics are simple and measurable and carried out to a constant degree, 
namely to the utmost of a man’s powers...and athletes themselves, being in a state of health 
and dynamic equilibrium, can be experimented on without danger and can repeat their 
performances exactly again and again. I might perhaps state a third reason and say, as I said 
in Philadelphia, that the study of athletes and athletics is “amusing”: certainly to us and 
sometimes I hope to them.27 
 
Hill’s work had an impact worldwide and David Bruce Dill credited him for providing the inspiration for much 
of the work they produced at the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory. Opened in 1927 as part of a joint venture 
between the Harvard Medical and Business Schools, it was responsible for producing some of the most 
extensive physiological and fatigue research data of the period.28 A large proportion of the research which 
was carried out there involved the use of athletes and, by working in conjunction with physiologist, Arlie V. 
Bock and the Boston General Hospital, were able to carry out a series of research studies in 1928 which 
also involved Clarence DeMar, who had been in a trained state continuously for approximately twenty 
years.29 Results demonstrated that physical training, amongst other things, significantly increased the lung 
capacity and reduced the pulse rate which had led researchers to conclude that the athlete who is in a 
trained state is more efficient than the sedentary individual because they have a superior ability to be able 
to meet the demand for oxygen.30 However, the research team failed to bridge the gap between monitoring 
the physiological response to exercise and effective performance enhancement. This was particularly 
frustrating for DeMar who remained disdainful of the efforts of officials, trainers and coaches throughout his 
life.31 In fact, he attributed his failure in the 1912 Olympics to their training methods.32 
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During this period, there was also a connection between the medical and scientific aspects of sport and 
the Olympic Games. The first obvious example of this emerged at the 1908 London Games when the 
Organising Committee insisted on medical checks for any individuals wishing to enter the marathon event. 
Each competitor was required to submit a ‘medical certificate of fitness’ with his entry and then undergo 
further medical examinations by officers appointed by the British Olympic Council.33 The committee could 
also be credited with introducing the first drugs ban at the Olympics when it was stated that ‘no competitor 
either at the start or during the progress of the race may take or receive any drug. The breach of this rule 
will operate as an absolute disqualification.’34 Although they had no way of actually proving if individuals 
were taking any substances, they had unknowingly set in motion a series of developments which would 
culminate in a more controlled competitive environment at Olympic competitions. Despite these early 
efforts, the first real example of a concentrated programme of scientific research at an Olympic competition 
occurred at the 1928 Games in Amsterdam after Professor Buytendijk had contacted the Organising 
Committee in 1927 to establish if he could ‘take advantage of the presence of athletes during the Olympic 
Games to carry out sport-physiological research.’35 The committee had been more than willing to lend their 
support and they even installed a laboratory for him to carry out his research.36 Buytendijk enlisted the help 
of many scholars and researchers from around the world including two Britons, Professor Crighton 
Bramwell and Dr Reginald Ellis. Many varied investigations were undertaken on the athletes and it was 
concluded ‘that such investigations were not only of scientific importance, but must also be considered of 
the greatest significance for the sports world and medical advisers.’37 All the researchers involved in the 
programme were so convinced of its benefits and its potential to further the field of research that they 
suggested that it should become a permanent feature of future Games under the direct supervision of the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC).38 However, it was highlighted that despite the ‘praiseworthy co-
operation of many trainers and athletes, a very large proportion of the competitors shirked the 
examinations’, something, which they argued, was attributable to ‘short-sightedness.’39 While researchers 
believed that statistical investigation was essential if they were to bridge the gap between the medical 
aspects of sport and the potential to achieve success, it was apparent that many athletes and coaches 
remained indifferent about its benefits. This probably stemmed from the notion that many athletes and 
trainers of the time viewed the scientific investigation of sport and exercise as being purely for the benefit of 
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the researcher because there was a general inability to successfully connect experimental results with 
performance enhancement.40  
Although these early studies were beginning to establish that physical exercise did influence the 
biological mechanisms of the body, because exercise physiology and sports science were still very much in 
their formative years, they were unable to apply their findings to a practical setting. Beamish and Ritchie 
suggest that ‘part of the reason was the inevitable and perpetual gulf that exists between theory and 
practice.’ Also, for many countries, this was an era which saw the ‘apogee of amateur sport’s emphasis on 
character development and education through athletic competition’, and as such, outcome and performance 
enhancement were not considered the primary goal.41 As previously demonstrated, it was not until the Cold 
War and the emergence of the Soviet Union that the socio-cultural conditions which were conducive to the 
application of modern training principles.42 
 
Development of Sports Medicine 
 
The provision of medical services to sport in Britain has for years been bedevilled by our 
casual amateur attitude. Simply caricatured this is: “sport isn’t serious, so sports medicine 
can’t be”.43  
 
British sport has always had an association with some form of medical support, but because of antagonism 
towards the professional aspects of sport, it has always been organised on an informal, ad-hoc basis. 
During the formative periods of British sport, the medical profession consisted of middle-class men, who by 
their very nature, would have been inclined to respect and support the amateur ideals of sport. Because 
these men presented no threat to its ethos, there was less resistance towards their involvement. Although 
Adolphe Abrahams claimed to have attended in the position of the British athletics Medical Officer at the 
1908 Games, it was not until 1928 that it was officially noted that an honorary Medical Officer had travelled 
with the British team.44 It was also in 1928 that the association now known as the Fédération Internationale 
de Médecine du Sport (FIMS) was formed at the Winter Olympics in St Mortiz.45 The volunteerism and 
amateurism present in British sport essentially shaped and controlled the way in which sports medicine 
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developed, and it was not until the mid-1950s that any sort of structure begins to emerge.46 The British 
Association of Sport and Medicine (BASM) was formed in 1953 by a group of doctors who had been acting 
as medical advisors to a number of National Governing Bodies (NGB). Sir Adolphe Abrahams was 
appointed president, Sir Arthur Porritt acted as chairman and Dr William Tegner was honorary secretary. 
The BASM was founded with the ‘aim of making it the authoritative body on every medical aspect of 
athletics and exercise.’47 Although the organisation began to expand, membership was reserved only for 
individuals with a recognised medical qualification and for those who had been nominated by the NGBs to 
act in an advisory capacity (often national coaches), so by 1960 the association had only grown to about 
100 members. In 1961, it was decided to make the BASM more accessible to ‘those in professions related 
to sport and medicine’ and it granted membership to psychologists, physiologists, physiotherapists and 
physical educationalists. As a result of this liberal policy on membership, the association numbers had 
almost trebled within two years.48  
However, the activity of BASM was minimal in the first few years, possibly because of an ingrained 
hostility towards formal sports medicine.49 Observations on the status of British sports medicine in the mid-
1960s noted that there was ‘no money, not just no recognition, but a “vindictive hostility” to the expression 
“sports medicine” in the senior medical world.’50 As a result, despite the early association between sport 
and medicine in Britain, because progress towards a more formalised and professional relationship had 
been influenced by other factors, it persistently trailed developments being established in other countries.51 
In 1960, the Secretary General of FIMS commented that although sports medicine was now widely 
accepted and utilised within many countries in Europe, it remained relatively unknown in Britain.52 In 1970, 
it was observed that ‘British athletes desperately need a good medical service. Their success depends on 
it. And if specialised treatment is not provided...will fall further and further behind the rest of the world.’53 
Despite this appeal to improve the provision of British sports medicine, it was clear that issues remained 
unresolved. In 1990, some twenty years after this complaint, it was commented that, 
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Despite achieving outstanding success at the highest level of international competition in a 
wide range of sports, Britain had lagged behind many countries in providing medical support 
at both elite and grassroots level...The Director of Coaching for the British Amateur Athletic 
Board has expressed the opinion that at each major games approximately 25% of this 
country’s medal winning opportunities is lost through illness or injury.54 
 
This apparent indifference towards sports medicine in Britain resulted in a lack of funding and the slow 
development as a formal speciality. It was not until 1981 that a postgraduate Diploma in Sports Medicine 
was offered by the London Hospital Medical College, which eventually developed into a Masters degree in 
Sports and Exercise Medicine.55 It was only in 2005 that Sport and Exercise Medicine was officially 
recognised by the British government as a specialism.56 Sarah Rowell commented that ‘one of the things 
that always did interest me was that sports science was funded well before sports medicine was and in 
some ways there is argument that you can't use sports science unless you've got uninjured athletes.’57 
Because of the lack of formal qualifications there has been difficultly in controlling the standard and the 
people involved. Peter Sperryn who became team doctor for the British Amateur Athletic Board (BAAB) in 
1969 explained that, 
 
They always had a team of “physios”, most of whom weren’t, and this caused a great deal of ill 
feeling between the professions. They had some very well-known and highly favoured 
masseurs called physiotherapists, with no qualifications except charm, and they made a good 
cup of tea and looked after the worries of the team.58 
 
In the 1970s, there were attempts to reduce the animosity between the bodies of professional medical staff 
and amateur assistants, when the British Olympic Association (BOA) declared, that ‘in future unqualified 
persons would not be taken to the Olympic Games described as physiotherapists.’59 However, it was clear 
that issues of suitability and qualifications remained a problem. In the mid-1980s it was noted that the 
BASM had written to the BOA expressing their ‘disquiet’ regarding the selection of some doctors because 
they lacked suitable experience in the sporting environment.60 Even as late as 1995 there had been 
complaints about some doctors working with sports teams who were not correctly qualified. Although it was 
‘ideal’ that doctors who were working in conjunction with team should hold a Diploma in Sports Medicine, 
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there was no way to enforce this because it was not an actual requirement.61 This reticence to question the 
qualifications and suitability of these individuals appears to have been closely associated with notions of 
amateurism and volunteerism:  
 
What of the worthy doctors, who accompany our international teams abroad, or give up their 
time for no reward, out of interest and involvement in sport? Commendable as it is, interest 
and involvement do not make up for specialised expertise. Every time I, or any other critic, 
assail officials in various sports for different inadequacies. I am made to feel a “cad” or an 
“outsider” because I have attacked someone “who after all, old boy, isn’t getting anything out 
of it and is just doing it for the love of the sport”.62 
 
For sporting organisations, questioning of the qualities of these individuals displayed a lack of appreciation 
for both amateurism and the voluntary tradition since these individuals donated their free time in order to 
make a vital contribution to British sport. From the traditionalists’ perspective, they were in some ways 
untouchable, a perception which severely hampered the growth of sports medicine in British sport.  
Even as it gradually became an established practice to utilise qualified doctors within international 
sporting teams, the whole process still remained very ‘amateur’. Malcolm Read was a member of the 1968 
Olympic hockey team and trained as a doctor. He went with a number of teams to several Olympic Games 
and also went on world tours with the British hockey team but he never received any remuneration. It was 
generally accepted that doctors would donate their services to sports teams and use their own holiday to 
be able to attend events, but Read faced difficulties when his employer refused to pay him while he was 
away from the practice. He described another situation in 1986 when he was asked to act as chief medical 
officer for the Olympics. After being approached by the BOA, he explained that in order to do the job 
correctly it would require a minimum of four days a week and they would need to pay him accordingly. 
However, he was told that he would not be paid and that he was expected to fulfil such duties voluntarily. 
Unsurprisingly, he refused to take on the job, explaining that it would be ‘impossible’ to try and earn a living 
and work four days a week for free.63  
This expectation that doctors should fulfil sporting duties on a voluntary basis was not confined to the 
BOA. The Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) and the BAAB both wanted to incorporate some form of 
sports medicine, but only on an amateur honorary basis, and they expected doctors to donate their time 
free of charge just as all the other honorary officials and coaches did. Peter Sperryn, who become honorary 
secretary of BASM in 1964, and who had a long involvement with the BAAB, explained that when he 
became team doctor for the European Championships at Helsinki in 1971, it was highlighted at a meeting 
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prior to the event, that while athletes would be awarded a ‘per diem’ allowance, support staff would receive 
nothing. When questioned, Harold Abrahams explained ‘there is no allowance, we don’t have any money.’ 
It later transpired that there were team expenses but Abrahams had carried them to Helsinki and back in a 
hope that they would not have to ‘waste’ any of them. Eventually, the doctors and support staff were 
offered ‘pocket money’, but as Sperryn highlights, ‘it was a gratuity and not a fee!’64 A further example 
occurred in 1971 when he was already an established BAAB medical officer, but had recently qualified as a 
consultant. He approached Arthur Gold in order to develop a medical centre at Loughborough where the 
athletes could visit on an annual basis and have routine tests. As this was something that the BAAB had 
requested, Sperryn hoped he may receive some sort of funding. However, ‘the minute that I had suggested 
some remuneration on professional terms, strictly according to the NHS consultant contracts - I wasn’t 
playing Harley Street - I was sacked!’65 
Resistance within the NGBs towards the professionalisation of the medical services was exacerbated 
by the fact that medical organisations were unwilling to cooperate with each other. As with many other 
areas of British amateur sport, this continual battle for autonomy between different organisations seems to 
have made a negative impact. Although it was acknowledged by the medical contingent that ‘doctors and 
coaches do not work closely enough together, with doctors probably being most at fault’, the cohesion 
between sporting bodies was minimal.66 Even in the late 1990s, it was still being noted by UK Sport that 
friction between organisations had slowed the overall development of sports medicine. Apparently, ‘from 
what is reported to us by both coaches and athletes, and from our own experience of trying to develop 
sports medicine services, development of sports medicine has on occasions been hindered by 
disagreements within the discipline.’67 In 1992, the Sports Council supported the development of a National 
Sports Medicine Institute (NSMI), which it was hoped would bring some form of standardisation and 
cohesion.68 However, far from creating an environment which was conducive to the development of British 
sports medicine this resulted in even more animosity between organisations as they fought to preserve 
their own autonomy. In 1999, it was observed that there was ‘an unstated agenda with some sort of power 
struggle developing’ between the BASM and NSMI but it was hoped that ‘the endemic strain of 
confrontation and disagreement’ could be eliminated and that the two bodies could ‘work together in mutual 
trust.’69 Despite this plea, disputes continued between the two organisations and this was particularly 
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apparent when the NSMI attempted to control aspects of sports medicine that the BASM believed to be 
under their authority, causing an aggressive response:  
 
It is vital that the BASM is recognised as the professional body for Sports Medicine 
Practitioners. Any involvement of the NSMI could be disruptive to this process...I think that at 
this time it is vitally important that Sports Medicine presents a united front, and I firmly believe 
that BASM is the organisation best place to represent doctors in this speciality.70 
 
Although British sport has had a long association with medical practitioners, it has been fairly informal and 
unstructured and the progress and development of sports medicine into a respected, recognised speciality 
has been constantly influenced by constraints associated with amateurism. As with other aspects of British 
sport, there was a belief that sports medicine should be conducted on an honorary basis. This has 
influenced the quality of medical support that British athletes have received and subsequently restricted the 
level of performance that athletes have been able to reach. However, despite this somewhat uncoordinated 
integration of medicine into British sport, the reactions to the issue of the effects of altitude at the Mexico 
Games in 1968 encouraged a greater formalisation of sports medicine, because it was recognised that 
athletes would not be able to compete effectively without some form of medical assistance. The altitude 
debate that emerged following the awarding of the Games to Mexico does appear to have offered some 
sort of direction to British sports medicine, and the following section uses the altitude research conducted in 
1965 as a case study to illustrate the effect of this debate on the future of British sports medicine. 
 
1965 Altitude Research and British Sport 
During the 1960s in British sport, research into various aspects of elite sport began to expand. Prior to this, 
apart from the limited amount of research being conducted by independent bodies, information associated 
with sports science was not widely available to coaches.71 Frank Dick has suggested that an increased 
interest in physiology in the mid-1960s was a direct result of the impending 1968 Mexico Games, and a 
realisation that altitude and dehydration played an important role within sporting performance. A need to 
know more about these principles in the practical sense in order to assist coaches, was the catalyst for not 
only training at altitude but also for the wider interest and incorporation of sports science and medicine into 
British sport.72 It is also likely that the sporting success of other nations, particularly the Soviet Union, with 
their very sophisticated and advanced sports science systems had begun to influence British sport. This 
combination of factors caused the BOA to become more involved in the development of British sports 
science partly through the launch of their Mexican research project in 1965 which specifically focused on 
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the effects of altitude. This represents a pivotal movement in the history of British sports science because it 
was the first instance of a major British sporting organisation investing a large sum of money into a sporting 
research project. A total of £5,000 was allocated, which consisted of £2,500 from the government via the 
Sports Council and £2,500 from the BOA itself.73 As Vanessa Heggie notes, the relative novelty of the BOA 
engaging in such a research project may be lost on modern audiences but this was the birth of a modern, 
medicalised, ‘expert’ BOA.74  
An ‘ad-hoc’ Medical Advisory Committee was formed in March 1965 by the BASM at the request of the 
BOA and included representatives from both bodies. The intention of the committee was to discuss and 
resolve matters associated with altitude and the impending Mexico Games.75 It was concluded that in order 
to fully understand the impact of altitude on athletic performances they would need to carry out their own 
body of research, and within a matter of months a draft scheme had been developed by Dr Raymond Owen 
of the BOA.76 The object of the project was to ‘find out how British Competitors are likely to react to the 
conditions in Mexico City at the Olympic Games in 1968 and to support findings with such physiological 
tests as seem necessary.’77 It was initially agreed that that research would consist of three separate 
studies, one at sea-level in the UK, one at sea-level in Acapulco and one at altitude in Mexico City. 
However, on the advice of Dr Lewis Griffith Cresswell Evans Pugh, who had experience of working at 
altitude through his Everest studies, the Acapulco leg of the research was dropped.78 The other projects 
were quickly approved as there was a desire to get the study underway as soon as was feasibly possible 
because ‘any longer delay would only increase the many wild rumours that already exist’ surrounding the 
issues of altitude.79 It was agreed that Owen would be in charge of the overall team and act as a 
representative for the BOA while in Mexico, and Pugh would control the technical aspects of the research 
and carry out all the necessary testing.80 Two other members of the research team were Arthur Gold, 
honorary secretary of the BAAB, and John Le Masurier, AAA national coach, who were responsible for 
selecting six athletes of ‘international calibre’ to participate in the study.81 Dr Noel Bleasdale, who was 
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heavily involved with the medical aspects of the Amateur Swimming Association (ASA), and a 
representative on the Medical Advisory Committee, indicated the ASA’s desire to include two swimmers, 
one male and one female in the altitude programme. However, this request was denied on the grounds that 
‘the swimmers body was 15 centimetres under the water when competing and that no altitude tests were 
being carried out on women.’82 The project began in Britain on 4 October 1965 and the athletes were 
monitored at the Medical Research Council facilities. They were requested to combine weekly sessions of 
interval training, one mile time trials, and three mile races with their regular training schedule.83 After this 
was completed, the research team, along with the athletes, travelled to Mexico on the 6 November 1965.84  
It is clear from the BOA evidence that there was issue with how Pugh conducted himself during the 
research, and this consequently created tension between him and others on the team. The main area of 
concern appeared to be the premature releasing of research results and other information to the press. 
Although it was agreed that both Pugh and Owen were authorised to make press statements, it was hoped 
that information would remain confidential until the report was completed.85 During the first week of 
research in Mexico an article appeared in the Star stating that ‘our Mexico athletes lose 24%.’ BOA 
secretary, Sandy Duncan, clearly had issues with this leaking of information and immediately contacted 
Owen to advise him to ‘clamp down a bit’ because the report had also stated ‘categorically that Dr. Pugh 
says that the Olympic team will require four weeks acclimatisation.’86 Owen proved incapable of preventing 
further disclosures in the second week of the study when ‘Dr. Pugh said there had been an average 5.5 per 
cent decrease in performance of runners compared with those at sea level.’87 Disgruntled, Duncan wrote 
directly to Pugh stating,  
 
Your comments - if indeed they were made, and one cannot rely on newspaper reports - are 
however causing embarrassment over here. We agreed mutually and in Committee that the 
main results and conclusions of the project should not be released until all the results of the 
project had been analysed. No doubt you did not in fact make the comment as quoted, since 
this would be pre-judging the results to be obtained in the third and fourth weeks. Sufficient to 
say that the remark attributed to you is causing some consternation over here.88 
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By early December the research team had returned to Britain and begun to collate their findings. Using the 
data presented to them the BOA established, that ‘all endurance competitors in the 1968 British Olympic 
Team should arrive in Mexico City approximately 4 weeks before the opening ceremony...competitors in 
explosive events should arrive in Mexico City a minimum of 3 weeks beforehand.’89 This recommendation 
represented a minimum and ideally the athletes would be given a longer period of training at altitude. This 
placed the IOC in a somewhat difficult situation, because under the rules of Olympic competition set in 
1960, in order to be considered as an amateur, an athlete was not permitted more than four weeks in one 
year at a designated training camp.90 As both the President and Vice-president of the IOC, Avery Brundage 
and Lord Exeter respectively, had a strong allegiance to the principles of amateurism and its place within 
the Olympic Movement it was necessary for them to clarify the situation regarding altitude training. Not only 
regarding the length of time necessary for individuals to adjust to elevated altitude levels but also the length 
of time permitted under the amateur ruling. Prior to a decision being made, it would appear that the British 
study was considered one of the most comprehensive and significant as it was frequently referred to during 
discussions.91 After much uncertainty, in August 1966, the IOC formally declared that in order to achieve 
fairness amongst competitors ‘no athletes, other than those who usually live or train at such heights shall 
specifically do so at high altitude for more than 4 weeks in the last 4 months before the opening of the 
Games.’92  
This imposition of a four week limit on high-altitude training for those who did not ‘usually live or train’ 
in such conditions caused widespread criticism regarding the selection of the host site. In April 1966, a 
group of British athletes voiced their displeasure of this ‘disastrous mistake’ in a letter to The Times. Their 
objections appeared to stem from belief that not only would they be placed in danger by competing (after it 
had been repeatedly suggested that athletes could potentially die from competing in Mexico) but also that 
some athletes would have an unfair advantage. They argued that, ‘the fundamental principle of the Olympic 
movement that all participants should compete on equal terms will have been completely subverted.’93 The 
majority of performances would ‘fall far short of normal national, let alone Olympic standards’ and therefore, 
although they accepted that it was no longer possible to relocate the site of the Games, they hoped that the 
organisers would be willing to compromise. They suggested that the endurance events should be held at a 
low-altitude venue, thus eliminating the issues of altitude acclimatisation, but these requests were 
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ignored.94 Other criticisms from British amateur officials appeared to be associated with the conditions of 
amateurism, whereby it was suggested that the amount of training required to compete at altitude would 
require a large amount of extra subsidy and support, and this would ultimately invalidate the ruling principle 
of the Olympic Movement.95 It was established that British athletes would not be able to compete at altitude 
with the regular minimal amount of training, and it was clear there was uncertainty about increases in 
training volume. For amateur officials the issue was, ‘how amateur can the distance runner of the future be 
if he must find some way of living most of the year at altitude?’96 Considering their rigid definitions of 
amateurism had long since provided British officials with an excuse for poor British performances, it was 
obvious why there was such a strong defence of its principles.97 Roger Bannister, who had always criticised 
the choice of Mexico, appeared to offer Britain as an example of true amateurism when he stated, 
 
How can any amateur athlete view with enthusiasm being used as a “guinea-pig” in low 
pressure acclimatisation experiments? Little wonder that Russia and America have not so far 
complained, but smaller countries look to us for a defence of the amateur.98 
 
This suggestion that neither Russia nor American would have an issue with altitude, appeared to imply that 
Bannister believed they were not truly amateur. Although they may have been considered amateur by the 
IOC, from the perspective of the British officials, by conducting extensive research on their athletes and 
having a ‘win at all costs’ attitude, these countries were breaching the true meaning of sport.  
As a result of the Cold War, there was now wide-spread acceptance that British athletes would be 
beaten by the ‘shamateur’ nations of Russia and America, but by holding the Games at altitude, there was 
now an additional concern that Britain could also be beaten by third world countries. Repeating previous 
excuses made over the issue of British defeats by ‘lesser nations’, Bannister argued that British athletes 
would be beaten, not because they were athletically inferior but simply because the nations in question had 
the opportunity to capitalise on an environment that was conducive to altitude acclimatisation. Despite 
expressing, although in a somewhat condescending manner, that he was ‘really in favour of Kenya winning 
as many medals as she can’ he made his beliefs explicitly clear when he commented, that when ‘a novice 
won an Olympic title because of the chance of his birthplace…this is utterly wrong.’99 
Regardless of the protests over the selection of Mexico, it was becoming increasingly apparent that 
the IOC would not be willing to select a new site. As Chris Brasher highlighted, it was therefore ‘time to use 
our brains to overcome handicaps imposed on a lowland country which keeps most of if its sport in a 
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perpetual state of penury.’100 The BOA had begun its efforts to establish suitable training arrangements for 
British competitors following an offer from the French government to train at the high-altitude athletic centre 
in Font Romeu. Although it was accepted that British and other sea-level competitors would be 
disadvantaged in Mexico, the BOA believed ‘Britain could do outstandingly well...because we have the 
technology, the know-how.’101 According to the mounting scientific evidence, it was clear that training at 
altitude would ensure that the athlete would acclimatise quicker, and ultimately perform better, and 
therefore, the IOC were forced to revise its limit on altitude training. They announced, that although the 
‘general operation of special training camps is not in accordance with the spirit of amateur sport’, in light of 
the evidence, they were willing to allow a further two weeks training in the year of Olympic competition only, 
thereby allowing a total of six weeks training at altitude.102 While it might be assumed that British sporting 
organisations would wish to take advantage of this opportunity, the ongoing influence of the amateur ethos 
was reflected in attitudes taken to the offer of high altitude training in France, when ‘the response from the 
20 or so sports which face the biggest Olympic problem in their history was, ‘some interest.’103 The 
resources available to aid acclimatisation were also not being utilised correctly. Pugh, who was at the time 
one of the most educated people on the subject in Britain, had stated that he felt ‘powerless’ because not 
one NGB sought his advice on how to successfully train for Mexico.104  
However, one NGB was keenly aware of the potential issues of competing at altitude and had begun 
to formulate their own training plans some years earlier. In 1966, the ASA had reserved £6,000 to develop 
an ‘Olympic Training Squad’ which would consist of swimmers whose performance could equal a ‘sixth 
placed finalist in the 1964 Olympic Games.’ In order to deal with the issue of altitude acclimatisation the 
squad would travel to Switzerland at Christmas in 1967 for ten days. While they were at high-altitude it was 
agreed that they would not swim but instead participate in different endurance activities in order to acquire 
the full benefit of training at altitude. In addition to this, the team would also spend ten days at both Easter 
and Spring in 1968 training at the Font Romeu centre in the Pyrenees, as well as utilising the full four week 
IOC allowance by acclimatising in Mexico before the opening of the Games.105 As it was always the 
intention of the ASA ‘to secure the widest publicity’ for their altitude training and preparation plans, it was 
inevitable that they would be subjected to criticism.106 When Norman Sarsfield, team manager of the 
‘Olympic Training Squad’, was questioned about their methods and how they could apparently defy the IOC 
rulings, he responded 
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Do the IOC really think that the Russians are spending £3,500,000 on an altitude training 
centre in the Caucasus and then not be able to use it in Olympic year? Are the Australians 
going to abandon their training camp at 7,000 ft in the Snowy Mountains? Have the Americans 
built a centre at Lake Tahoe at 6,200 ft so that they can leave it idle? I am sure we will be told 
that whatever the others do we must not sin but I am going to recommend to the ASA 
committee…that we go right ahead with our plans because all other countries are going 
ahead.107 
 
Chris Brasher fully supported the ASA and suggested that ‘it is time we stopped being supposed gentlemen 
and become modern realists with a professional attitude.’ However, he did acknowledge that ‘such a whole 
hearted approach’ would never be taken in British athletics while the traditional amateur officials remained 
in charge.108  
The BOA’s response to Sarsfield was not quite as supportive, since, ‘what happens if the swimmers, 
for instance, ignore the rules? Do the BOA tell them they must not do it, and if they still insist on it will they 
then be forbidden to take part in the Games?’109 Contained herein was essentially the issue with the 
altitude debate and how it challenged the values of the Olympic Movement. Although it had long been 
established that ‘shamateurs’ frequently participated in the Olympics no action could be taken because the 
IOC had no proof. The altitude debate offered the IOC the opportunity to uncover evidence that athletes 
had exceeded the allotted time training at altitude, and according to IOC ruling, would no longer be 
amateur, but this was no guarantee the IOC would take action. The widespread feeling was that it was no 
longer a case of whether an athlete was truly amateur, but whether the IOC would actually enforce the 
amateur ruling. Essentially there could not be a solution to the altitude debate until ‘the thorny old problem 
of amateurs and professionals is finally cleared up.’110 As a result, the IOC’s choice of venue seemingly 
acted as a pivotal moment regarding amateur status in the Olympic Movement. It had been established that 
athletes who had been born, grown up and trained at high-altitude were predisposed to success in 
endurance events and that athletes born at sea-level could replicate such success by training or living at 
altitude.111 Perhaps one of the factors that ‘hastened the end of [the] ideals of amateurism’ within the 
Olympic Movement more than any other was an understanding that living and training at altitude could 
potentially improve performance in certain events. Consequently, athletes needed the freedom to live and 
train where it would be best to improve their own performance.112 From a British sports science 
perspective, as the research which had been commissioned by the BOA was so influential in the altitude 
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debate, it was clear that the large investment of both time and money in the research project had been fully 
justified and this appeared to provide the impetus required for researchers to continue their work.  
During the late 1960s, the increasing use of ergogenic aids and drugs in sport was beginning to 
present a problem both ethically and morally for sports administrators and coaches. At the time there was a 
particular focus on the use of anabolic steroids and their effect on both performance and the human body. 
The BOA stated that ‘in the doses alleged to be used by some athletes to give an improved performance, 
there is a grave risk of danger to health, such as sterility in the male...other affects may not be apparent 
immediately.’113 There was so much uncertainty surrounding its use that in an attempt to discover more 
information about the substance and develop methods of detection, in 1970, the Sports Council offered a 
three year grant to Professor Brooks and the St Thomas Hospital. By 1973, Brooks and his team had 
successfully developed a urine screening method to detect the use of anabolic steroids and the IOC soon 
adopted this as the official testing method for use during the Olympic Games. The Sports Council were so 
encouraged by the results of the study that they agreed to fund the research for a further two years, by 
which point Britain had emerged as a leading country in this field of research, and this success continued to 
provide momentum for further research in other areas.114  
The medical and scientific aspects of sport were becoming ever more present in British sport but 
because of the legacy of amateurism there was still an underlying uncertainty about its use among officials 
and coaches. However, the concerns over altitude at the 1968 Games appear to have encouraged a 
greater formalisation of British sports medicine because it had been established that athletes could suffer 
physiologically without some form medical support. Yet as well as offering direction, the altitude issue also 
raised further questions regarding the issues of amateurism. It could be considered somewhat ironic that 
the 1965 British research caused a dilution of the amateur ruling at the Olympic Games; a nation which had 
fought so hard to preserve amateurism by limiting the integration of professional coaching and specialised 
training techniques had now, through engaging with scientific research, raised questions about the place of 
amateurism at the Olympics. Although the sports sciences remained marginalised in British sport at this 
time, pockets of research had begun to emerge in the post-war period which indicates that some sports, 
particularly swimming, were willing to integrate them into their programmes. However, as the following 
chapter highlights, these advances were occurring because of a few influential coaches and individuals 
rather than being initiated or actively encouraged by the NGBs themselves. As Terry Denison notes, the 
administrators ‘didn’t obstruct it, but they weren’t proactive in saying this is what we should do... they relied 
on the chief coaches or whatever to say, this is what I need.’115 
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Chapter Nine: British Coaches and Sports Science in the Post-War Period 
As the ethos of amateurism still permeated throughout British sport during the early post-war period, sports 
science developed in a very disconnected manner, similar to that of sports medicine. There was no central 
scheme controlling its formation and the minimal progress that was being achieved, as with other aspects 
of British sport, was because of individual initiatives, predominately led by experienced and skilled 
coaches. This chapter explores these post-war developments and explains how increased government 
intervention and funding created a greater system of centralisation and coordination. The text demonstrates 
how the ways in which swimming and athletics utilised and incorporated science during the post-war period 
were a reflection of their differing positions on amateurism and specialisation, and then, by using the 
National Coaching Foundation (NCF) as an example, illustrates how greater funding and direction from the 
government stimulated the development of an efficient sports science support system. Finally, using 
interview material gathered from coaches, the chapter explores what factors, other than those related to 
amateurism, may have prevented or discouraged some coaches from utilising scientific methods. 
 
Science, Coaches and Swimming at Loughborough 
The Loughborough Swimming School was significantly more accommodating of scientific principles than its 
counterpart in athletics. Perhaps this was due to the greater acceptance of professionalisation in 
swimming, which is not to say professional coaches were accepted and valued within the Amateur 
Swimming Association (ASA), but as previously noted, professional coaches have always had a more 
significant presence in swimming compared to that of athletics.  
The second Loughborough Course in 1948, saw for the first time, the involvement of a medical officer. 
Dr R. H. Bolton, attended in an honorary capacity in order to provide lectures for the swimmers, compile 
their medical histories and monitor them throughout the course. It was also noted that ‘he was particularly 
interested in observing their reactions to training.’1 Max Madders, a lecturer at Birmingham University and 
an ‘old friend’ of Harry Koskie, was invited to administer ‘swimming gymnastics’ and ‘relaxation 
techniques.’2 It was believed that if swimmers were taught how to relax by means of land exercises, they 
would then successfully be able to transfer this to the water and improve their stroke technique.3 Madders, 
and his wife Jane both acted as physiotherapists for the swimmers and were responsible for administering 
‘sun ray and infra red.’4 Particularly in the 1950s, the widespread use of ultra-violet radiation had become 
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common practice. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War there had been a high prevalence of the 
bone deforming disease, rickets, and in an attempt to try and reduce incidence rates, milk was fortified with 
vitamin D. While this successfully eradicated rickets in both the United States and Europe, it gradually 
began to emerge that overfortification of milk had caused widespread vitamin D toxicity in Britain and it 
was, therefore, subsequently banned throughout Europe. As a result, because it had been discovered that 
exposure to ultra-violet radiation prevented and treated rickets there was a widespread uptake of such 
methods.5 The use of ultra-violet radiation at Loughborough became a regular aspect of the course and 
whilst this may have been primarily for medicinal purposes it does also need to be considered that there 
could have been additional benefits.6 By the 1930s, research by Soviet and German researchers had 
established that there were athletic benefits of using UV radiation: 
 
It is a well-known fact that physical performance can be increased through ultra-violet 
irradiation. In 1927, a heated argument arose after the decision by the German Swimmers’ 
Association to use the sunlamp, as an artificial aid, as it may constitute an athletic unfairness, 
doping, so to speak.7 
 
In reality, this kind of research was confined to the East at this time and the continued use of UV at 
Loughborough was purely because Madders, Koskie and Kinnear could see that it was having a positive 
impact on the swimmers.  
By 1949, Madders had taken responsibility for the course because Koskie felt he could no longer 
donate enough of his time to ensure its efficient running. Madders, coming from a physical education 
background, had a familiarity with strength exercises and he began to introduce swimmers to conditioning 
activities because he regarded ‘greater physical strength’ in British swimmers as essential if they were ‘to 
reach the top.’8 Strength exercises continued to feature prominently on the course and as the techniques 
began to evolve with improved research, so too did the methods used at Loughborough. Another point of 
interest of the 1949 course was the use of a ‘mechanical pacer’ which had been purchased by the ASA for 
£20. It was considered a ‘great help in controlling the speed of the swimmers’ and it enabled them to learn 
pace judgment.9 
                                                     
5 Michael F. Holick and Tai C. Chen, ‘Vitamin D Deficiency: A Worldwide Problem with Health Consequences’, The American 
Journal of Clinical Nutrition 87, no. 4 (2008): 1080. 
6 Dr Noel Bleasdale, Annual Report 1950-‘ASA Advanced Training Course: Report of Dr. H N. Bleasdale, Medical Officer’, 41, 
ASA Headquarters. 
7 G W. Parade and H. Otto, ‘Die Beeinflussung der Leistungsfahigkeit Durch Hohensonnenbestrahlung’ [The Effect of Sunlight 
on Performance] Zeitschrift für Klinische Medizin 137 (1940): 17-21, quoted in John J. Cannell et al., ‘Athletic Performance and 
Vitamin D’, Medicine and Science in Sports and Exercise 41, no. 5 (2009): 1104. 
8 Max Madders, Annual Report 1949- ‘Loughborough College Summer School ASA Advanced Training: Report of Max Madders, 
Tutor’, 29, ASA Headquarters. 
9 Amateur Swimming Association, Annual Report 1949-‘Loughborough College Summer School ASA Advanced Training’, 28-29, 
ASA Headquarters. 
 192 
Tegan Carpenter July 2012 
 
In 1950, £500 which had been raised from a number of sources, including contributions from the 
readers of the Swimming Times, was allocated to allow Madders to visit Japan in order to study their 
methods of teaching swimming and ‘the specialised training given to competitive swimmers.’10 One press 
report observed that he would be the ‘first English coach to be sent abroad on an ASA sponsored mission 
to help our champions’, and it was hoped that while he was there, he would have the opportunity to 
compare the ‘techniques and methods of training.’11 Unfortunately, the ASA Committee abandoned his visit 
suggesting that ‘the time is not now opportune for the visit to take place’ and all the subscriptions were 
returned to the respective donors.12 In 1951, Madders was authorised to visit Holland to observe the 
‘training methods of Jan Stender’, the successful Dutch Olympic coach who had developed world record 
performers for the 1948 Olympics, and this time, the ASA seeing the potential of the visit for British 
swimming, fully supported the trip.13 The ASA’s view appeared to be based on the record of Stender, 
whose swimmers held forty-one individual world records and had participated in ten world record relay 
teams.14 
Dr Noel Bleasdale had become the new resident medical officer in 1949 and he served the 
Loughborough swim school for many years. During this time, he carried out tests on the swimmers and the 
nature of his research and testing became ever more sophisticated as the school developed. For example, 
in 1949 he monitored vital capacity and pulse rates and noted that the resting pulse rates of the swimmers 
was exceptionally slow, leading him to believe that ‘this is very significant when one considers that a small 
body always tends to have a higher pulse rate and indicates that cardiac function is well above average.’15 
In 1950, he was administering glucose and vitamin B supplements throughout the fortnight in an attempt to 
establish their impact on performance.16 By 1960, he was conducting an array of tests on the swimmers 
including chest x-rays, electrocardiograms, oxygen diffusion of the lungs and ventilatory costs of interval 
training. This research had been conducted in association with the ‘London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine’, which suggested that British swimming was beginning to establish research relationships with 
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higher education institutes in order to ensure the further development of scientific principles in swimming.17 
Bleasdale’s focus on swimming nutrition became more explicit, and in 1964, it was reported that he had 
given the swimmers ‘Pro-Nutro’, a concentrated food he had located in South Africa that was predominately 
used to treat malnutrition. He concluded that it made ‘an excellent pre-game meal’ because it contained a 
good balance of ‘protein, carbohydrate, fat, minerals and vitamins.’18 These pioneering investigations by 
Bleasdale and his colleagues suggest that they were at the forefront of this type of research in the British 
athletic world as there is no evidence to suggest that athletics or any other sport of the time was carrying 
out this level of study on a regular basis. 19 
The Loughborough Swim School continued to develop, and by 1954 the course had entered what 
Koskie referred to as its third phase. The first phase (1947-8) had been to gather and train a suitable team 
for the 1948 Games; the second phase (1949-53) was to establish Loughborough by training as many 
coaches and swimmers in four years. The third phase (1954 onwards) involved what Koskie had ‘always 
had in mind’ and that was the long term preparation of future Olympic swimming teams.20 Koskie’s ‘third 
phase’ was facilitated by an increase in available pool time on the course after the Loughborough School 
was moved to Easter in 1953, which ensured that the baths would be available all day long rather than the 
previous four hours a day. A. D. Kinnear was appointed as assistant tutor and Matt Mann ran the course in 
1954.21 It had been agreed that it would benefit British swimming if ‘the services of a coach, with 
outstanding abilities from another country’, could be enlisted to run the course. Mann, who had previously 
assisted the ASA in 1951 when he visited with his Michigan State University team, had agreed to assist on 
the proviso that the ASA would pay his airfare, and similar to his previous visit he would request no 
payment for his services.22 Despite initial concerns from the organisers, primarily because Mann did not 
have an overall plan for the ten days, it was unanimously concluded, that owing to his personal attributes 
and his ability to keep the swimmers ‘on their toes’, the course had been a success, so much so that it was 
suggested that it had made British ‘swimming history.’ Although Mann took an informal approach, it was 
noted that the swimmers ‘worked harder than they had ever worked for anyone’ although this was probably 
attributable to his keen interest in hard work and his strong dislike for ‘slackness.’23 The 1954 course had 
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been the most successful to date. In exposing the swimmers to a coach of international calibre and 
including strength and relaxation exercises, as well as Bleasdale’s medical expertise, the Loughborough 
swim school had exceeded expectations. It was unique for its time in Britain and certainly acted as an 
exemplar for similar ventures elsewhere.24 
The 1956 course saw the culmination of Koskie’s ‘ten year plan’ and the introduction of new methods 
of training and coaching. Weight training was incorporated into the scheme and it was hoped that 
eventually it would ‘be found in every swimmer’s training schedule.’25 Al Murray, who Hamilton Smith 
referred to as a ‘great iconic figure of coaching and weight training in those days’, had been appointed (for 
an undisclosed sum) by the ASA to introduce the swimmers to land training methods.26 Kinnear’s 
admiration for science, and the potential of his coaching ability were beginning to emerge when it was 
noted that the introduction of the new weight training methods, and the utilisation of Murray, had been due 
to his drive to set up these new ventures.27 Symptomatic of the creative nature of coach thinking were the 
attempts by Madders and Kinnear on the 1956 course to analyse the movements of an eel. They were 
agreed that if they could establish the key principle behind efficient ‘undulatory movement’ in the water then 
they would be able to demonstrate this to the swimmers to ensure they were as ‘supple’ and ‘flexible’ as an 
eel.28  
All the expense outlaid for the increased training of swimmers and the introduction of scientific 
principles into British swimming were considered fully justified when Judy Grinham achieved the first British 
swimming gold medal for thirty-two years at the 1956 Melbourne Games.29 Notwithstanding the success of 
British swimmers at the Games, it was obvious however, the British training methods still trailed behind the 
advanced techniques being implemented in both Australia and America. Comments made by the honorary 
team manager, A. C. Price following the Games demonstrate, that despite all the advances, the amateur 
tradition remained ever present. Although he could appreciate the ‘sacrifices and the tremendous amount 
of hard work’ it had taken for the Australian and American swimmers to achieve the results they had, he 
doubted the desire of those involved in sport in Britain to adopt their systems because it was not ‘in accord 
with our British outlook.’30 
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From 1957, Kinnear was appointed as tutor at Loughborough and he began to develop further his 
theme of ‘land and water conditioning.’31 Al Murray was again in attendance and he increased the amount 
and type of weight training that the swimmers were exposed to by including the use of ‘pulley weight and 
spring work.’32 However, it was a year later that Kinnear really sought to improve the scientific methods 
being implemented at Loughborough by recruiting the services of John Atha, to organise a scheme of ‘tests 
and measurements.’33 Atha, who was a member of staff at Loughborough College of Technology 
introduced a battery of tests for the swimmers, including balance, pulse-rate, strength, power and agility.34 
Hamilton Smith experienced Atha’s ‘tests and measurements’ as a swimmer and recalled that he 
incorporated the use of dynamometers and had a keen interest in shoulder flexibility. Atha had also 
experimented with a flotation tank in order to establish the swimmer’s centre of gravity and buoyancy.35 Not 
only did Kinnear have the swimmers accumulating a daily average of 4,000 yards, and had drastically 
increased the volume of circuit and weight training, he also introduced the use of underwater filming and 
because of this, Smith referred to him as ‘way ahead of his time.’36 The swimmers were filmed on the first 
day of the course, and through the cooperation of Kodak Ltd, they were able to analyse the film with the 
swimmers and coaches only four days later, which was considered highly beneficial because it 
demonstrated to the swimmers the exact nature of their faults and allowed for in-depth discussion.37  
The increase in scientific provision at Loughborough could be accounted for by Kinnear’s keen interest 
in the area. Prompted by the Wolfenden Report, in his 1960 annual report Kinnear commented that the 
ASA should continue to make provisions to ‘widen their scope’ and carry out research into various aspects 
of swimming, since the ‘mechanical problems’ and ‘physiological problems in training’ for the competitive 
swimmer were areas that needed to be urgently addressed.38 Smith, who worked in close association with 
him during his time as National Technical Officer, suggested that Kinnear was aware that if new principles 
were to be incorporated into swimming then he had to bring in outside experts.39 Evidence clearly suggests 
that he did this on a regular basis, particularly when he appointed both Murray and Atha, although, 
internationally the individual who was the most influential with regards to science and swimming during this 
period was an American, Jim or “Doc” Counsilman. Counsilman was appointed head coach at Indiana 
University in 1958 and began to develop a new swimming programme and methods of training by 
combining swimming techniques with the physiological and psychological knowledge he had gained 
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through his doctorate, hence the name “Doc”. As coach at Indiana University he experienced 
unprecedented success, and as result he was selected as Olympic head coach for the 1964 and 1976 
Games, during which the swimmers achieved forty-eight medals of which seventeen were gold.40 
Counsilman had adopted training principles from track and field and re-structured them so they could be 
used successfully within swimming. Smith suggested that he was the first person to introduce the idea of 
repetition into swimming, and he made coaches begin to question the science behind swimming ‘as 
opposed to having preconceived notions of how the strokes might be swam.’41 Counsilman’s book, The 
Science of Swimming was published in 1968 and soon became established as the swimming ‘bible’.42 Even 
though it was produced over forty years ago, the principles which he applied to swimming are as relevant 
and applicable now as they were then. This demonstrates quite how advanced his coaching ability was and 
Kinnear was acutely aware of this. If British swimming was to progress successfully along scientific lines he 
needed to incorporate Counsilman’s principles on swimming, and so he arranged for “Doc” to visit from 
America. Smith recalled Counsilman’s visit to Britain and described how he had brought some of his 
swimmers over to run sessions. During one of the demonstrations at Crystal Palace, there were over 300 
people in attendance.43 
As the integration of scientific training methods became ever more widespread, it was obvious that the 
ASA Committee not only wished to exert some control over the use of these scientific methods but they 
also required a body that could answer their specific scientific queries, so they introduced a Scientific 
Advisory Committee.44 The committee comprised six members, including both Atha and Kinnear, and its 
aim was the ‘scientific investigation of all aspects of aquatic sport and of swimming training’, with a specific 
focus on the physiological implications of interval training, the somatotyping of swimmers and their 
relationship to style and technique in their chosen events.45 The committee expressed a desire to build 
good relationships with external bodies, including university departments, and this was the beginning of the 
environment which is commonplace today, whereby National Governing Bodies (NGB) have close 
affiliations with universities, particularly sports science departments. The ASA began working in conjunction 
with the physiologists at Middlesex Hospital and carried out physiological tests on eight selected Southern 
Counties swimmers. This testing was similar to that of Atha’s at Loughborough, but now that it had the 
benefit of extra financial backing from the ASA Committee the researchers were able to incorporate the use 
                                                     
40 Indiana University, ‘Doc Counsilman: Making Waves’, http://www.indiana.edu/~radiotv/wtiu/doc/docbio.html (accessed 
February 9, 2012). 
41 Smith, interview. 
42 James E. Counsilman, The Science of Swimming (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1968). 
43 Smith, interview. 
44 Keil and Wix, In the Swim, 82; Amateur Swimming Association, Annual Report 1959-Scientific Sub-Committee Minutes, July 
25, 1959, 47, ASA Headquarters. 
45 Amateur Swimming Association, Annual Report 1959-Committee Minutes, April 20, 1959, 17, ASA Headquarters; Amateur 
Swimming Association, Annual Report 1959-Scientific Sub-Committee Minutes, July 25, 1959, 47, ASA Headquarters. 
 197 
Tegan Carpenter July 2012 
of ‘more modern equipment.’46 In 1960, the committee had been authorised to undertake an ‘ambitious 
investigation’ into the techniques of swimming strokes and its associated resistance in the water using the 
tank and wind tunnel at Liverpool University. In Kinnear’s 1960 annual report he had expressed a desire to 
undertake such research and it can be assumed that he was the driving force behind such a venture.47  
One indication that the ASA were keen to monitor, and perhaps incorporate some Soviet methods of 
training and coaching surfaced in 1960 when they authorised Dr E. Kendall, honorary secretary of the 
Scientific Advisory Committee, to visit the Department of Medical Research at Lenin Stadium in Moscow. 
Kendall had already been in discussions with a Professor Litvinoff, who had informed him about the 
physiological dangers of intensive training and suitable ways to prevent overtraining and staleness.48 
However, perhaps the most progressive work of the Scientific Advisory Committee was attempting to 
establish a bridge between coaches and the use of sports science by running annual weekend courses for 
coaches, which focused on different aspects of science in swimming. The course, which created a ‘great 
deal of interest amongst coaches’, continued to develop, and it was noted that the twenty coaches in 
attendance in 1964, had all paid their own expenses to attend, which signifies that they were so intent on 
gaining a greater scientific base for their coaching that they were willing to participate in the course even at 
some personal cost.49  
 
The Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) and the Incorporation of Science 
In athletics, the relationship between science and coaching took a slightly different form from swimming, 
but despite this, it still relied on the drive and initiative of experienced coaches. The writing of 
uncomplicated instructional booklets and pamphlets for use by the honorary coaches was an expected duty 
of the AAA national coaches.50 However, as the scheme progressed, the manuscripts which had once been 
fairly basic and consisting of no more than a few pages, developed into informative in-depth publications 
which were set to have a far reaching influence. The most renowned, and arguably the most influential, in 
the series of these publications was Geoff Dyson’s The Mechanics of Athletics. The book was published in 
1962, translated into French, Italian, Spanish and Japanese and ran to eight editions. Considering Dyson 
had left school at ten and was self educated, to produce a book of such calibre was a great achievement.51 
He always had a keen interest in engineering and human mechanics, and often applied these principles 
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when working with his own athletes through various methods such as “his nibs” and film loops, but 
presenting this information in a book allowed the dissemination of his scientific principles to a much wider 
audience. The far reaching significance of Dyson’s book was noted in the 1980s when Tom Tellez, coach 
to Carl Lewis, referred to it as ‘his bible’ and suggested that any success he had achieved as a coach could 
be credited to Dyson, because ‘his book started me on the trail of discovering the real facts about track and 
field.’52 
John Disley suggested that Dyson ‘devoted his life to making coaching a science’ and that he was 
acutely aware of the benefits that the application of scientific principles could offer sport.53 The opening 
passage of his book quoted Leonardo Da Vinci in observing that ‘those who are enamoured of practice 
without science are like a pilot who goes into a ship without rudder or compass and never has any certainty 
of where he is going.’54 While he acknowledged the importance of a sound knowledge of science in sport, 
Dyson believed that it was the application of those principles that would ensure success. He commented 
that ‘because athletes learn their skills through kinaesthetic sensations’, descriptive rather than mechanical 
explanations are often more beneficial for the athletes as ‘too much analysis bears paralysis!’55 If the coach 
could successfully correct faults and inspire confidence using such a method then ‘herein lies the art, as 
opposed to the science, of coaching athletics.’56 Frank Dick later referred to a similar principle, whereby at 
the point of competition ‘athletes have to relate to simple things...focussing, being calm and allowing them 
to get the adrenaline mix that they need to go out there and deliver.’ Describing a scenario at the 1992 
Barcelona Olympics when he was Director of Athletics, Dick explained that ‘when one luckless sport 
psychologist thought it was a good idea to walk into the warm-up area...I made sure that the military 
escorted him off very quickly, I didn’t want anybody in there who could distract the athletes.’57 
Dyson’s book was predominately an analysis of the mechanics of sport, or ‘biomechanics’ as it is now 
more commonly known. However, he suggested (as he did frequently) that this comprised just one area 
among many and that if the athlete was to benefit fully, the application of other scientific principles were 
required, thereby subjecting the athlete to an integrated multi-science approach.58 He suggested that, 
 
In his study of athletic performance the modern coach stands at the crossroads of several 
sciences. Thus, to the physiologist, athletic performance is a phenomenon of cells, humours, 
tissues and nutrient fluids obeying organic laws. The psychologist sees the athlete as a 
consciousness and a personality, while to the physicist he suggests a machine unique in its 
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organisation, adaptiveness and complexity. To the imaginative coach the borders of these and 
other specialities are seen to overlap; the techniques of one science become meaningful and 
illuminating in others.59  
 
Dyson believed that it was the combined effort of many sciences working in successful conjunction with the 
coach and athlete that would ensure success in a specified event, and although his book is now forty years 
old, his principles remain relevant, especially when it is considered that the integration of the many sub-
disciplines of sports science is now common practice in the sporting world. 
Frank Dick introduced science not only into athletics but a multitude of sports when he produced 
Sports Training Principles in 1980.60 He presented an adapted overview of the principles of periodisation, a 
training method widely used in Eastern Europe, which allowed British coaches to apply this revolutionary 
method of planning into their training programmes. Dick suggests that he was constantly aware of the 
impact of science on training and sport, and although he felt he had enough scientific ‘know-how’ to do his 
job effectively, he was conscious that something was lacking. The ‘bridge between training and the art of 
delivery on the day seemed to me to be bound into the notion of preparation, was there something out there 
that was making that bridge?’ He monitored the research emerging from Poland that had a specific focus on 
speed and also noted what the Romanian and Finnish coaches were implementing with their athletes. It 
was at this point that he became aware of the training paradigm which was being utilised and developed by 
Soviet researchers, in particular Lev Pavlovich Matveyev, and the work being conducted on the same 
subject by Dietrich Harre in Leipzig in Germany.61 He 
 
looked at periodisation of athlete planning and that was it, I could see the whole...there was a 
connection between everything you did from the moment you started training until you finished 
your competitions in the summer and then that caused me to look a lot deeper at whole notion 
of adaptation because I began to understand the cycles very well and the notion that you 
adapted during recovery not during activity.62 
 
Prior to the emergence of periodisation in Britain there was only basic long term planning of training 
programmes, because scientific understanding was lacking and training was often just fitted in around other 
factors.63 Breaking an athlete’s training into meso (4-6 weeks) and micro (1 week) cycles allowed for 
optimal adaptation since altering the training programme every six weeks ‘shocked’ the body and prompted 
further adaptations. This had to be planned carefully because if changes were made prior to six weeks then 
the athlete would not get the full benefit from the programme.  
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By adapting the theories of periodisation for a Western audience Dick enabled British coaches and 
athletes to utilise the successful methods that Soviet Olympic teams had incorporated during the 1960s and 
1970s and his interpretation of periodisation has been considered pivotal moment in the history of training in 
Britain. 
 
Formalisation of Sports Science in Britain  
During the 1970s, scientific work with a specific focus on sport, particularly in the areas of experimental 
psychology and physiology, were beginning to emerge in universities and higher education institutes 
throughout Britain. However, because the Sports Council was unable to develop an efficient sports science 
system, coordination between these establishments was lacking, as was a successful process of 
dissemination. Consequently, as well as dealing with coaching issues, it was decided that one of the main 
responsibilities of the NCF would be to ensure the development and formalisation of sports science, but as 
with other aspects of British sport, progress was slowed by a lack of finance. It was not until 1989 that the 
Sports Science Support Programme (SSSP) and the Sports Science Education Programme (SSEP) were 
established within the NCF.64 
Sarah Rowell suggests that prior to the development of the SSSP, any sports science that was being 
employed ‘was there simply because the governing bodies had been enlightened enough to decide it 
wanted to use some of the money it got to do it.’ However, because the value of sports science had not yet 
been firmly established, in reality probably very few NGBs were using their funding for such a provision, 
particularly when some organisations were receiving so little financial support. When the SSSP emerged, 
the Sports Council agreed to ‘ring fence’ £900,000 a year to be used solely for sports science research and 
support, which then provided an opportunity for those NGBs which may have had the desire but not the 
available finance to incorporate sports science into their sport.65 The SSEP essentially controlled and 
administered this funding from the Sports Council but the SSSP, which Sarah Rowell had been appointed 
to oversee, dealt with the sports directly through the NGBs. Rowell was a pioneering figure in the 
development of British Sports Science. Les Burwitz, who was involved with the SSSP, not only through the 
British Association of Sport and Exercise Sciences (BASES) or British Association of Sport Science (BASS) 
as it was originally known, but also through Crewe and Alsager College, suggested that if Rowell had not 
worked as effectively as she did, ‘I don’t think sport science would have been accepted in the way it has 
been accepted in terms of performance sport.’66 
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Rowell’s role was to initially meet with the sports and discuss with them what sort of support they 
required. If they had clear notions of the practitioners they wanted to work with then these links would be 
made, but for others, it was a case of establishing a relationship between suitable practitioners and NGBs. 
A tender would be advertised, and researchers, which at the time meant individuals involved with BASES, 
would then respond. Then it would be Rowell’s responsibility to appoint suitable practitioners to work with a 
specific sport project, most of which were based within higher education institutes, although a small number 
were housed at Lilleshalle National Sports Centre.67 Once the practitioner was placed within the sport, the 
project would be monitored via frequent reports from both the researchers and the NGBs to ensure they 
were achieving what they had initially set out to achieve.68 If it was felt that what was being delivered was 
not suitable or was not making a difference then it would be Rowell’s decision to end the project. Because 
she was in this position of authority and essentially controlled what each sport would receive in terms of 
support, Burwitz suggests that ‘at the time there was a lot of complaints and animosity towards Sarah’ 
because some NGBs ‘thought she had a bias against them and some thought she had a bias in favour of 
them.’ But considering the circumstances, whereby she had to ‘almost write on behalf of the Governing 
Body what was required, assess applications that were made and try to make the right decisions...she did a 
reasonably good job in a difficult position.’69 
As with other aspects of British sport, where organisations remained suspicious of each other, Rowell 
believes that BASES ‘were probably a bit annoyed’ that the NCF had been given the authority and 
responsibility to control the SSSP, because they believed it came under their jurisdiction. However, as 
Burwitz highlights, when BASES was initially formed it was no more than ‘an academic club’ run by 
volunteers and it took time before it began to impact on the ‘sharp end of the delivery on performance 
sport.’70 Since the NCF was an organisation controlled by paid employees and was closely linked with the 
Sports Council, it was inevitable that they would be offered the responsibility to control the SSSP. When it 
became apparent that these programmes required some form of quality assurance, the NCF worked in 
conjunction with BASES to develop a system of accreditation. It became a requirement that the programme 
leader on each project had to have BASES accreditation and this helped ensure that there was an agreed 
level of standardisation across all the programmes, which in turn made them easier to monitor and 
control.71 
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When the SSSP initially emerged, it was well received by the majority of NGBs and ‘there was always 
more demand than there was funding available.’72 However, some sports were more willing than others to 
fully embrace the programme. Burwitz, who did work with both the athletics and netball programmes 
suggested that because the ‘traditions were so grounded’ it was ‘very hard to break down some of those 
traditional barriers and boundaries.’ In order for sport to progress performance-wise, some of the ‘old 
school things needed to go’, but because there was so much power in the ‘old brigade’ of the more 
traditional sports such as swimming and athletics, it was increasingly difficult to ensure the successful 
integration of scientific aspects. Sports such as cycling, who had much more control over their ‘own destiny’ 
in terms of how the sport developed, were much more willing to experiment and incorporate new methods. 
Burwitz explained that he was in discussions with British cycling in 1998 when Peter Keen was in charge, 
someone who Burwitz suggested, ‘had a vision that was ahead of its time.’ Keen wanted to establish an 
academy at the Alsager College Campus ‘where their young starlets could train.’ As British Cycling was 
based in Manchester it was sometimes taking them over an hour to get onto safe roads outside the centre 
of Manchester, but if they were to be based in Cheshire they would have the opportunity to access safe 
roads within minutes. ‘They wanted cheap accommodation; they wanted access to science, access to 
medical massage, physiotherapy...a pleasant, safe environment where they wouldn’t be hassled in any 
way.’ Although the plan was never executed, ‘nobody else was thinking along those lines at the time.’ They 
also realised that in order to progress to the next level performance wise they needed to be investing in the 
level below by working with the young individuals who they had found through their very basic talent 
identification programme.73  
Although the success rate ‘in terms of getting the right delivery matching what the governing body 
was actually looking for...was probably no more than 50-60 per cent’, the SSSP was generally deemed 
productive, particularly when the climate in which it was required to function is taken into consideration.74 
Rowell suggests that this programme was the start of true integration between the sports sciences and 
NGBs in British sport and many of the relationships between the practitioners and the sports were 
extremely positive, with some programmes lasting eight years or more.75 In addition, since projects were 
available to all sports because it was based on a ‘first come, first serve’ basis, some of the smaller sports 
such as Lacrosse, were able to secure funding to carry out programmes.76 While one of the major positives 
of the SSSP was its level of availability for all sports, unfortunately, as elite British sport has moved towards 
a more professional and controlled system in terms of funding and support, these opportunities, particularly 
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for minor sports, are no longer readily available. 
Rowell suggests that although the majority of sports involved did profit from the SSSP it did not 
always reach its full potential because of the climate in which it was required to function.77 This was 
apparently a result of the resistance expressed to the integration of science within some sports rather than 
the calibre of science that was actually being implemented. Burwitz believes that sports science in the UK 
at this time ‘was at least on par if not leading the way’ in terms of scientific research. However, because 
‘people needed to prove themselves, evidence needed to be gathered to show these things actually 
worked...it took quite a few years before sports science was accepted and used in practice by some of the 
Governing Bodies.’78 Partly because sports science had the potential to threaten some of the pillars of the 
amateur ethos, many of the more ‘traditional’ NGBs were initially suspicious of its use, which in some ways 
is understandable particularly as many of its benefits had yet to be proven. Yet this desire to remain true to 
amateurism in Britain, in contrast to attitudes in other countries, may have also delayed the development of 
sports science and had a subsequent impact on the performance of elite British athletes.79 
The SSSP ended on the 31 March 1998, almost ten years after its initial inception.80 Rowell believes 
that it was ultimately terminated because of the introduction of Lottery Funding. Prior to the onset of the 
Lottery, funding for each project would be placed under ‘tight financial controls’ and there were set rates 
and strict financial boundaries regarding how much would be offered to both practitioners and consultants 
working on the projects. However when Lottery Funding came in, ‘it was basically an open book’ because 
the NGBs now had access to other sources of financial support and had no need to go through the SSSP, 
which now lost control over the projects, and it was eventually run down because it was being superseded 
by Lottery programmes.81 Reviewing the SSSP, Rowell suggested that while a lot of the NGBs had used 
the programme, ‘some of them probably used it because it was there, rather than they really believed in it.’ 
However from that point onwards, British sports science in Britain continued to expand because people had 
had the initial opportunity to discover that science had the potential to make a difference. The combination 
of these factors has resulted in contemporary attitudes to performance sport whereby ‘you would be hard 
pushed...to find many coaches that believe that it is coaching alone that make an Olympic Champion in any 
sport.’82 
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Resistance to Sports Science 
 
There is no attempt to apply the sciences to sport, sport has been obliged to apply and adapt 
themselves to the sciences, that was a mistake. Science in my knowledge has never led sport 
and it shouldn't. In fact I believe in the very words of Sir Winston Churchill when he said, 
'scientists should be on tap not on top’.83 
 
Les Burwitz believes that it took about fifteen years from the initial introduction of science through the NCF 
SSSP for it to be widely accepted and even then he suggested that ‘it was more about one-off relationships 
actually beginning to work.’84 The following section explores, from the perspective of the coach in particular, 
some of the rationales offered for continuing resistance to the incorporation of science in British sport. The 
evidence examined in chapter four suggested that British loyalty to amateurism and an aversion to the 
integration of Soviet methods delayed the incorporation of sports science, and although this may account 
for the resistance among amateur officials, evidence collected from professional coaches suggests that the 
reluctance to the incorporation of sports science was far more complex.  
Frank Dick suggests that coaches initially resisted sports science because there was an assumption 
that the research and testing that sports scientists were conducting were purely a means to further their 
own research and would not be of any benefit to the athlete. He explained 
 
It’s not an experiment, this is not a scientific experiment, this is not a laboratory. If you’re 
gonna do tests...first of all, maybe very old fashioned, I want to know what the hell you are 
doing, I don’t want my athletes legs to look like Swiss cheese and I want to know why and I 
want to see the outcome because whatever you’re doing has got to be effective for what I’m 
doing, it has to be exclusively in the interest of the athlete. I don’t want some daft experiment 
going on that someone wants to get a degree on at the expense of the athlete, these are not 
guinea pigs.85 
 
Although this may not have been the intention of the all sport scientists, Alan Lynn described a similar 
scenario whereby when he was a swimmer, his coach had a strong connection with the local Physical 
Education College and they would often have researchers join them during training session to carry out 
various tests. Although the testing being conducted was fairly basic, the swimmers were being made to do 
‘some pretty extensive things’ in the lab. However, his coach had been ‘furious’ after the completion of the 
experiments because the researchers had failed to provide any scientific information to the coach. The 
swimmers had just been used as ‘subjects’ and received no real benefit from co-operating with sports 
science staff.86 It was situations like this, where academics were purely ‘using’ the swimmers to gain data 
which could then be used in publications, which potentially tainted how coaches viewed the integration of 
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sports science. In order for the relationship to be successful it needed to be mutually beneficial for both the 
scientists and the coach. This perceived exploitation of the swimmers influenced how the coaches 
perceived academics and discouraged coaches from allowing further testing in the future. 
There was also an assumption by some coaches, that allowing sports scientists to work with their 
athletes could impact on the athlete-coach relationship and this made them ‘suspicious’ of science. Bill 
Furniss explained that the ‘coaching triangle’, which consists of the coach, athlete and sports scientist, 
needs to be well managed in order for the relationship to be successful. He believes that the ‘sport scientist 
can easily interfere with the relationship between the coach and athlete and can easily undermine him.’ 
When sports science was initially introduced, Furniss suggests that it was not well managed and that it 
caused a lot of tension amongst the coaching contingent. The coaches viewed it as a threat because 
individuals were coming into the coaching environment and trying to tell the coaches what they were doing 
wrong and as a result, when sports science was first introduced to swimming, ‘it created as many problems 
as it solved.’87  
The overriding consensus from the coaches interviewed here, is that although the introduction of 
money undoubtedly improved British sporting performances, poor management meant that there was a 
tendency to pour money into projects just in a hope that would develop the sport.88 As Denison highlights, 
 
It’s not just about having money, you can throw loads of money at whatever you want, but 
you’ve got to use it well, you’ve got to know exactly what it is you want to do with it in order to 
make a difference.89 
 
In the early stages, because sports science was seen as key to improving British performance, large sums 
of money were funnelled towards its provision and this did result in a greater availability of science to 
sport. However, it was often so disorganised that coaches viewed it with suspicion. Almost immediately 
after the introduction of the Lottery funding, science and testing were being ‘forced’ into sports, and 
coaches, who had little time to consider how these methods would be incorporated into their training 
programmes, initially resented both the scientific methods and associated personnel.90 Frank Dick 
suggests that the way in which sports science provision developed in the West ultimately influenced the 
way in which it was perceived by coaches. Because the structures developed differently in the East, 
coaches were able to accommodate the sciences much more successfully. He commented,  
 
What was happening in Eastern Europe was that the coaches were asking questions so the 
scientists could get solutions to their problems. Whereas what was happening in the West was 
that the sciences were pushing answers to questions that had never been asked, to the 
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coaches who didn't want to hear the science. So there was a different kind of relationship 
between sports science and coaching from the very outset.91  
 
Some coaches suggest that when sports science staff first became involved ‘there was a bit of ivory 
towerism’, partly because they were on a higher salary than the coach, and partly because there was a 
perception that they were some way superior in terms of technical knowledge. They, therefore, made 
attempts to undermine the coaches.92 Sarah Rowell explains that because the sports scientist would ‘go in 
really arrogant and try and say what needs to be done’ they would alienate the coach who would perceive 
the situation as threatening, particularly if the researcher was younger. Subsequently, the coach would 
become very defensive and resist the researcher’s methods, because from their perspective, they had 
‘never been on the poolside at 5 o’clock in the morning’ and therefore, ‘what the hell does he know about’ 
successful coaching and training.’93 Alan Lynn believes, that ‘as long as the coach holds the whip in that 
relationship I think generally speaking the coach gets what they want.’94 If the sports scientists clashes with 
the coach, then as Sarah Rowell notes, ‘the coach will win’ and they will ensure the researcher is removed 
from the environment, possibly to the detriment of the sport since science would no longer be available to 
coach and athlete. Although the coach may have been ‘open to trying it’ as soon as the researcher tried to 
tell the coach they were ‘doing it wrong’ they would ‘fall back to their areas of safety’ and rely on the 
methods to which they had become accustomed.95 
Many of the coaches believed that there was initially opposition to sports science because the 
relationships between coach and sports scientists were poorly managed. Alan Lynn knew of relationships 
that had broken down, but the issue was more to do with personalities with coaches and they were not 
saying ‘I don’t want you because you’re a sport scientist, they would say I don't want you because you're 
lazy or I don't want you because I don't like the way you talk to the swimmers.’96 Sarah Rowell supports this 
by suggesting that then when a coach has a problem with a sports scientist it is rarely because they have 
an issue with their technical skills but because they have a problem with the individual themselves. She 
explained that the key to the problem is ‘in the working relationship between the two groups.’97 Lynn further 
suggests that, 
 
When it worked of course it was about the good relationships that had been built up between 
the sport scientist and the coaches. By and large it was just about relationships again, when 
people were accepted, particularly by key people within the sport, there wasn't too much 
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difficulty. As with anything, the more you build a relationship, the more you develop trust, the 
more you start to accept each other's point of view.98 
 
In some cases, it was suggested that it was not the coach who had resisted the incorporation of science 
but other individuals, in particular the amateur officials. Terry Denison described a situation when he was 
head coach for the Olympic swim team in 1992 and wanted to involve a sport psychologist. This was the 
first time that a psychologist had been officially involved with the British Olympic swimming team but it was 
suggested that he had worked well with both the coaches and athletes and the overall consensus was that 
it had been a benefit to the team. However, because the British swimming results at the 1992 Barcelona 
Games were not particularly successful, both the press and British officials branded the psychologist as a 
‘waste of time.’ Essentially he was used as a ‘scape-goat’ for the poor performance of the team and British 
officials refused to incorporate a psychologist for a number of years after that. As Denison highlights it was 
not ‘until we got into this modern period, post 2000 when we did start to bring it back in’, by which time ten 
or more years of potential development were lost.99 
 
Improved Integration of Sports Science 
Despite issues, as sports science and coaching have developed there is evidence to suggest that a better 
working relationship between the two bodies is being established and resistance to sports science is being 
reduced. Both coaches and sports scientists believe that there is now a greater level of integration.100 For 
Terry Denison ‘sport scientists are regarded as much more as part of the team now and it’s accepted that 
there will be sport scientists there.’ In addition, the ‘sport scientists have also had to move on a bit as well 
because they can now see that there is more to this coaching thing than maybe they thought there was.’101 
Sarah Rowell suggests that those sports scientists who have been successfully accepted by coaches and 
achieved a mutual respect and cooperation ‘spend time to get to know the coach, get to know the sport, get 
to know the event, ask stupid questions and in effect seem to be caring and non-threatening.102 When this 
is achieved, it creates a much a more beneficial training environment for the athlete.  
Although the relationship has improved and sports science is more widely accepted, Sarah Rowell 
suggests that ‘it’s still not there yet’ and that improving this relationship is the responsibility of both the 
coach and the sports scientist.103 However, because the purpose of sports science is to enhance athletic 
performance through the development of scientific knowledge, and the purpose of coaching is to improve 
performance through interventions in preparation, it could be suggested that the shared goals of these two 
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groups, which is that of performance enhancement, is perhaps not compatible with their other goals. For 
example, considering most of the research conducted by sports scientists is carried out within an academic 
institution they are therefore subjected to methods of assessment and monitoring such as the Research 
Excellence Framework (REF). Pressure is placed on researchers to achieve a positive outcome so it is not 
surprising that there is sometimes a tendency to ‘place papers above people.’104 On the other hand, the 
‘coach is only interested in one thing, and that is the equivalent of making the boat go faster.’105 If the 
sciences are to become more integrated and the relationship is to develop further and ensure a positive 
dynamic rapport between the two groups, scientists need to ground their research in genuine practical 
problems and coaches seeking sound science should select researchers who can speak to them in the 
language of sporting practice.106 Many of the interviews conducted here suggest that the key to ensuring 
this is successful lies with relationship management, because as Frank Dick highlights, ‘the one thing that 
prevents us moving forwards in sport is a general inability to manage relationships.’107 As the professions 
have a tendency to develop in ‘silos’, coaches do not develop their expertise in the presence of scientists, 
while individuals in academia are not generally prepared to work in an applied situation, so they do not 
have experience of solving problems together.108 Appointing someone whose main responsibly is purely to 
monitor and manage relationships, not only between coaches and sports scientists but also between these 
individuals and their administrators, could potentially ensure successful partnerships.109 Sarah Rowell also 
believes that if coaches and researchers were ‘grown together’ and exposed to semi-real examples, they 
would both be able to gain a better understanding of where the problems exists and how to work together 
more efficiently.110  
Sports science has become ever more integrated in British sport, particularly in the last thirty years, 
but the way in which it initially developed and progressed reflected the control that amateurism held over 
sport in Britain. Similar to their coaches, while administrators did not completely refuse to incorporate the 
techniques of sports science, there was an underlying uncertainty as to its principles and this was 
characterised by the resistance which administrators offered towards its amalgamation. As funding and 
government involvement increased it was inevitable that this would require a greater amount of 
specialisation from sports coaches and sporting bodies, but because British sport had not been founded on 
and encouraged to develop under such a premise, there was a lack of understanding regarding its 
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successful integration. Evidence would suggest that while amateurism was an important factor it was 
essentially the lack of understanding associated with its successful integration that caused a degree of 
resistance amongst some coaches. As Tom McNab has emphasised, even though amateurism was no 
longer considered the guiding principle by the late twentieth century, the amateur setup had left a void in 
British sport and the legacy of its ethos had left no one with any sort of professional managerial approach 
to sport. It was this lack of appreciation of how to integrate the specialised components of sport that 
ultimately created difficulties in Britain.111 
                                                     
111 McNab, interview. 
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Concluding Comments 
 
‘Administrators thought they were the most important people; that the sport couldn’t exist 
without them. Nothing could be further from the truth...coaches [are] the key, not 
administrators.’1 
 
This thesis has documented the development of coaching, sports science and elite sport throughout the 
course of the twentieth century in order to trace the trajectory of amateurism and establish what influence, if 
any, this ethos had on the formation and development of British coaching traditions. While amateurism has 
previously received a great deal of attention, much of it centred around its early conception and its public-
school influences, research which has had a specific focus on coaching traditions and its relationship with 
amateurism, particularly from a British perspective, has been almost entirely absent. Initially, the 
researcher’s primary focus was on the post-1945 era, but it soon became apparent that in order to 
understand how and why amateurism had become so influential in British coaching, it was necessary to 
appreciate its emergence and how this had shaped the future of its life-span. Coupled with this was an 
acknowledgement that, because amateurism was such a prominent factor, its moral authority would be 
present in all aspects of British sport. Consequently, in order to gain a true understanding of the evolution 
of both amateurism and coaching traditions it was established early on in the research that many different 
facets of British sport would need to be explored in order to produce a cohesive coaching narrative. 
While British coaching structures were fairly unorganised in the early part of the twentieth century it 
gradually emerged that a number of different centralised coaching schemes had been attempted. The 
investigation of these schemes, and the individuals involved, gave an early indication of how coaching 
provisions could be formulated even at a time when amateurism was considered a ruling principle, 
especially within sports like athletics and swimming. Adopting the Olympics as a forum in which to explore 
British sport ensured that not only could the success (or failure) of coaching developments be assessed but 
that British coaching and training techniques could also be examined in relation to developments in other 
nations. In order to achieve these objectives it was necessary to access previously unexplored primary 
material and this resulted in the utilisation of a number of different archives and organised oral history 
interviews with high-profile, experienced and accommodating individuals. An enlightening, and perhaps not 
entirely unexpected aspect of the research, emerged regarding the amateur notion itself, when, as the 
research progressed, it was constantly reinforced that amateur hegemony went much deeper than merely 
constraining the development of coaching and coaches. Amateurism was not just a definition or a set of 
rules that had to be adhered to by a true sporting amateur, whether playing or administrating, its ethos was 
                                                     
1 Peter Snell, ‘Coaches the Key, Not Administrators, New Zealand Herald, January 9, 2011. 
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embedded within the fabric of British sport. It was an explicit understanding of how one should approach 
sport. 
Throughout the twentieth century, professional coaching battled to find acceptance within British 
amateur sport. Even as the relationship between the two strengthened during the latter half of the century, 
it continued to be viewed with an underlying degree of uncertainty by some National Governing Bodies 
(NGB) and this was reflected in the way that administrators approached professional coaches. It was the 
amateur officials’ steadfast espousal of amateurism and their continued denigration of professionalism that 
undoubtedly influenced and fuelled the struggles that professional coaches experienced. It was not that 
administrators did not appreciate the value of coaching and training, because there are many instances 
throughout this work that demonstrate they actively sought to appoint amateur honorary coaches, it was 
just that the notion of professional coaches did not match their vision for sport.  
As demonstrated in the introduction of this thesis, this philosophy on professional coaching appears to 
have stemmed from the initial origins and foundations of amateurism which occurred during the late 
nineteenth century. As amateur hegemony increased, many sports began to reject professionalism in 
favour of volunteerism, which is particularly evident in university rowing where the preference was for 
amateur rather than professional coaches. However, there were some sports, such as cricket, which 
acknowledged that, if upper-class amateurs were to perform with elegance and style, they required support 
from skilled and knowledgeable professional coaches. Although there was a willingness to utilise 
professionals, this did not guarantee that they were regarded as being of equal status. Because many 
professional coaches and trainers during this period came from a working-class background, there was a 
desire to marginalise these individuals to ensure they never gained any level of authority within their sport. 
It was commonly believed that the working classes could not appreciate or understand how to work with 
upper-class individuals and this issue of class-status was the primary reason why many sports refused to 
incorporate professional coaches. Even sports which did permit some coaching sought to regulate the 
lower ranks by the imposition of a master-servant relationship. By accepting this subservient role, 
professional coaches and trainers lost a degree of dependence and this constrained their traditional 
working practices which had been founded on experience and experiment. The fact that both Dyson and 
Kinnear suffered similarly during their time as national coaches is perhaps testimony to the continuing 
power that NGBs wielded over the structure and nature of the coaching environment. Although the 
relationships which Dyson and Kinnear held with amateur administrators may not have mirrored those 
experienced by men in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, there was still this 
continuing tendency to want to impose control over professional coaches to ensure they did not gain 
control of the organisation. 
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This early position on coaching was perhaps further solidified with the formation of the British Olympic 
Association (BOA) in 1905. Chapter one outlined some of the founding members of the BOA and 
established that many of them had come from an upper-class, amateur sporting background. As a result, 
they were imbued with the associated philosophy regarding the place of professional coaching within 
amateur sport. Their beliefs regarding coaching were then reinforced following the clashes which occurred 
between Britain and America at the 1908 and 1912 Olympics, revolving partly around their differing 
perceptions on coaching. While, for the most part, commentators in the British press became increasingly 
defensive about defeats at the Olympic Games, poor performances did appear to provide an impetus for 
improving British standards. Proposals for training and coaching schemes began to appear after poor 
performances at the 1912 Olympics, but because amateurism remained a guiding philosophy, these 
initiatives developed in a very haphazard and uncoordinated manner. Although the intentions of these 
efforts, and the individuals who devised them were positive, they were unable to successfully become 
established because of the British sporting climate and the improvisation which characterised their 
development. Consequently, because these schemes were unable to gain momentum and rarely survived 
from one Games to the next, they were never able to substantially improve the performance of British 
athletes, resulting in an ongoing cycle whereby poor Olympic performances often stimulated the formation 
of new programmes.  
This continued refusal of administrators to willingly accept input from professional coaches and to 
encourage the developments of coaching schemes, coupled with a struggling British economy and a 
government which wished to remain distant from the sport domain, resulted in a gradual decline in sporting 
performances. Beginning shortly after the 1912 Games, and gaining momentum during the twentieth 
century, British performances reached their low point at the latter stages of the twentieth century. While 
some Games, such as 1956, saw an improvement in terms of numbers of medals achieved by British 
athletes, Britain generally struggled to compete against other nations that were employing advanced 
training and coaching techniques and these international comparisons did provide a platform for innovation. 
While the poor performances of British athletes rarely persuaded NGBs to initiate far-reaching change in 
terms of coaching provision, the emergence of Soviet athletes at the Games, explored in chapters six and 
seven, did encourage some sections of British sport, including the coaches themselves, to explore potential 
developments. Unlike the previous short-lived and impromptu schemes some of these newer initiatives 
would later become established aspects of sport in Britain. Perhaps this was possible because of a shifting 
climate within British sport but it also needs to be considered that these schemes may have prospered 
where others failed, partly because some centralised initiatives reduced the power of NGBs, which in turn 
created a degree of flexibility with regards to the amateur boundaries.  
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Although the NGBs never relinquished their control entirely, a reduction in their influence over 
coaches, for example, may have been conducive to allowing British sport to develop and progress in a 
different direction. However, it soon became apparent that even though post-war initiatives were gradually 
experiencing a longer life-span and encouraging greater utilisation of professional coaches than ever 
before, the amateur ethos remained ever present. The centralised coaching schemes, analysed in depth in 
chapters three and four, were always aligned to amateur principles and, rather than encouraging 
professional coaches to work with promising athletes, the primary objective of the national coaches was to 
produce a contingent of honorary amateur coaches. Despite imposing restrictions whereby coaches were, 
for the most part, not to work with athletes, there was still an assumption within the NGBs and the public 
that these national coaches would somehow raise the standard of British athletes at the Olympics. When 
this was not immediately forthcoming, it was perceived that it tainted professional coaching, because the 
limited outcomes of professional coaching did not appear to justify the money which had been spent on 
appointing them. It is clear, looking retrospectively, that British sporting failure did not occur because of a 
lack of available coaching expertise. Both Dyson and Kinnear were considered to be at the fore-front of the 
coaching world during their time in sport although, because amateur administrators continually resisted 
their integration and imposed a master-servant relationship over these men, they were never able to 
develop fully as coaches. Individuals such as Dyson and Kinnear could certainly have done much more to 
further British elite sport if they had been able to function without so many constraints, but because there 
was never any indication that this would be achieved, they became so become disillusioned that they left, 
either to take up other posts elsewhere or leave their sport altogether. Dyson and Kinnear were by no 
means isolated cases in British coaching. The continued resistance towards professional coaches 
undoubtedly resulted in a loss of expert coaching knowledge in Britain as elite men were forced to take up 
positions abroad.  
What has become particularly apparent throughout the research is the fluid nature of the amateur 
philosophy, particularly with regards to coaching and training techniques. Athletics, in particular, initially 
opposed the use of professional coaches within the sport but they gradually altered their amateur 
boundaries, without shifting too far from its principles, to allow them to function. For example, although 
amateur administrators were resistant to taking advice from foreign coaches, they accommodated them 
within the Loughborough Summer Schools, thereby demonstrating a rare degree of pragmatism, but only 
on the proviso that they were there on an honorary basis and were not given too much control. Fluidity of 
the amateur definition was not just confined to the issues of professional coaching because, as chapters 
eight and nine demonstrate, this also surfaced within other aspects of British sport. While administrators 
viewed sports science with a degree of indifference and were wary of encouraging its integration into British 
sport they were more accepting of certain aspects of medicine. There were even instances of 
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administrators actively seeking the inclusion of medical support but, as always, this needs to be kept in 
perspective because it was generally offered to medical men on an honorary basis. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
By utilising a wide number of primary and secondary sources, which included the collection of oral history 
interviews, this research had contributed to the existing narratives on British coaching in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century and offers a platform for future research which has an emphasis on coaching 
history. However, while they added richness of the data, some limitations of the interviews should be noted 
here. Because the very nature of research of this type ensures that it constantly evolves and adapts as it 
progresses, the direction of the questioning was directly related to the point at which the interviews were 
conducted. Although this could have been resolved by requesting a second interview at a later stage, this 
was never a practical solution because the majority of individuals selected for this research are still heavily 
involved in sport full time and it would have been unreasonable to expect them to agree to a further 
meeting. It should also be noted here, of course, that the personal memories and opinions of these 
individuals may not always have been entirely accurate and they were certainly coloured by their own 
experiences with sports administrators and NGBs. 
This research covered a number of different aspects of British sport in order to demonstrate the 
trajectory of amateurism and coaching traditions but, due to time constraints, the number of sports 
analysed was restricted. If this research were to be extended, the first stage would be to examine other 
Olympic sports to see how their coaching strategies co-existed with the amateur ethos. For over a century 
both swimming and athletics in Britain have retained strong connections to amateurism whereas other 
sports, such as cycling, developed differently and could offer an alternative perspective. Many of the 
interviewees in the research referred to British cycling and suggested that because of their willingness to 
utilise forward thinking administrators with a professional attitude, who have then, in turn, encouraged the 
use of professional coaches, they have been able to secure international success. Another sport which 
could offer an alternative avenue for research is boxing. As this is now the only remaining sport in the 
Olympics where athletes have to amateur, it would be intriguing to establish what impact and influence this 
ruling may have had in terms of the level of coaching encouraged and whether, because it is an amateur 
event, there is any stigma attached to professionalism and professional coaches. 
 
Amateur Legacy 
While conducting this research it was constantly reinforced, by both primary and secondary material, that a 
professionalised sporting system was never integrated as successfully into Britain as it was in other 
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countries and that the reasons for this appear to lie with its amateur foundations. If something has always 
functioned in a certain way, as British sport has, then not only is it difficult to instigate change, but if change 
does occur, any new situation may well be lacking in individuals who have an understanding of how to take 
reforms forward. Consequently, although British sport began to experience greater government 
involvement and increased funding levels during the 1960s, which inevitably prompted change, there was a 
lack of knowledge regarding how to use these initiatives successfully because British sport had never been 
previously administered in such a way. Tom McNab suggests that when athletics first received greater 
funding they did not appoint the correct people and, while he acknowledges that it was not an easy task, 
they in turn then ‘appointed people who weren’t very good, second rate people then appointed third rate 
people so the mediocrity was multiplied.’ In order to be successful, he suggests that, ‘you’ve got to appoint 
people as good as you are. Or better in some ways, if you’re going to achieve success.’ He notes that 
sports such as cycling have achieved this whereas athletics continue to struggle to find successful 
administrators, something which he believes may never be resolved.2 Because the sport had been run by 
amateurs for such a long period, when there was a shift towards greater specialisation, the people with a 
professional mind-set to ensure that the transition was successful were not available and this was the key 
to why some amateur principles remain in British sport.  
Evidence gained from other interviewees also appears to support this notion whereby the foundations 
of amateurism have been so influential that sporting organisations remain resistant towards relinquishing 
their own autonomy and co-operating with others. Sarah Rowell, who was heavily involved in the work of 
the National Coaching Foundation, suggests that Sport England, UK Sport and Sports Coach UK all have 
areas of overlap where they could effectively work together, but because they remain jealous of their 
autonomy these partnerships are not as effective as they could be.3 Similarly, Dave Collins notes that when 
the UK Sport Institutes were originally established they were seen as separate little companies that would 
almost compete against each other.4 Although sporting bodies like these have undeniably progressed and 
developed since the early twentieth century, these observations suggest that the residual effects of 
amateur heritage and volunteerism are still being felt in contemporary British sport.  
Previous research by Richard Holt and Tony Mason suggests that during the 1970s and 1980s when 
amateurism was devalued as the guiding principle in British sport, its ethos ceased to be influential, 
particularly at the elite end of British sport. They argue that that while amateurism may still operate within 
the lower ranks of sport, essentially, ‘the age of the amateur is over.’5 Although it is not disputed that the 
control of amateurism did indeed diminish, the overriding evidence presented here suggests that remnants 
                                                     
2 McNab, interview. 
3 Sarah Rowell, interview by author, August 31, 2011, Batley, West Yorkshire. 
4 Collins, interview. 
5 Holt and Mason, Sport in Britain, 36-7. 
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of its ethos can still be seen, even in elite sport in Britain and that this continues to impact on coaching and 
coaches. Bill Furniss suggests that while the elite sporting system now in place in Britain has marginalised 
amateur hegemony and encouraged people to become more selfish, which he believes is a prerequisite in 
order to be successful in sport, he still experiences examples of amateurism at the performance end of 
sport.6 Fellow swimming coach, Terry Denison, acknowledges that there is now a greater acceptance that if 
an athlete wants to be successful they have to put in the training and preparation and suggests that this 
has been encouraged by the emergence of a ‘new generation of officialdom’ who ‘accept that’s how it 
works and they’re most supportive of it.’7 Especially in swimming, people recognise that ‘if you’re not 
training 50,000 metres a week at 16 years of age, you are not going to compete internationally.’8 However, 
he notes that, even within this current results driven climate, there is still an uneasiness associated with 
professionalism and, while no one out rightly acknowledges this, it remains an underlying presence.  
Establishing why this diluted amateur ethos is still visible and able to survive in an environment which 
is target conscious and money orientated has been particularly challenging. As noted throughout this thesis 
and in this conclusion, the definitions of amateurism have always taken a degree of fluidity, whereby the 
application of its principles has been ever changing and moulding itself to accommodate the shifting climate 
of British sport. While this may have made British sport somewhat ambiguous at times, particularly with 
regards to what was acceptable in terms of coaching and science, this versatility also guaranteed 
amateurism a far reaching life span and ensured its continuing presence in elite British sport. Although Alan 
Lynn suggests that British performance sport is now ‘an island...that has drifted further and further from the 
mainland’, particularly as funding and professionalism have increased, he acknowledges that there is still 
an ‘amateur channel’ that connects the island to the mainland.9 It is this continuing transfer of both athletes 
and coaches from the mainland (the club and grassroots environment), where the amateur ethos remains 
particularly ingrained, to the island (elite sport), that ensures amateurism is a continuing influence at all 
level of British sport.  
Influenced by the success of other sporting nations, beginning in the late 1960s and gradually gaining 
momentum, the British government began to play a more significant and influential role in sport. As the 
amount of funding that elite sport could be expected to receive from the National Lottery and other sources 
gradually became dictated by medal targets and results there was increased demand for greater 
specialisation. Coupled with this increasing specialisation was an ongoing realisation that grassroots and 
elite level sport required very different types of support and attention, particularly regarding personnel and 
resources. Despite this increasing level of specialisation in elite sport and a growing detachment between 
                                                     
6 Furniss, interview. 
7 Denison, interview. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Lynn, interview. 
 217 
Tegan Carpenter July 2012 
the acknowledged separate entities of British sport, many people have and remain to be introduced into 
sport through grassroots opportunities. At this foundation level of sport, amateurism is particularly influential 
and, while the amateur ethos is probably not directly comparable to that seen some sixty years ago, the 
clubs are still voluntarily run by individuals who have a passion for the positive development of the sport. 
Consequently, the coaches and athletes who function within this setting become immersed in these values 
and they inexorably incorporate such principles into their own sporting philosophies. As some individuals, 
coaches and athletes alike, make the transition between the grassroots foundation level to the elite end of 
sport it is inevitable that this established mind-set will travel with them and, while it is accepted that some 
dilution may occur, their amateur beliefs and values of sport remain as a powerful underlying presence. As 
this research has repeatedly shown, amateurism is not just a definition or something that can be switched 
off; it is an innate tradition, an unconscious state of mind. The only way to prevent this transfer of attitudes 
would be to alter the foundation of British sport by shifting towards an American or Soviet style model. 
However, international sporting models, whether they be the Soviet system of sports science or an 
American system of professional coaching, are not directly compatible with British culture and, while some 
aspects of these systems may have been cherry picked in the past, they were chosen specifically because 
they could be moulded to successfully fit into the sporting culture in Britain. It also needs to be considered 
that, as many of the interviewees highlighted, committed individuals would always fight to retain the British 
sporting model because the positives, such as the availability of sport for everyone and a belief that anyone 
has the opportunity to achieve success, outweighed any potential negatives. If the benefits of this unique 
sporting system are to be retained then it has to be accepted that a diluted ethos of amateurism will 
continue to influence the elite end of sport. Consequently, how well Britain’s athletes will fare in future 
international sport will depend primarily on how well the system and associated personnel can work within 
the amateur mind-set. If British sport can attract professionally minded people, there may well be an 
opportunity at some point to disconnect its two branches, grassroots and elite sport, but this research 
suggests that, regardless of any future changes, preventing the ethos of amateurism from filtering into elite 
sport will be particularly challenging. 
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Appendix A: Short Biographies of Oral History Interviewees 
 
Professor Dave Collins: Holds a PhD in psychology and is also a chartered psychologist. Has worked in 
various roles associated with performance sport since 1985; was appointed Performance Director for UK 
Athletics from 2005-2008 and has attended eight Olympic Games with different sports.  
 
Frank Dick: In 1970 he was appointed as National Coach for Athletics in Scotland and in 1979 he became 
the Director of Coaching for UK Athletics, where he remained until 1994. In 1980 he published Sports 
Training Principles which offered the British audience an interpretation of the principles of periodisation.  
 
Tom McNab: Appointed as National Coach for Southern Counties AAA from 1963-77. In 1966 he 
developed several programmes including the Five Star Award and a junior national decathlon programme, 
which produced Daley Thompson. In 1978 he began working as the technical director for Chariots of Fire 
and the following year he trained the British bobsleigh team for the 1980 Lake Placid Games.  
 
Hamilton Smith: A successful swimmer in his youth he frequently attended the Loughborough Summer 
School where he experienced an array of coaching and scientific methods. He later transferred his skills to 
coaching and took up various posts until he was appointed as NTO for the ASA from 1963-67. He worked 
in close conjunction with Bert Kinnear and between them they were responsible for introducing many new 
and progressive methods into British swimming.  
 
Bill Furniss: Has been head coach at both Nottingham County swim squad and Nova Centurion swimming 
club since 1980 and he was appointed head coach for the 1996 British Olympic swim team. He is also the 
coach of 2008 double Olympic gold medallist, Rebecca Adlington. 
 
Terry Denison: Became head coach at the City of Leeds swimming club in 1972 where he went on to coach 
individuals such as Adrian Moorhouse (Olympic gold medallist), Andrew Astbury (Olympic bronze medallist) 
and James Hickman (World short course champion). Involved in the coaching staff at six different Olympic 
Games and was appointed chief coach in 1992. Named coach of the year on ten separate occasions by the 
British Swimming Coaches Association and in 1999 was awarded an MBE for his services to swimming. 
 
Alan Lynn: Has been involved in the preparation of a number of Olympic swimmers and was named coach 
of the year by the Scottish national agency for sport, Sportscotland, in 1999. Was appointed Technical 
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Director of Scottish Swimming in 2000 and remained in the post until 2002. He is now an academic 
member of staff at the University of Stirling School of Sport and he also coaches at the British Swimming 
Intensive Training Centre on campus. 
 
Professor Les Burwitz: Gained a PhD at the University of Illinois and was appointed at Manchester 
Metropolitan University (MMU) in 1974. Developed one of the first sports science departments in the 
country which then later became one of only three departments in the UK to achieve 6 star rating for world 
class research. In 1984 he was one of the founding members of The British Association of Sport and 
Exercise Sciences. He retired as professor of MMU sport and exercise science in 1997 but was awarded 
emeritus status. 
 
Dr Sarah Rowell: Successful long distance runner who participated in the 1984 Olympic Games Marathon. 
Gained a first class honours sports science degree and completed her PhD in 1989. Appointed as the 
manager of the National Coaching Foundation Sports Science Support Programme and then went on to 
become a Technical Advisor and helped establish the English Institute of Sport. 
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